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THE FOUR FACES OF TORT LAW:
LIABILITY FOR EMOTIONAL HARM
JOHN J. KIRCHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
A short time after matriculating, a new law student first encounters
the truism that the life of the law is not logic.' Soon thereafter, during
that person's first semester study of torts, he or she may inevitably come
to the conclusion that another sage observation is also true: "If the law
supposes that,... the law is a ass-a idiot.",
2
The coalescence of both observations in respect to one situation may
come, as it did with me, on discovering the manner in which the law of
torts deals with cases in which the victim of tortious conduct sustains
emotional harm as the result of that conduct. (Of course, my reaction
may have been due in large part to the fact that I married a psychologist
as well.) Nevertheless, the law deals with emotional harm in relation to
three distinct torts: Assault, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. In a fourth area of tort
law, Damages, another matter is often considered as well. And that
matter is referred to as "parasitic" emotional harm-the harm produced
as a byproduct of some physical injury. Uniformity is not the hallmark
of the law with respect to these four areas.
In this Article I will analyze how tort law deals with emotional
distress in each of the four areas. Inconsistencies in each area will be
noted-both as to the application of the law generally within a given
jurisdiction and also as to jurisdictional differences. Inconsistencies
among the four areas also will be noted. The Article will conclude with
my suggestions for reform.
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. The author extends his special
thanks and deep appreciation to his former colleague Professor Christine M. Wiseman,
Provost at Loyola University Chicago, for her valuable comments on an earlier draft of this
Article. He also expresses his appreciation to his research assistants, Alexis Boyd and Jessica
Swietlik of the Law School Class of 2006 for their significant contributions to this Article.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publ'ns 1991) (1881).
2. CHARLES DICKENS, THE ADVENTURES OF OLIVER TWIST 399 (Oxford Univ. Press
1981) (1838).
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II. ASSAULT
A. Early History
The first form of protection the common law afforded against
tortious infliction of emotional distress came through the action for
assault under the ancient writ of trespass. The seminal British case on
the subject involved a woman whose husband operated a tavern.3 A
would-be patron took offense to the fact that the establishment was
closed and swung his ax at the bar owner's wife when she advised him of
the closure. He missed his mark. The woman's luck, the assailant's
drunkenness, or both, saved her from any physical injury or death.
Nevertheless, the court held that "[t]here is harm done and a trespass
for which [the woman's husband] shall recover damages since he made
an assault upon the woman, as has been found, although he did no other
harm."4
Protected was the victim who suffered apprehension of impending,
wrongful, physical contact by the assailant. An assault has been
characterized as an unlawful threat to do bodily harm to another
individual coupled with the ability, when the threat was made, to carry
out that threat.5 The victim need not sustain any physical harm as a
prerequisite to recovery. Nor did the emotional harm sustained need to
be "severe." Prosser probably best described the tort: "Since assault, as
distinguished from battery, is essentially a mental rather than a physical
invasion, it follows that the damages recoverable for it are those for the
plaintiff's mental disturbance, including fright, humiliation and the like,
as well as any physical illness which may result from them."6
B. The Restatement
The Restatement of Torts sets forth the elements of the tort of
assault as follows:
An actor is subject to liability to another for assault if
3. I de S et ux v. W de S, Y.B. 22 Edw. III, f. 99, pl. 60 (1348).
4. Id. Of course, at that time women could not sue in their own right and the action was
brought by the husband as if the tortfeasor caused harm to the husband's chattel.
5. Dahlin v. Fraser, 288 N.W. 851, 852 (Minn. 1939).
6. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 43
(5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted).
[90:789
FOUR FACES OF TORT LAW
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive
contact with the person of the other or a third person, or
an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) the other is thereby put in such imminent
apprehension.'
Definition of the terms used by the Restatement is important. The
word "intent" is used throughout the Restatement to mean that the
actor desires the consequences of his or her act or believes those
consequences are substantially certain to follow.' Thus, to commit an
assault, in the Restatement's view, the actor must want to cause harmful
or offensive contact with a person or merely desire to put a person in
apprehension of such contact. Even if the actor has no such desire as to
the specific victim, intent may be found if the actor believes such a
consequence is substantially certain to follow the act. For example, one
who knows about firearms would understand that firing a shotgun at an
intended victim who is in a crowded room may also cause others in the
room to be hit by the shotgun projectiles. Thus, others standing near
the actor's target may be placed in apprehension that they too will be
struck, and the actor should be able to anticipate that they may be
apprehensive of contact when he points the weapon and announces his
intent.
The foregoing example also brings up the subject of transferred
intent. As noted above, the Restatement requires that the actor's intent
must be directed at the "person of the other or a third person."9 Assault
is one of five, old common law torts under the writ of trespass as to
which the doctrine of transferred intent applies.'" Thus, if the actor's
intentional conduct is directed at one person and another is thereby
affected, liability to the non-intended victim may also attach.
To recover for an assault, the one making the claim must establish
that he or she was placed in imminent apprehension of a harmful or
offensive contact as a result of the actor's conduct. While some might
equate "apprehension" with fear, such is not the case. What constitutes
apprehension? According to the Restatement:
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 21(1) (1965).
8. Id. § 8A.
9. Id. § 21(1).
10. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 9, at 38.
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In order that the other may be put in the apprehension
necessary to make the actor liable for an assault, the
other must believe that the act may result in imminent
contact unless prevented from so resulting by the other's
self-defensive action or by his flight or by the
intervention of some outside force."
Thus, an action for assault protects an individual's "interest in freedom
from apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact."12 An assault
could be found when the proverbial ninety-nine pound weakling comes
up to a NFL linebacker, makes a fist, threatens to punch the linebacker
in the jaw and attempts that feat. There would be an assault even
though the linebacker had absolutely no fear of being hit, let alone of
being hurt by the weakling. The Restatement's Reporter explains:
It is not necessary that the other believe that the act done
by the actor will be effective in inflicting the intended
contact upon him. It is enough that he believes that the
act is capable of immediately inflicting the contact upon
him unless something further occurs. Therefore, the
mere fact that he can easily prevent the threatened
contact by self-defensive measures which he feels amply
capable of taking does not prevent the actor's attempt to
inflict the contact upon him from being an actionable
assault. So too, he may have every reason to believe that
bystanders will interfere in time to prevent the blow
threatened by the actor from taking effect and his belief
may be justified by the event. Bystanders may intervene
and prevent the actor from striking him. None the less,
the actor's blow thus prevented from taking effect is an
actionable assault. The apprehension which is sufficient
to make the actor liable may have no relation to fear,
which at least implies a doubt as to whether the actor's
attempt is capable of certain frustration. 3
For there to be imminent apprehension, the would-be victim must be
aware of the threat at the time it is made. Thus, when Sleeping Beauty
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 24 (1965).
12. Id. § 21 cmt. f.
13. Id. § 24 cmt. b.
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was kissed by Prince Charming, a battery may have been committed."
However, there could not have been an assault because she was asleep
and could not observe him pucker or move in to complete the act. If she
was told of the amorous advance after the fact, no assault would occur
as the threat of his impending kiss had ceased.
Whether the alleged victim was apprehensive of contact is a question
of fact and, in some cases, the actual inability of the assailant to carry
out his or her desire may not be controlling. The perception of the
victim is the key. This is well illustrated by the case of Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Hill.5 That action involved a woman who was
confronted by an agent of Western Union when she came to its local
office to have a clock repaired.1 6 It was alleged that the agent, named
Sapp, who was located behind a counter in the office, attempted "to put
his hand on the person of plaintiff's wife coupled with a request that she
come behind the counter in defendant's office, and that, if she would
come and allow Sapp to love and pet her, he 'would fix her clock.' 1. 7
Western Union presented evidence to establish that it would have been
physically impossible for Sapp to have touched the woman unless she
was standing against the counter and he was standing on something to
elevate him and allow him to reach beyond the counter. The woman
testified she was within Sapp's reach as she stood on the other side of
the counter. The court stated that the facts presented an issue for the
jury to decide. It said that for there to be an assault:
[Tihere must be an intentional, unlawful, offer to touch
the person of another in a rude or angry manner under
such circumstances as to create in the mind of the party
alleging the assault a well-founded fear of an imminent
battery, coupled with the apparent present ability to
effectuate the attempt, if not prevented.
Thus, whether the victim reasonably believed the assailant could carry
out the threat becomes key. Adroit counsel for the plaintiff in Hill
would call the jury's attention to the fact that the woman did not have
14. See id. sections 13 and 18 for the definitions of battery. Of course, whether the
prince had the intent to cause harmful or offensive contact and whether such a contact
occurred are questions best left to the fairy tale experts.
15. 150 So. 709 (Ala. Ct. App. 1933).
16. Id. at 710.
17. Id.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
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the time, or a tape measure, to accurately determine if Sapp could
actually make contact with her. Her choice was retreat.
C. Assault and Battery
Clearly, there are many cases in which the term "assault and
battery" is properly descriptive of what happened to a tort victim if that
apprehension of contact was followed by actual contact. The assailant
may have intended to cause harmful or offensive contact with his or her
victim, the victim may have observed what was coming, and the contact
may then have occurred. In fact, a search of reported cases displays
many more "assault and battery" cases than those limited to "assault."19
In fact, if one compares the Restatement sections that define "battery"2 °
with the one that defines "assault,"'" it will be found that the provisions
are identical as to the actor's intent. They differ only as to the
consequences of the act for the victim-harmful or offensive contact as
to the first two and apprehension of contact as to the latter.2
According to the Restatement, "[w]ords do not make the actor liable
for assault unless together with other acts or circumstances they put the
other in reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive
contact with his person., 23 Simply stated, words alone do not constitute
assault; some overt act is required for an assault action. Thus, abusive
or insulting words and threats of future harm may constitute a cause of
action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, not assault.24 If
words are accompanied by a threat of physical violence, and conditions
indicate a present ability to carry out that threat, an assault may have
been committed.Y
D. Current Status
As an Appendix to this Article illustrates, an action for assault is
recognized in every jurisdiction in this country. 26 Thus, regardless of
whether the emotional distress sustained by the assault victim is minor
or severe, recovery may be sought because of the assailant's mental
19. See infra Appendix A.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965).
21. See id. § 21.
22. See id. §§ 13, 18, 21.
23. Id. § 31.
24. See discussion infra Part III.
25. Dahlin v. Fraser, 288 N.W. 851,852 (Minn. 1939).
26. See infra Appendix A.
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invasion of the victim's previous tranquility. If the defendant assaults
the plaintiff, the plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress
even if no other damages exist.27 Whether the victim chooses to pursue
the action or can find an attorney willing to assist in its prosecution is
another question. However, assault as an intentional tort opens the
door to punitive damages.2" That may make the game worth the candle.
III. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. Early History
The concept of intentional infliction of emotional distress may be
traced to the Nineteenth Century and the case of Wilkinson v.
Downton.2 As a practical joke, the defendant told the plaintiff that her
husband had been involved in an accident and had been taken to a
public house with both of his legs broken. The joker advised the
plaintiff that she was to take two pillows and come to her husband's aid
by cab and then bring him home. The court described the result:
The effect of the statement on the plaintiff was a violent
shock to her nervous system, producing vomiting and
other more serious and permanent physical
consequences at one time threatening her reason, and
entailing weeks of suffering and incapacity to her as well
as expense to her husband for medical attendance.
These consequences were not in any way the result of
previous ill-health or weakness of constitution; nor was
there any evidence of predisposition to nervous shock or
any other idiosyncrasy.
Although the court did not characterize the defendant's conduct as
the intentional infliction of emotional distress, it did find that the facts
justified recovery for the plaintiff:
27. David Crump, Evaluating Independent Torts Based Upon "Intentional" or
"Negligent" Infliction of Emotional Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in
the Bath Water?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 458 (1992).
28. See JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 5:8 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
29. (1897) 2 Q.B. 57.
30. Id. at 58.
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I think, however, that the verdict may be supported upon
another ground. The defendant has, as I assume for the
moment, wilfully [sic] done an act calculated to cause
physical harm to the plaintiff-that is to say, to infringe
her legal right to personal safety, and has in fact thereby
caused physical harm to her. That proposition without
more appears to me to state a good cause of action, there
being no justification alleged for the act. This wilful
injuria is in law malicious, although no malicious purpose
to cause the harm which was caused nor any motive of
spite is imputed to the defendant.31
In modern parlance, one could say that the plaintiff in Wilkinson
suffered emotional distress that physically manifested itself. We do not
know what the court would have done had there been only free-standing
emotional harm without physical consequences. Nevertheless, we have
a starting point.
In this country, long before intentional infliction of emotional
distress became a separate tort, courts did allow recovery for mental
distress associated with intentional mistreatment of dead bodies or
burial rights.32 For example, in Gray Brown-Service Mortuary, Inc. v.
Lloyd, the court observed that "[i]t has long been the law of Alabama
that mistreatment of burial places and human remains will support the
recovery of damages for mental suffering."33 Prosser notes that liability
for intentional infliction of emotional distress also was allowed early on
as to common carriers, telegraph companies, and innkeepers.34 While
various rationales may be ascribed to the courts for so holding, it is well
to remember that early in this nation's history these businesses were in
many cases "the only game in town" in that they were the equivalent of
a monopoly as to the services they provided to many communities. That
gave many people no choice as to with whom they would deal. They
simply could not take their business elsewhere. What should happen
when there is only one food store or pharmacy in town and an employee
there subjects a patron to gross insults? The concept, however, appears
31. Id. at 58-59.
32. See, e.g., Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus &
Mary, 186 N.E. 798, 800 (N.Y. 1933).
33. 729 So. 2d 280, 285 (Ala. 1999).
34. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 12, at 57-58; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 48 (1965) (subjecting common carriers or any "other public utility" to liability for
gross insults of its servants that reasonably offend patrons).
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not to have been extended beyond common carriers, telegraph
companies, and innkeepers.35
B. The First Restatement
The first Restatement of Torts stated the position that an individual
was not liable for the emotional distress or bodily injury that resulted
from conduct intended or likely to cause emotional disturbance.36 The
only exceptions were, as previously noted, for breach of the duty to
exercise civility that common carriers, innkeepers, and telegraph
companies were found to owe to their customers, 37 and recovery in cases
involving the mishandling of dead bodies.3" While the courts "purported
to find a property or quasi-property interest" in the bodies of decedents,
"in reality they were entertaining claims for emotional distress."
39
The initial development of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress transpired largely in law review articles and academic
circles rather than in the courts.' Two publications in particular spurred
the development of the law: Calvert Magruder's 1936 article Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts in the Harvard Law Review"
and William L. Prosser's 1939 article, Intentional Infliction of Mental
Suffering: A New Tort in the Michigan Law Review. 2
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress first appeared
in the Restatement of Torts in a 1948 supplement. It was there stated
that one who intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is
liable "(a) for such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting
from it. , ,"43 The California Supreme Court considered that development
four years later when it decided the landmark case of State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff." Siliznoff was sued by the association to
35. See, e.g., Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc., 100 So. 2d 396, 396-97 (Fla. 1958)
("If you want to know the price, you'll have to find out the best way you can *** you stink to
me." (quoting the defendant's employee)).
36. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934).
37. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 824 (2000).
38. Id. at 825.
39. Id.
40. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 42,42 (1982).
41. 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936).
42. 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939).
43. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948).
44. 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).
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collect on promissory notes that he had signed. 5 He counterclaimed,
alleging assault. In a situation sounding much like the storied
"protection racket," the evidence revealed that the notes were signed
only after representatives of the association threatened the defendant
with physical violence and the destruction of his property because he
was collecting trash in what was the "territory" of an association
member. ' After considering the evidence, the court concluded:
[T]hat a cause of action is established when it is shown
that one, in the absence of any privilege, intentionally
subjects another to the mental suffering incident to
serious threats to his physical well-being, whether or not
the threats are made under such circumstances as to
constitute a technical assault. 7
C. The Second Restatement
In 1965, the second Restatement refined that rule further.
According to its section 46, a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress exists when:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results
from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the
actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family
who is present at the time, whether or not such distress
results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if
such distress results in bodily harm.4
45. Id. at 284.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 284-85.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 46 (1965).
[90:789
FOUR FACES OF TORT LAW
As stated previously, the term "intent" is used throughout the
Restatement to mean "that the actor desires to cause consequences of
his act, or... believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it."49 It should be noted, however, that although the rule is
dubbed "Intentional Infliction," recovery also will be allowed when the
defendant's conduct is not intended to cause emotional distress, but the
defendant is merely reckless in doing so. The Restatement defines
recklessness as intentionally acting or intentionally failing to act when
one knows or should know not only that the conduct creates an
unreasonable risk of harm to another, "but also that such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent."50  Recklessness could be characterized as engaging in
conduct with conscious disregard of its consequences. The recklessness
aspect of the tort, of course, may pose a problem in a jurisdiction that
does not recognize recklessness as a separate tort theory, leaving for
determination only the intentional aspect of the rule.5 However, that
problem may be more imagined than real because, as previously noted,
intent is defined to include situations in which the actor does not desire
a certain result, but is substantially certain that a given result may occur.
Under the Restatement approach, the defendant not only must
intentionally or recklessly cause severe emotional distress, but the
conduct must be deemed "extreme and outrageous" as well. In the
Restatement's view, the court determines whether the defendant's
conduct can reasonably be viewed as so outrageous as to permit
recovery, and where reasonable minds might differ, the jury decides. 2
The Restatement notes that it is not enough that the defendant acted
with a tortious or criminal intent; that he intended to inflict emotional
distress; or that his conduct was characterized by malice: "Liability has
been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community. 5 3  The Restatement further states that the
recitation of the facts to an average member of the community should
lead the person to exclaim, "Outrageous!"54 Furthermore, "liability...
49. Id. § 8A.
50. Id. § 500.
51. See, e.g., Alsteen v. Gehl, 124 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Wis. 1963) (adopting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) except as to "recklessly" caused harm).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1965).
53. Id. § 46 cmt. d.
54. Id.
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does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities."55
Severe emotional distress can be found only when "the distress
inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to
endure it."'56 That concept must be explored with some caution, as
preying on a plaintiff's peculiar vulnerability or idiosyncratic problem
may subject one to liability even though the stalwart "reasonable
person" would easily endure the situation. 7 For example, assume a
person learns that a neighbor has pickle paranoia. As a practical joke,
jars of pickles are placed on the neighbor's porch. The word "pickle" is
purposely inserted into conversations with the neighbor and
photographs of pickles are sent to the neighbor through the mail or by
e-mail. The reader who has no such paranoia hopefully will find this
illustration humorous. However, should a person who holds the
neighbor's condition be told to "grin and bear it"? One would hope not.
An individual is never liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress when he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in
a permissible way, even if he knows that it is certain to cause emotional
distress. 8 An example of that situation might occur when an insurance
adjuster advises a widow that she will not receive her husband's life
insurance policy benefits, which she sorely needs, because the insurer
has a valid policy defense. 9 Of course, legislative action can change
common law principles. °
Except as noted below, the Restatement does not require proof of
any physical symptoms to recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.6 The defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct alone tends
to prove the severity of the distress. But when the defendant's conduct
is not so extreme, the plaintiff may need additional evidence that his or
her distress is severe. 62 The failure to produce sufficient evidence of
severe emotional distress can be fatal, even when the defendant's
55. Id.
56. Id. § 46 cmt. j.
57. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37, 38-39 (La. 1920) (discussing the eccentric
woman and the "pot of gold").
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965).
59. I purposely used the term "valid policy defense." I did not want to open the topic of
"insurance bad faith" which is beyond the scope of this Article.
60. See WiS. STATS. § 427.105(1) (2005-2006) (allowing recovery for any form of
emotional distress resulting from certain prohibited debts collection practices).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. k (1965).
62. DOBBS, supra note 37, at 833.
[90:789
FOUR FACES OF TORT LAW
conduct was, by all measures, utterly egregious. For example, in Harris
v. Jones, the plaintiff's supervisor at an automotive plant knew that the
plaintiff suffered from a speech impediment that made him stutter.63
The supervisor also knew of the plaintiff's sensitivity and insecurity
caused by that problem. Over a five month period the supervisor
frequently mimicked the plaintiff verbally and physically at the worksite.
In the action for intentional infliction, the only evidence the plaintiff
produced as to his psychological condition, other than his own
testimony, came from a physician seen by the plaintiff once during the
five-month ordeal. 64 The doctor had prescribed pills for the plaintiff's
nervousness, but the court was unimpressed:
Assuming that a causal relationship was shown between
Jones' wrongful conduct and Harris' emotional distress,
we find no evidence, legally sufficient for submission to
the jury, that the distress was "severe" within the
contemplation of the rule requiring establishment of that
element of the tort. The evidence that Jones'
reprehensible conduct humiliated Harris and caused him
emotional distress, which was manifested by an
aggravation of Harris' pre-existing nervous condition and
a worsening of his speech impediment, was vague and
weak at best. It was unaccompanied by any evidentiary
particulars other than that Harris, during the period of
Jones' harassment, saw his physician on one occasion for
his nerves, for which pills were prescribed-the same
treatment which Harris had been receiving from his
65physician for six years prior to Jones' mistreatment.
D. Transferred Intent
The Restatement has a form of "transferred intent," allowing
recovery for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress suffered
by one who is not the object of the defendant's extreme and outrageous
conduct. This may occur in one of two situations. In the first, if the
plaintiff is a member of the immediate family of the one at whom the
conduct is directed, the plaintiff's emotional distress is compensable if
intentionally or recklessly inflicted, regardless of whether physical harm
63. 380 A.2d 611, 612 (Md. 1977).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 617.
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results. However, the person claiming the distress must be present at
the time of the extreme and outrageous conduct.66 In the second
situation, plaintiffs who are not immediate family members of the victim
of the extreme and outrageous conduct have an additional requirement.
Like immediate family members, they must show that the actor
intentionally or recklessly caused them severe emotional distress while
they were present at the time of the conduct. 67 However, they must also
establish that the distress resulted in bodily harm to them.
8
To be distinguished is the type of case that initially appears to be one
of transferred intent but really involves both extreme and outrageous
conduct and intentional infliction directed at the plaintiff. Knierim v.
IZZO, 6 9 is a good example. The defendant there threatened the plaintiff
that he would murder her husband and then carried out the threat. The
court held that a complaint alleging those facts stated a cause of action
for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. ' The husband
was nothing more than a pawn used by the defendant to affect the
plaintiff's mental well-being. Interestingly, recovery was allowed even
though the plaintiff was not present at the murder scene and learned
afterward of her husband's death.71
E. Outrageous Conduct
Critics have argued that determining what constitutes "outrageous"
conduct and "severe" distress is primarily a subjective question that has
led the tort to be applied inconsistently among jurisdictions. 2 Because
section 46 fails to offer a concise definition of outrageous conduct,
courts have had difficulty formulating clear standards as to what conduct
is prohibited. Despite the numerous elements provided in section 46,
critics have argued that in practice, the tort is reduced to a single
element-the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct.73  In turn,
courts may assume that severe emotional distress resulted anytime there
is evidence of outrageous conduct. 74 And, when outrageousness cannot
be established, the action cannot be maintained even if emotional
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2)(a) (1965).
67. See id. § 46(2)(b).
68. See id.
69. 174 N.E.2d 157 (I11. 1961).
70. Id. at 165.
71. Id.
72. Givelber, supra note 40, at 51-53.
73. Id. at 46.
74. Id.
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distress was intended and created.7" Scholars note that danger lies in the
arbitrary enforcement of this tort. In particular, "factfinders may
confuse outrageous with unpopular so that fear of tort judgments might
chill constitutionally protected (or at least socially important)
behavior.,
76
In general, four categories of conduct support a finding of outrage
when the defendant intentionally inflicts emotional harm: (1) abusing a
position of power; (2) emotionally harming a plaintiff known to be
especially vulnerable; (3) repeating or continuing conduct that may be
tolerable when committed once but becomes intolerable when
committed numerous times; and (4) committing or threatening violence
or serious economic harm to a person or property in which the plaintiff
is known to have a special interest.
77
1. Position of Power
As to this type of situation, the Restatement uses the following
example:
A, the principal of a high school, summons B, a
schoolgirl, to his office, and abruptly accuses her of
immoral conduct with various men. A bullies B for an
hour, and threatens her with prison and with public
disgrace for herself and her parents unless she confesses.
B suffers severe emotional distress, and resulting illness.
A is subject to liability to B for both.8
The illustration comes directly from the case of Johnson v. Sampson.79
Since this case was decided well before the 1948 amendment to the first
Restatement, the Minnesota court had difficulty in categorizing the
theory to be applied. The plaintiff had claimed it to be an "assault."
However, relying on Wilkinson,8° the court eventually observed:
On the whole we see no good reason why a wrongful
invasion of a legal right, causing an injury to the body or
mind which reputable physicians recognize and can trace
75. Id.
76. Id. at 52.
77. DOBBS, supra note 37, at 827.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e, illus. 6 (1965).
79. 208 N.W. 814 (Minn. 1926).
80. Wilkinson v. Downton, (1897) 2 Q.B. 57; see supra Part III.A.
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with reasonable certainty to the act as its true cause,
should not give rise to a right of action against the
wrongdoer, although there was no visible hurt at the time
of the act complained of. Of course, there is always a
possibility of trumped-up claims if there may be a
recovery when no evidence of bodily injury can be
discovered immediately. However, the matter is in the
control of the trial courts, and verdicts for plaintiffs for
any substantial amounts, when based chiefly on proof of
subjective symptoms, will not usually be allowed to
stand."
2. Especially Vulnerable Plaintiff
Again, the Restatement offers an illustration to explain this type of
situation:
A, an eccentric and mentally deficient old maid, has the
delusion that a pot of gold is buried in her back yard, and
is always digging for it. Knowing this, B buries a pot with
other contents in her yard, and when A digs it up causes
her to be escorted in triumph to the city hall, where the
pot is opened under circumstances of public humiliation
to A. A suffers severe emotional disturbance and
resulting illness. B is subject to liability to A for both."
That example is taken from the Louisiana case of Nickerson v. Hodges.83
The facts are somewhat different from the Restatement's example in
that there were multiple defendants and the digging occurred on
another's property. 8'  The woman affected died before the action
reached the court. Nevertheless the court, again many years before the
Restatement's 1948 amendment, found the conduct actionable:
The conspirators, no doubt, merely intended what they
did as a practical joke, and had no willful intention of
doing the lady any injury. However, the results were
quite serious indeed, and the mental suffering and
81. Johnson, 208 N.W. at 816.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f, illus. 9 (1965).
83. 84 So. 37 (La. 1920).
84. Id. at 37.
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humiliation must have been quite unbearable, to say
nothing of the disappointment and conviction, which she
carried to her grave some two years later, that she had
been robbed."
The court found the conduct actionable and awarded damages to the
survivors.86
3. Conduct Committed Numerous Times
This type of situation is best illustrated by the case of Kanzler v.
Renner.8 7 Over a period of six weeks, the plaintiff, who was a police
dispatcher, had various run-ins with the defendant, a police officer.
These situations included those where the defendant, driving a police
car at a high rate of speed, caught up with the plaintiff's car and then
followed her home, parking in front of her house; parking down the
street from the plaintiff's home at 4 a.m.; putting his arm around the
plaintiff while she was talking with another officer; and making a sexual
advance toward the plaintiff in a utility closet at the police stationY The
court held that material issues of fact existed, precluding summary
judgment as to the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional
distress.8 9
4. Threatening Violence or Serious Economic Harm
Again, this type of situation finds its roots in litigation and is
illustrated by the case of La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc.90 In
that matter, the plaintiff was engaged in preparing breakfast when a
trash collector came for the refuse. The plaintiff had tethered her
miniature dachshund outside. She saw the collector empty her trash can
and then hurl it toward her dog. 9 Hearing the dog yelp, the plaintiff
went outside and found the dog injured. The trash collector laughed
and left. The dog died from the blow. When the plaintiff consulted her
physician that afternoon, she was upset to the point of hysteria and
could not recount her experience coherently.' The court held that the
85. Id. at 39.
86. Id.
87. 937 P.2d 1337 (Wyo. 1997).
88. Id. at 1339-40.
89. Id. at 1344.
90. 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
91. Id. at 268.
92. Id.
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element of the owner's mental suffering resulting from the malicious
destruction of her dog was properly submitted to the jury for their
consideration in assessing damages. 9
F. Current State of the Law
All states have recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress
as an independent tort and have adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 46 in some form.94 But again, it should be noted that recovery is
only allowed when the defendant's conduct can be characterized as
"extreme and outrageous," and then only if the plaintiff sustains
"severe" emotional distress.
IV. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. Early History
As in the areas previously discussed, the early history of negligent
infliction of emotional distress may be traced to the nineteenth century.
Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas concerned a married
couple and the wife's brother who were in a buggy attempting to cross a
railway line. 9 The gates at the crossing were closed. The gate-keeper
came and opened the gates nearest to the buggy and then went across
the line to the gates on the opposite side. The trio followed him in the
buggy and got partly over the far track when a train was seen
approaching at a rapid speed. In the ensuing confusion the buggy barely
made it across the track ahead of the train. The train passed close to the
back of the buggy, but did not make contact. As the train approached,
the female passenger in the buggy fainted. "[M]edical evidence shewed
[sic] that she received a severe nervous shock from [her] fright.", An
illness, from which she subsequently suffered, was claimed as a
consequence of her fright, but no physical damage was found to her.'
In assessing whether that passenger, Mary Coultas, could recover
from the railway due to the negligence of its employee, the court
observed:
93. Id. at 269.
94. See infra Appendix B for a state-by-state analysis.
95. (1888) 13 App. Cas. 222, 224 (H.L. & P.C.) (appeal taken from Vict.).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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According to the evidence of the female plaintiff her
fright was caused by seeing the train approaching, and
thinking they were going to be killed. Damages arising
from mere sudden terror unaccompanied by any actual
physical injury, but occasioning a nervous or mental
shock, cannot under such circumstances, their Lordships
think, be considered a consequence which, in the
ordinary course of things, would flow from the
negligence of the gate-keeper. If it were held that they
can, it appears to their Lordships that it would be
extending the liability for negligence much beyond what
that liability has hitherto been held to be. Not only in
such a case as the present, but in every case where an
accident caused by negligence had given a person a
serious nervous shock, there might be a claim for
damages on account of mental injury. The difficulty
which now often exists in case of alleged physical injuries
of determining whether they were caused by the
negligent act would be greatly increased, and a wide field
opened for imaginary claims.
Whether the court's approach to the facts actually came from a "stiff
upper lip" mentality that sometimes marked British society, or the fact
that the victim was a woman, is impossible to determine at this late date.
The expressed concern, quite obviously, was with whether there could
be any guarantee of the genuineness of the plaintiff's claim. Little was
known about mental illness at the time. Sigmund Freud was in his early
thirties when the case was decided. 99 It was not all that long before this
decision that Bedlam Hospital in London charged the curious a penny
to observe the mentally ill patients who were kept there.'00
Interestingly, a little less than one hundred years later the Delaware
Supreme Court allowed recovery under facts almost identical to
Coultas.10
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has only
emerged as a cognizable, independent cause of action within
98. Id. at 225-26.
99. See 1 ERNEST JONES, THE LIFE AND WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD 1 (1953) (stating
May 6, 1856, as the date of Freud's birth).
100. See JOE SHARKEY, BEDLAM: GREED, PROFITEERING, AND FRAUD IN A MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM GONE CRAZY 12 (1994) (stating that at the "notorious English asylum
Bedlam" the "18th century spectators were charged an admission fee to see the lunatics").
101. See Robb v. Pa. R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 714-15 (Del. 1965).
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approximately the last half century. Prior to that time courts avoided
awarding damages for negligently inflicted emotional injuries because
the early common law was "wary of opening the floodgates to
fraudulent, frivolous, and perhaps even marginal lawsuits."1" Harms of
an emotional nature, as noted earlier, were viewed as subjective and
difficult to categorize or to assign damages. Concerns stemmed from a
lack of precedent, a fear of frivolous litigation, and from a difficulty in
measuring emotional harm physically and financially.' 3 Emotional
harm was viewed as subjective and difficult-if not impossible-to
assign damages. Moreover, "[c]ertain types of interest, because of
various difficulties they present, have been afforded little protection at
the hands of the law against negligent invasions."'
Although the shift has been towards liberalizing the threshold for
bringing causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
Prosser and Keeton cites "three principal concerns ... that continue to
foster judicial caution and doctrinal limitations. 1 5 These are:
(1) the problem of permitting legal redress for harm that
is often temporary and relatively trivial; (2) the danger
that claims of mental harm will be falsified or imagined;
and (3) the perceived unfairness of imposing heavy and
disproportionate financial burdens upon a defendant,
whose conduct was only negligent, for consequences
which appear remote from the "wrongful" act.1°6
B. The Restatements
The Restatement (Second) of Torts deals with negligent infliction of
emotional distress in two sections. The first provides:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress
to another, he is subject to liability to the other for
resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an
unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise
102. Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 808 (2004).
103. Id.
104. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 54, at 359 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 360.
106. Id. at 360-61.
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than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third
person, and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized that
the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or
bodily harm."
The second states:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an
unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or
emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such
emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or
other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for
such emotional disturbance.'8
Reading these two sections together it may be said that the Restatement
stands for the proposition that there can be no recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress absent some physical manifestation of
harm caused by that distress. More will be said about that concept.
It should be noted that the "Proposed Final Draft" for the
Restatement (Third) of Torts states that "[1]iability for emotional
disturbance (that is not derivative of personal injury) or economic loss
(that is not property damage or derivative of personal injury) is
governed by the principles of the Restatement (Second) of Torts until
additional portions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts addressing this
matter are published."' 9
C. Current State of the Law
Only two states continue to prohibit recovery for negligent infliction
of emotional distress.' Others vary in the tests that they apply when
assessing a claim for negligent infliction. At the outset it should be
observed that negligent infliction cases fall into two general categories.
The first involves persons who barely escape physical harm and suffer
emotional distress as a consequence. An example would be a pedestrian
who, while waiting for a traffic light to change, is nearly run over by a
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(1) (1965).
108. Id. § 436A.
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 6 cmt. f
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
110. See Mechs. Lumber Co. v. Smith, 752 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Ark. 1988); Jaynes v.
Strong-Thorne Mortuary, Inc., 954 P.2d 45, 50 (N.M. 1997).
2007]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
drunken driver whose car jumps the curb and comes within inches of
striking the pedestrian. The second negligent infliction category
involves cases in which the person suffering emotional distress is not in
harm's way, but merely a bystander to a harm that befalls another. An
example would be parents who, while looking out of a window in their
home, observe their child being struck by an errant motorist. Each
category will be considered separately. We are not dealing with
emotional distress that results from negligently inflicted bodily harm-
so-called parasitic emotional distress. That subject will be discussed
later in this Article."'
The rules adopted by courts for negligent infliction of emotional
distress are cumulative to those they generally employ for other
negligence cases. We are dealing with what Prosser and Keeton
describes as "limited duty" rules.112 As explained previously, at the root
of these rules is judicial concern over the genuineness of claims for
negligently caused emotional distress.
1. Non-Bystanders
Several rules have evolved over time regarding what limits, if any,
are to be placed upon the right of recovery of one, other than a
bystander, who sustained emotional distress resulting from another's
negligent conduct.
i. Impact Requirement
One of the earliest impediments to recovering for negligent infliction
of emotional distress required not only proof of the standard quartet of
duty, breach, cause, and damages, but also required that the plaintiff
sustain some contemporaneous physical injury or physical impact to
their person as a result of the negligent act. In other words, no impact,
no recovery. A few states continue to follow this approach."'
Florida consistently has followed the impact rule. In Reynolds v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the court observed:
The impact rule is the long-standing rule that a plaintiff
must suffer a physical impact before recovering for
emotional distress caused by the negligence of another.
111. See infra Part V.
112. KEETON ETAL., supra note 6, ch. 9.
113. The states are Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky and Nevada. See infra
Appendix C for state-by-state analysis.
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In essence, the impact rule stands for the proposition that
before a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional
distress caused by the negligence of another, the
emotional distress suffered must flow from physical
injuries the plaintiff sustained in an impact. Thus, the
impact rule precludes the recovery of damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress unless the
emotional distress arises directly from the physical
injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the impact." '
The Florida court does not appear to allow recovery in a case like
Coultas, in which the emotional distress preceded the physical harm."5
With emotional distress flowing from a physical injury, the Florida court
appears to be tendering a rule limiting recovery to parasitic emotional
distress alone.1
16
In Indiana, in the case of Shuamber v. Henderson, the court
explained its version of the rule as follows:
This rule is known as the "impact rule" because of the
requirement that there be some physical impact on the
plaintiff before recovery for mental trauma will be
allowed. This has been the rule in Indiana for nearly one
hundred years, and has it [sic] origins in England. The
rule, as applied in Indiana, has three elements: (1) an
impact on the plaintiff; (2) which causes physical injury
to the plaintiff; (3) which physical injury, in turn, causes
the emotional distress. 1
7
As with Florida, Indiana appears to use the impact rule to limit recovery
only to emotional distress produced by negligently inflicted physical
harm.
Georgia, like Indiana, continues to follow the impact rule today,
requiring "three elements: (1) a physical impact to the plaintiff; (2) the
physical impact causes physical injury to the plaintiff; and (3) the
physical injury to the plaintiff causes the plaintiff's mental suffering or
emotional distress."'
1 8
114. 611 So. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted).
115. See (1888) 13 App. Cas. 222, 224 (H.L. & P.C.) (appeal taken from Vict.).
116. See infra Part V for discussion of parasitic emotional distress.
117. 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind. 1991) (citations omitted).
118. Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 82, 85 (Ga. 2000).
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The issue that such a rule presents is whether an impact, without any
actual physical injury, will be enough to satisfy the rule. In Christy Bros.
Circus v. Turnage, for example, the contact came from a performing
circus horse that "evacuated his bowels" into the lap of a woman who
was a guest at the performance.119 The plaintiff only alleged that she
"was caused much embarrassment, mortification, and mental pain and
suffering," presumably because observers of the event laughed at what
they saw. 12 Nevertheless, the Georgia court held that "[a]ny unlawful
touching of a person's body, although no actual physical hurt may ensue
therefrom, yet, since it violates a personal right, constitutes a physical
injury to that person." 12' Georgia, however, later clarified the rule and
expressly overruled Christy to make it clear that "the impact which will
support a claim for damages for emotional distress must result in a
physical injury."' 122 What would occur in an impact state today in a less
bizarre situation than Christy is open to question, for example when a
person walks away from a violent auto collision without a scratch
because of effective air bags but subsequently suffers paranoia about
motor vehicle travel.
ii. Physical Manifestation
It appears that a majority of states that have considered the issue
allow recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress so long as that
mental condition produces some physical sign of its existence. 123 In
Maryland, the term "physical injury" is used. In Vance v. Vance, the
court explained that:
[T]he requisite "physical injury" resulting from
emotional distress may be proved in one of four ways. It
appears that these alternatives were formulated with the
overall purpose in mind of requiring objective evidence
to guard against feigned claims. The first three
categories pertain to manifestations of a physical injury
through evidence of an external condition or by
119. 144 S.E. 680, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Ob-Gyn Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146, 149 (Ga. 1989).
123. Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah. See infra Appendix C for state-by-
state analysis.
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symptoms of a pathological or physiological state. Proof
of a "physical injury" is also permitted by evidence
indicative of a "mental state," . . . therefore, the term
"physical" is not used in its ordinary dictionary sense.
Instead, it is used to represent that the injury for which
recovery is sought is capable of objectivedetermination. ,
Evidence found sufficient in some jurisdictions includes loss of appetite,
insomnia, nightmares of the accident; 125 nervous disturbance or
disorder; 12 6 weight loss, inability to perform household chores, extreme
nervousness and irritability;'27 and nervous prostration."
Nevada appears to employ both physical impact and physical
manifestation theories. In Olivero v. Lowe, the court held that "in cases
where emotional distress damages are not secondary to physical injuries,
but rather, precipitate physical symptoms, either a physical impact must
have occurred or, in the absence of physical impact, proof of 'serious
emotional distress' causing physical injury or illness must be
presented."'2 9
In Bass v. Nooney Co., the Missouri court was confronted with a
case in which a woman was trapped in an elevator some twenty stories
above the ground.3 ° She rang the emergency bell but no one answered
on the elevator's intercom system and no one came to her aid from the
outside. After ten to fifteen minutes, she began to pound on the door.
A man in the corridor heard the pounding and told her he would get
help. The plaintiff then became dizzy and slid to the floor. When the
elevator door was finally opened, the plaintiff had been confined for
about thirty minutes. The following day she was hospitalized and placed
under heavy sedation. She remained there for five days. Her attending
psychiatrist testified that the elevator confinement resulted in a severe
anxiety reaction. She returned to work less than a month after the
incident following her psychiatrist's opinion that there would be no
permanent disability. The Missouri Supreme Court found that the
action had to be retried to determine whether the plaintiff's damages
124. 408 A.2d 728, 733-34 (Md. 1979) (footnote omitted).
125. D'Ambra v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 1180, 1183 (D.R.I. 1973).
126. Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 249 P.2d 843, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
127. Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 396 (Mich. 1970).
128. Netusil v. Novak, 235 N.W. 335, 337 (Neb. 1931).
129. 995 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Nev. 2000).
130. 646 S.W.2d 765, 766-67 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
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were sufficiently severe to be legally cognizable.' Nevertheless, the
court held:
Instead of the old impact rule, a plaintiff will be
permitted to recover for emotional distress provided: (1)
the defendant should have realized that his conduct
involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress; and
(2) the emotional distress or mental injury must be
medically diagnosable and must be of sufficient severity
so as to be medically significant.132
As Bass reflects, it is not enough to state a rule requiring physical
injury, manifestation, or contact as a precursor to recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress. The question then becomes: just
what type of contact, manifestation, or physical injury will be enough.
In the case of Hawes v. Germantown Mutual Insurance Co., for example,
the plaintiff was in the basement of her home when a wall began to
collapse inward.'33 Realizing that she was in danger of being crushed,
the plaintiff ran up the basement stairs. She escaped with only an
abrasion to one of her heels that was caused by falling wall fragments.
Following that experience, the plaintiff "complained of anxiety, panic
during rainstorms, impairment of social communication skills, and
uncontrollable crying spells for no apparent reason. She also suffered
loss of sleep and appetite, resulting in an eleven-pound weight loss."'' 4
At the time the matter was heard, Wisconsin followed the rule requiring
physical injuries for recovery of negligent infliction of emotional
distress."5 The Hawes court held that the heel abrasion, standing alone,
was not "sufficient to remove an emotional distress claim from the
realm of speculation."'36  However, coupled with the loss of sleep,
appetite, and weight loss, the abrasion was adequate when augmented
by the plaintiff's fear for her own safety "and a direct causal relationship
between the emotional distress and the traumatic collapse of the
131. Id. at 774.
132. Id. at 772-73.
133. 309 N.W.2d 356, 360 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
134. Id. at 360.
135. See Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 177 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Wis. 1970).
136. Hawes, 309 N.W.2d at 360.
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wall."' 37  These provided "a sufficient basis for the trial court to
determine that this was not a fraudulent claim."'38
iii. Zone of Danger
Other courts simply require that the plaintiff be in the zone of
danger when the tortious conduct occurred, and subsequently
experience a physical manifestation of emotional distress. The zone of
danger test draws upon Judge Cardozo's reasoning in Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Co. that if a plaintiff is within close proximity to a cause
of harm, it is foreseeable that harm may in fact be caused to that
person.'39 Of course, if a jurisdiction already follows the zone of danger
test for the duty element of a negligence claim, requiring it for a
negligent infliction claim adds nothing more. However, as Prosser and
Keeton explains, duty is not that cut-and-dried an issue.'" Therefore, it
is important to note when a jurisdiction uses zone of danger with
negligent infliction cases. Regardless of the jurisdiction's general duty
rule, the zone test will be important for the negligent infliction case
because the test may be intended to limit liability in terms of
"proximate" or legal causation in that particular jurisdiction.
A number of jurisdictions appear to espouse zone of danger as a test
in negligent infliction cases."' For example, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Bowers, the Alabama Supreme Court explained: "In negligence actions,
Alabama follows the 'zone-of-danger' test, which limits recovery of
mental anguish damages 'to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical injury
as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, or who are placed in
immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct.",112 The court's use of
the disjunctive is, of course, important.
Some states couple the physical manifestation rule with the
requirement that the plaintiff be within the zone of danger. For
example, in Hamilton v. Nestor, the Nebraska court stated: "a plaintiff
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Interestingly, it appears that the bulk of Mrs. Palsgraf's
injuries were psychological. Mark G. Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon": The Human Voice
in Legal Rules, 66 TEX. L. REV. 589, 617 (1988).
140. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 43, at 280.
141. Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
and Vermont. See infra Appendix C for state-by-state analysis.
142. 752 So. 2d 1201,1203 (Ala. 1999) (citing AALAR, Ltd. v. Francis, 716 So. 2d 1141,
1147 (Ala. 1998); White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Wilkerson, 737 So. 2d 447, 449 (Ala. 1999)).
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seeking recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress was still
required to show (1) that some type of physical injury resulted from the
negligently inflicted suffering and (2) that the plaintiff was within the
'zone of danger' or actually feared for his or her own safety."' 3
Although the facts appeared to present more of a situation of assault
and battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Vermont
court, in the case of Brueckner v. Norwich University, defined the
element of negligent infliction:
If there has been an impact, plaintiff may recover for
emotional distress stemming from the incident during
which the impact occurred. If plaintiff has not suffered
an impact, plaintiff must show that: (1) he was within the
"zone of danger" of an act negligently directed at him by
defendant, (2) he was subjected to a reasonable fear of
immediate personal injury, and (3) he in fact suffered
substantial bodily injury or illness as a result.'"
Also in New York, the home of Palsgraf, the zone of danger rule as
to negligent infliction cases appears to be alive and well:
The circumstances under which recovery may be had for
purely emotional harm are extremely limited and, thus, a
cause of action seeking such recovery must generally be
premised upon a breach of a duty owed directly to the
plaintiff which either endangered the plaintiff's physical
safety or caused the plaintiff fear for his or her own
physical safety. 141
iv. No Limitations
Of late, a number of states have removed any limitation on the
recovery of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress in non-
bystander situations.14 '6 Hawaii was one of the first states to remove all
limitations in this area of negligent infliction.147 In Leong v. Takasaki,
143. 659 N.W.2d 321, 326-27 (Neb. 2003).
144. 730 A.2d 1086, 1092 (Vt. 1999) (citation omitted).
145. Lancellotti v. Howard, 547 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (App. Div. 1989).
146. The states are Hawaii, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix C.
147. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520-21 (Haw. 1970).
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the court observed: "[b]ecause other standards exist to test the
authenticity of plaintiff's claim for relief, the requirement of resulting
physical injury, like the requirement of physical impact, should not stand
as another artificial bar to recovery, but merely be admissible as
evidence of the degree of mental or emotional distress suffered."'' 8
Likewise, in Paugh v. Hanks, the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
"[a]lthough we believe that a manifestation of physical harm which
occurs as a result of serious emotional distress can assist a jury in
determining whether a claim is compensable, we find that a limitation
such as this may prevent a worthy plaintiff from recovering from a
blameworthy defendant.'
19
In Tennessee, in the case of Camper v. Minor, the court similarly
noted:
[W]e conclude that these cases should be analyzed under
the general negligence approach discussed above. In
other words, the plaintiff must present material evidence
as to each of the five elements of general negligence-
duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation in fact, and
proximate, or legal, cause, in order to avoid summary
judgment. Furthermore, we agree that in order to guard
against trivial or fraudulent actions, the law ought to
provide a recovery only for "serious" or "severe"
emotional injury. A "serious" or "severe" emotional
injury occurs "where a reasonable person, normally
constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the
mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the
case."
150
Wisconsin has had an interesting history with negligent infliction of
emotional distress in non-bystander cases. Initially, even though the
state subscribed to the Andrews dissent in Palsgraf and held that duty is
established in a negligence case when an unreasonable risk of some
harm should have been foreseen as to anyone,"' the same court adopted
the zone of danger rule as to negligent infliction of emotional distress."'Later, recognizing the doctrinal conflict, the court attempted to clarify
148. 520 P.2d 758, 762 (Haw. 1974).
149. 451 N.E.2d 759, 764-65 (Ohio 1983).
150. 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996) (citations omitted).
151. A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Wis. 1974).
152. Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 498 (Wis. 1935).
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by asserting that it was really talking about public policy considerations
for limiting liability and was not discussing duty at all.'53 Nevertheless,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co. recently ruled that in non-bystander cases a claimant need
not prove physical manifestation of severe emotional distress; rather,
the claimant must demonstrate only traditional negligence elements of
negligent conduct, causation, and harm. l" The court announced its
rationale as follows:
First, as we have seen, the physical manifestation
requirement has denied recovery for serious emotional
distress not accompanied by physical symptoms. Second,
given the present state of medical science, emotional
distress can be established by means other than proof of
physical manifestation. Third, although it was designed
to ensure against manufactured or feigned claims, the
physical manifestation requirement has encouraged
extravagant pleading, distorted testimony, and
meaningless distinctions between physical and emotional
symptoms. Detection of false claims is best left to the
adversary process. Finally, we can find no evidence that
the predicted deluge of litigation has occurred in states
that have abandoned either the zone of danger or
physical manifestation rule.155
Tennessee has adopted a similar approach, with some limitations.
Camper v. Minor involved a truck driver whose vehicle collided with an
automobile that had entered an intersection. "6 The driver of the
automobile was killed instantly. The truck driver brought an action
against the administrator of the motorist's estate and the owner of the
automobile driven by the motorist to recover damages for emotional
distress caused by viewing the motorist's body in the wreckage. Like the
Wisconsin court in Bowen, the Tennessee court found the physical
manifestation rule "inflexible and inadequate in practice; . . . it
completely ignores the fact that some valid emotional injuries simply
may not be accompanied by a contemporaneous physical injury or have
153. Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 77 N.W.2d 397, 402-03 (Wis. 1956).
154. 517 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1994).
155. Id. at 443.
156. 915 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tenn. 1996).
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physical consequences."' 117  Like Bowen, it also determined that a
plaintiff claiming negligently inflicted emotional distress need only
establish the basic elements of a negligence case. 59 That being said, it
did note a limitation:
Furthermore, we agree that in order to guard against
trivial or fraudulent actions, the law ought to provide a
recovery only for "serious" or "severe" emotional injury.
A "serious" or "severe" emotional injury occurs "where
a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be
unable to adequately cope with the mental stress
engendered by the circumstances of the case." Finally,
we conclude that the claimed injury or impairment must
be supported by expert medical or scientific proof."5 9
2. Liability to Bystanders
As noted previously, negligent infliction of emotional distress
suffered by a bystander usually occurs as the result of some physical
harm sustained by another-most often one of the bystander's loved
ones. The bystander either witnesses the event that caused the physical
injury or learns about it soon afterward. The example cited previously
of parents who, from the safety of their home, looked out the window
only to observe their child being hit by an errant motorist is apt.
Initially, bystanders were not entitled to recover damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress regardless of the circumstances.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts unequivocally denies the right to
recover for such harm "which is caused by emotional distress arising
solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the
actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the
other. "'60
Appellate courts in a number of states do not appear to have
confronted the issue.161 In a few states, the courts have rejected such an
157. Id. at 446.
158. Those being "duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation in fact, and proximate,
or legal, cause." Id.
159. Id. (citations omitted).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(2) (1965) (emphasis added).
161. No authority has been found in Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, and Kentucky.
See infra Appendix C.
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action out of hand. 62 The reason underlying denial of bystander
recovery for emotional distress is, once again, the principle of
foreseeability-that liability should not extend to harm that is
speculative and too far removed from the scope of the tortious conduct.
Courts uniformly adhered to the notion that negligent tortfeasors should
not be subject to unlimited liability to any witness of the tortious event,
because these are unforeseen harms. Of course, that concept is subject
to debate. It is certainly not unforeseeable that a person who sustains
serious bodily injury or death will have close relatives who are
emotionally impacted by the event. Likewise, why is there no problem
in allowing emotional distress damages to survivors when the remains of
a loved one are mishandled, but yet a problem when a live body is
mishandled and relatives claim emotional distress as a result? Courts
that allow bystander recovery have established various rules to govern
the situation.
i. Impact
As noted previously, Georgia has consistently applied the impact
requirement in non-bystander cases involving negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 163 It appears to be the only state where the impact
requirement also pertains to a bystander situation as well. In Lee v.
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., a woman was injured in the same auto
collision that took the life of her daughter.'6 She claimed damages for
the emotional distress that was caused by witnessing the death of her
daughter. The court held:
When, as here, a parent and child sustain a direct
physical impact and physical injuries through the
negligence of another, and the child dies as the result of
such negligence, the parent may attempt to recover for
serious emotional distress from witnessing the child's
suffering and death without regard to whether the
162. See Waldrip v. McGarity, 605 S.W.2d 5, 5-6 (Ark. 1980) (except as permitted by
wrongful death statute); Slaton v. Vansickle, 872 P.2d 929, 931 (Okla. 1994); Litton v. Cann,
47 Va. Cir. 334, 339 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (finding that only exceptions allowed are parents'
malpractice claims for wrongful birth of a child or the birth of a severely injured child
inflicted during the delivery).
163. See discussion supra Part IV.C.I.i.
164. 533 S.E.2d 82, 82 (Ga. 2000).
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emotional trauma arises out of the physical injury to the
parent. 165
But, it refused to budge further as to other situations.
ii. Zone of Danger
As the Restatement passage quoted above foretold, some courts
recognized a bystander's right to recover for negligent infliction of
emotional harm in limited situations, e.g., when the bystander-plaintiff
was in the zone of danger from the tortious event. A number of courts
still follow that approach.66
In Illinois, however, the court decided to abandon the impact
requirement in the case of Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority:
The standard that we substitute for the one requiring
contemporaneous injury or impact is the standard which
has been adopted in the majority of jurisdictions where
this question of recovery by a bystander for emotional
distress has been examined. That standard has been
described as the zone-of-physical-danger rule. Basically,
under it a bystander who is in a zone of physical danger
and who, because of the defendant's negligence, has
reasonable fear for his own safety is given a right of
action for physical injury or illness resulting from
emotional distress. This rule does not require that the
bystander suffer a physical impact or injury at the time of
the negligent act, but it does require that he must have
been in such proximity to the accident in which the direct
victim was physically injured that there was a high risk to
him of physical impact. The bystander, as stated, must
show physical injury or illness as a result of the emotional
distress caused by the defendant's negligence.
167
Thus, Illinois requires both presence in the zone of danger and physical
manifestation of the emotional trauma.
In Resavage v. Davies, the Maryland court considered a case
involving a mother who witnessed her daughters' death when they were
165. Id. at 86-87.
166. Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, South
Dakota, Utah, and Vermont. See infra Appendix C.
167. 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (I11. 1983) (citations omitted).
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struck and killed by a motorist.' 68 The mother was standing on the
porch of her home and her daughters were standing on a parkway some
distance away waiting for a bus. In full view of the mother an
automobile jumped the curb and struck the children. The mother "ran
to the children who were languishing in pools of blood" and dying. 69
The mother was confined to bed for a considerable time from the shock
of her observation. The court expressed concern over the fact that if the
mother, not in harm's way, was allowed to recover for her emotional
harm, the flood gates would be opened. 70 It observed:
We see no logical reason for holding that liability does
not extend to bystanders or persons less closely related
than a child or spouse, but may extend to a child or
spouse, as indicated in the caveat in [Restatement] § 313.
We think the operator of a motor vehicle on the highway
is not liable to spectators in a place of safety off the
highway for visible shock to them. If such a rule were
adopted it would involve a tremendous extension of
liability to the world at large, not justified by the best
considered authorities. 7'
The South Dakota court, in Nielson v. AT&T Corp., first reviewed
the various tests employed in surrounding jurisdictions. 172 It then held:
After reviewing case law in other jurisdictions, we hold
that South Dakota law recognizes a bystander's claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by
contemporaneous observation of the serious injury or
death of a third party with whom the bystander has a
close relationship. The bystander must be within the
zone of danger. However, the emotional distress
suffered may be caused by fear for the third person and
need not be caused by the bystander's fear for his or her
own safety. The negligently inflicted emotional distress
must be accompanied with physical manifestations. 173
168. 86 A.2d 879, 879 (Md. 1952).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 883.
171. Id.
172. 597 N.W.2d 434, 440-42 (S.D. 1999).
173. Id. at 442.
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Thus, zone of danger is again coupled with physical manifestation.
In North Dakota, the court in Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital,
confronted a situation involving a mother who had just given birth."'
She watched while a hospital attendant brought the newborn to her and
proceeded to drop the child on the floor. While one might not expect a
clearer guarantee of the mother's genuine emotional distress, the court,
after a review of various authorities available at the time, held that "the
plaintiff herein could recover only if the defendant's negligent act had
threatened the plaintiff herself with harm or placed her within what is
termed the zone of danger. The complaint contains no facts upon which
such a contention could be supported." '175 Apparently, if the clumsy
hospital staffer had caused the infant to sail past the mother's head
before it hit the floor, recovery might have been allowed. The court
seemed to fear the opening of a Pandora's Box if it went further.
In Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital, the Missouri court
was confronted with a situation in which a mother brought an action
against physicians who allegedly committed medical malpractice
resulting from a heart operation on her five-year-old son.'76 She claimed
that due to their errors following an operation, she was forced to
observe the child's pain and fainting spells for over a year and a half
until his condition was finally rectified.'77 The court noted that the case
addressed an issue left undecided by its ruling in Bass v. Nooney Co.,'78
regarding whether recovery might be had for emotional distress caused
solely by observing injury caused to a third person by another's
negligence. 17 9 It answered that question in the negative, finding zone of
danger a preferable rule:
We hold, therefore, that in Missouri a plaintiff states
a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress upon injury to a third person only upon a
showing: (1) that the defendant should have realized that
his conduct involved an unreasonable risk to the plaintiff,
(2) that plaintiff was present at the scene of an injury
producing, sudden event, (3) and that plaintiff was in the
174. 197 N.W.2d 678, 679 (N.D. 1972).
175. Id. at 684.
176. 799 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Mo. 1990).
177. Id.
178. 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983). See discussion supra Part IV.C.l.ii.
179. Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 597-98.
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zone of danger, i.e., placed in a reasonable fear of
physical injury to his or her own person.
Given its broadest intendment, Asaro's petition does
not aver that she was herself endangered by the
negligence of the respondents. While appellant was
intimately involved with her son's treatment and
understandably distressed at the condition of his health,
she was not the patient. She faced no personal peril.
Her understandable distress follows solely from seeing
the harm and suffering endured by her young son. 8°
iii. The Dillon Test
The final test to be considered with respect to bystander recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress came from the California
Supreme Court in the case of Dillon v. Legg.' The rule of Dillon, or a
variation thereof, has been adopted in a number of states.182
In Dillon, the plaintiff alleged that she was in close proximity to a
collision that caused her infant daughter's death and personally
witnessed that collision.83  As a result, she claimed to have sustained
great emotional distress, "'shock and injury to her nervous system'
which caused her great physical and mental pain and suffering."' 8  After
examining the law in other jurisdictions, as well as its own, 8 and the
views of various commentators, the court decided that relief should be
granted in such a case in certain circumstances. 8 It determined that
foreseeability was the key to deciding liability:
We note, first, that we deal here with a case in which
plaintiff suffered a shock which resulted in physical
180. Id. at 599-600.
181. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
182. Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix C.
183. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914.
184. Id.
185. It overruled Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963). Id.
at 925.
186. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920-21.
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injury and we confine our ruling to that case. In
determining, in such a case, whether defendant should
reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff, or, in other
terminology, whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty of
due care, the courts will take into account such factors as
the following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the
scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a
distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from
others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the
victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence
of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship. 187
It is important to note that the foregoing are mere factors for
consideration and not elements of a hard-and-fast test. In considering
these three factors, if a court determines that the tortfeasor should
reasonably have foreseen that bystanders might suffer emotional harm,
liability follows if that emotional harm manifests physically. Once again,
severe emotional distress standing alone will not suffice.
California subsequently drew a bright line emphasizing the second
requirement of the Dillon test in Thing v. La Chusa. 8 In that action a
minor was injured when he was struck by an automobile operated by the
defendant. The plaintiff mother was nearby, but she neither saw nor
heard the accident. She learned of her son's injury from a daughter.
The mother "rushed to the scene where she saw her bloody and
unconscious child, whom she believed was dead, lying in the roadway.
[She] sued [the] defendants, alleging that she suffered great emotional
disturbance, shock, and injury to her nervous system as a result of these
events.' ' 189 The majority of the court, expressing concern with what it
thought was the open-endedness of the Dillon approach, recast the
three elements of that case as follows:
[A] plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress
caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a
third person if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely
187. Id. at 920.
188. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
189. Id. at 815.
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related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of
the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is
then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3)
as a result suffers serious emotional distress-a reaction
beyond that which would be anticipated in a
disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal
response to the circumstances.'90
While many jurisdictions chose to follow the Dillon approach, some
did so with modifications. The Ohio case of Paugh v. Hanks91 is an
example. The case involved a woman who lived with her husband and
two children in a home across the street from the end of an Interstate
exit ramp.1" On three separate occasions, from December to August of
the following year, cars exiting the ramp collided with the plaintiff's
home or the fence surrounding that home. The collisions occurred late
at night or very early in the morning. The earlier collisions put the
plaintiff in fear for the safety of her children. After the last collision she
began fainting and hyperventilating and went to a mental health center.
She had no prior history of fainting. Thereafter, she began to see a
nurse at the mental health center and was placed on medication. The
plaintiff claimed "she was experiencing serious nightmares; was afraid to
be left alone at her home; was afraid to cross streets; was afraid of traffic
in general, or being on a big street; and was afraid to drive the family
car." 93 The court stated:
Although we adopt in close form the guidelines of
reasonable foreseeability established in Dillon, it must be
remembered that this court, unlike the Dillon court, does
not limit recovery to that emotional distress which
manifests itself in the form of some physical injury.
Furthermore, we do not believe that it is necessary that
the victim (whose safety was feared for by the plaintiff-
bystander) even suffered actual physical harm. We
believe that a cause of action for the negligent infliction
of serious emotional distress may be stated where the
plaintiff-bystander reasonably appreciated the peril
which took place, whether or not the victim suffered
190. Id. at 829-830 (footnotes omitted).
191. 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1983).
192. Id. at 761.
193. Id. at 762.
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actual physical harm, and, that as a result of this
cognizance or fear of peril, the plaintiff suffered serious
emotional distress. 94
Unlike Dillon, the court in Paugh declined "to draw an absolute
boundary around the class of persons whose peril may stimulate the
mental distress. This usually will be a jury question bearing on the
reasonable reaction to the event unless the court can conclude as a
matter of law that the reaction was unreasonable."'1 95 In its view,
''serious emotional distress may be found where a reasonable person,
normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the
mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case. 196
New Hampshire adopted the Dillon criteria a97 and later denied an
application to expand them to include a case in which parents did not
see the accident that injured their child but later viewed the injured
child in a hospital.9 8 However, in Graves v. Estabrook, the supreme
court was confronted with a situation in which a decedent's fianc6e
brought an action to recover for the emotional distress she sustained in
witnessing the death-causing accident." 9 She lived with the decedent
before the accident. The court concluded that to foreclose recovery to
the plaintiff because her relationship with her fianc6e did not have the
correct label would be unjust.20
The New Hampshire court relied heavily upon the New Jersey case
of Dunphy v. Gregor,2"' in reaching its decision. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, like its New Hampshire counterpart, was dealing with a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress brought by a woman
after witnessing an accident involving a man to whom she was engaged
and with whom she was cohabiting.2' The couple was engaged in April
1988 and began cohabitating two months later. They set a date in
February 1992 for their wedding. The accident occurred on September
29, 1990. After analyzing its own law and that of other jurisdictions, the
court determined that under the circumstances of the case the plaintiff
194. Id. at 767.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 765.
197. Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 306 (N.H. 1979).
198. Wilder v. City of Keene, 557 A.2d 636, 639 (N.H. 1989).
199. 818 A.2d 1255, 1257 (N.H. 2003).
200. Id. at 1261-62.
201. 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994).
202. Id. at 373.
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should be protected against negligent infliction of emotional injury.0 3 In
the court's view, the basis was "the existence of an intimate familial
relationship" with the injured person:
An intimate familial relationship that is stable, enduring,
substantial, and mutually supportive is one that is
cemented by strong emotional bonds and provides a
deep and pervasive emotional security. We are satisfied
that persons who enjoy such an intimate familial
relationship have a cognizable interest in the continued
mutual emotional well-being derived from their
relationship. When that emotional security is devastated
because one witnesses, in close and direct proximity, an
accident resulting in the wrongful death or grievous
bodily injury of a person with whom one shares an
intimate familial relationship, the infliction of that severe
emotional injury may be the basis of recovery against the
wrongdoer.~
Since an "intimate familial relationship" in the New Jersey court's view
applied to unmarried cohabitants who were involved in a long-term
engagement, other relationships of a similar nature might qualify.
South Carolina expanded upon Dillon in another fashion. In Kinard
v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., the court was concerned with an accident
in which the plaintiff and her daughter were injured when a load of roof
trusses fell from defendant's truck and struck their car.2"5 The daughter
was severely injured and was comatose for three months after the
accident. The plaintiff sought damages not only for her physical
injuries, but also for severe emotional distress caused by witnessing the
serious injury to her daughter. She claimed that she lost weight, often
cried, was unable to do heavy housework, was unable to sleep, and had
difficulty socializing. She also alleged that she was unable to tolerate
stress.2° Interestingly, prior to this time the court had refused to adopt
an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.0 7 Nevertheless:
Today, we approve the general approach of Dillon v.
203. Id. at 380.
204. Id.
205. 336 S.E.2d 465,466 (S.C. 1985).
206. Id.
207. See Dooley v. Richland Mem'l Hosp., 322 S.E.2d 669, 670-71 (S.C. 1984).
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Legg, and adopt the cause of action with the following
elements:
(a) the negligence of the defendant must cause death
or serious physical injury to another;
(b) the plaintiff bystander must be in close proximity
to the accident;
(c) the plaintiff and the victim must be closely related;
(d) the plaintiff must contemporaneously perceive the
accident; and
(e) the emotional distress must both manifest itself by
physical symptoms capable of objective diagnosis and
be established by expert testimony.2°8
Once again, an emotional problem absent physical manifestation is not
enough.
As noted previously, Wisconsin has one of the more liberal
approaches to negligent infliction of emotional distress, limiting
recovery only on the basis of legal cause or public policy
considerations.2" In the case of Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co., the court confronted the issue of whether additional limits should
be set in a bystander case.21° The court in Bowen dealt with a situation
involving a mother and fatal injuries to a child.2 ' The mother here did
not witness the car strike her child's bike. She arrived at the scene a few
minutes later. She observed that her severely injured son was trapped
under the defendant's car and watched the rescue attempt. She claimed
that these experiences caused her extreme emotional and psychic
injuries. These were accompanied by "hysteria, insomnia, nausea and
the disruption of [her] work and family relationships."2"2  The court
noted that "the doctrine of public policy, not the doctrine of duty, limits
the scope of the defendant's liability" in a negligence action in the
state, 3 and that application of public policy principles is a function of
the court.1 While the court noted that a public policy determination
might be made at the pleading stage, it also observed that "when the
issues are complex or the factual connections attenuated, it may be
208. Kinard, 336 S.E.2d at 467.
209. See discussion supra Part IV.C.l.iv.
210. 517 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Wis. 1994).
211. Id. at 435.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 439.
214. Id. at 443.
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desirable for a full trial to precede the court's determination." '215 The
court reasoned:
Historically, the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress has raised two concerns: (1)
establishing authenticity of the claim and (2) ensuring
fairness of the financial burden placed upon a defendant
whose conduct was negligent. A court deals with these
concerns by exploring in each case such public policy
considerations as: (1) whether the injury is too remote
from the negligence; (2) whether the injury is wholly out
of proportion to the culpability of the negligent
tortfeasor; (3) whether in retrospect it appears too
extraordinary that the negligence should have brought
about the harm; (4) whether allowance of recovery
would place an unreasonable burden on the negligent
tortfeasor; (5) whether allowance of recovery would be
too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims; or (6)
whether allowance of recovery would enter a field that
has no sensible or just stopping point. The court has
stated these public policy considerations that may
preclude liability in capsule form as follows: When it
would shock the conscience of society to impose liability,
the courts may hold as a matter of law that there is no
liability.
216
It then proceeded to enunciate Dillon-like public policy factors for
consideration in bystander cases.
[T]o determine on the basis of public policy
considerations whether to preclude liability for severe
emotional distress to a bystander a court must consider
three factors: the severity of the injury to the victim, the
relationship of the plaintiff to the victim, and the
extraordinary circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's
discovery of the injury.217
215. Id. at 443.
216. Id. at 443-44.
217. Id. at 445.
[90:789
FOUR FACES OF TORT LAW
In applying those various factors to this case, the court held that the
plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the
various public policy considerations would not preclude liability.1
Thus, as observed above, recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress is confined by limitations affecting bystander and
non-bystander cases in most jurisdictions. Some are less stringent than
others.
V. PARASITIC EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The last emotional distress area to be considered involves situations
in which the emotional harm occurs as the result of some physical injury
that was negligently inflicted. Various terms such as "loss of enjoyment
of life,, 219 "emotional damages''2° or "hedonic damages, 22' have been
used as descriptors. However, the terms are used to describe a damage
category, not a separate cause of action as with the other three areas
discussed above.
A. Early History
As frequently occurred, early common law declined to afford legal
protection to mental tranquility. It has been stated that when first
allowing recovery for emotional harm that was intentionally inflicted,
"early cases focused more on preserving peace by offering an alternative
to self-help retribution than on preserving emotional tranquility.
22
One author observed that "[lloss of enjoyment of life made its debut as
a peripheral element of damages in the 1890's." '223
B. The Restatement
The Restatement (Second) of Torts stands for the proposition that
negligently inflicted emotional distress is not compensable absent some
physical harm.224 It does not speak directly to the subject of parasitic
218. Id. 446.
219. Thibeaux v. Trotter, 883 So. 2d 1128,1130 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
220. Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 203 (Alaska 1995).
221. Hunt v. K-Mart Corp., 981 P.2d 275,277 (Mont. 1999).
222. Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 772, 788 n.78 (1985) (citing Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently
Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV.
477, 486 (1982)).
223. Carleton R. Cramer, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damages,
12 PAC. L.J. 965, 965 (1981).
224. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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emotional distress. Nevertheless, it does provide that: "Compensatory
damages that may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss include
compensation (a) for bodily harm, and (b) for emotional distress., 22 An
accompanying illustration emphasizes the point: "A seriously wounds B,
who fears that the wound will cause death. In addition to damages for
the physical impairment of the body and pecuniary loss caused by the
wound, B is entitled to compensatory damages for the fear of death., 2
6
Thus, it could be argued that given a negligently inflicted physical injury,
the Restatement allows that compensation for parasitic emotional harm
is acceptable.
The proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts assumes a slightly
modernized approach regarding parasitic emotional distress. First, the
"Proposed Final Draft" of section 4, in comment b, stresses the
difference between a physical injury and emotional disturbance and
seems to preserve the approach of the second Restatement that physical
impact is a prerequisite to recover for emotional injury.2 Comment d
to section 4 reads:
This Restatement is limited to liability for physical harm.
Thus, whether and when the interest in emotional
tranquility is protected against culpable invasion is a
matter left to the Restatement Second of Torts §§ 46-47
and § 436A, the developing case law, and future Third
Restatement efforts. Emotional disturbance, often
referred to as mental suffering or emotional distress, is
recoverable under the rules of this Restatement when it
results from bodily harm. When emotional disturbance is
recoverable, the rules of this Restatement on the prima
facie elements of a tort claim may be employed to
determine if the requisite elements of the emotional-
disturbance claim are satisfied.2m
At the same time, comment d goes on to caution that:
Since the Restatement Second of Torts, courts have
liberalized recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1965).
226. Id. cmt. e, illus. 6.
227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 4 cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
228. Id. cmt. d (emphasis added).
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disturbance. To the extent this liberalization has occurred
by recognizing a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, this Restatement does not address that
development. However, other courts have liberalized
recovery for negligently inflicted emotional disturbance
by characterizing what is essentially psychic or emotional
harm as bodily harm. The Second Restatement
contributed to this development by providing that some
serious, long-term conditions, such as nausea, headaches,
and hysterical attacks constituted illnesses that were
bodily harm. To the extent that courts liberalize the
standard for what constitutes bodily harm and
characterize a plaintiff's harm as such, those cases are
governed by the rules provided in this Restatement. This
Restatement leaves to the developing case law the
determination of where to draw the line between bodily
harm and emotional disturbance.229
Comment d seems to suggest as well that the definition of what
constitutes a "physical harm" continues to broaden.23 °
Finally, section 6 of the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts
seems to suggest that parasitic emotional distress will be recoverable
even when negligently inflicted, so long as it is accompanied by physical
injury. It reads "[a]n actor whose negligence is a factual cause of
physical harm is subject to liability for any such harm within the scope of
liability, unless the court determines that the ordinary duty of
reasonable care is inapplicable."' 1 Comment f to that section offers
further substance: "[l]liability for emotional disturbance (that is not
derivative of personal injury) .. .is governed by the principles of the
Restatement Second of Torts until additional portions of the
Restatement Third of Torts addressing this matter are published.,
232
C. Current Status
As an appendix to this Article illustrates, the ability to recover for
loss of enjoyment of life, whatever its label, is now generally recognized
in all jurisdictions.233  The only disagreement among them is over
229. Id. (emphasis added).
230. See id.
231. Id. § 6.
232. Id. cmt. f.
233. See infra Appendix D.
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whether it should be considered a separate form of damages or merely
an aspect of damages for pain and suffering.- Of course, as a general
proposition, in a personal injury action sounding in negligence, a person
now may recover damages for whatever consequences of the tortfeasor's
act or omission occur, despite the fact that the specific form of the injury
was not foreseen or foreseeable.235
That damages for pain and suffering are allowed at all speaks to the
fact that tort law considers a human being something more than a
machine to be repaired and placed back in operation. If a tortiously-
inflicted physical injury causes the harmed person emotional concern
about the future consequences of that injury (Will I ever tap dance
again?), then that injury is compensable.
Consider the daughter of a woman who took DES during pregnancy.
As a result of the drug, the young woman suffered from "adenosis," apre-cancerous condition that requires careful mon . 236 Ipre aneros ndiio q e re monitoring. t is not
difficult to imagine the concerns that linger in the mind of that person-
wondering whether the "bad news" will arrive then or after a later
examination.
In LeBleu v. Safeway Insurance Co., the plaintiff was injured in an
automobile accident. 37 She "was thrown against the steering wheel, and
her knees hit the dashboard." 38 The impact was so severe that the rear
seat of the plaintiff's car moved forward and a tire tool from the trunk
smashed through the windshield on the passenger side. "The trial court
found credible [the plaintiff's] testimony that her doctor [cautioned] that
her lung would be painful during the winter" and that she would have
difficulty breathing when she exercised.23 ' The plaintiff also testified
that her condition limited her ability to participate in family activities,
"such as jogging and hunting with her husband and playing with her
children. '' 21 On appeal, the court held that "an award for disability may
include compensation for limitations on activities outside the
234. Compare Adams v. Miller, 908 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Ky. 1995) ("There is no need to
allow for the recoupment of hedonic damages as a separate category of loss."), with
Smallwood v. Bradford, 720 A.2d 586, 592 (Md. 1998) ("Generally, the 'loss of enjoyment of
life' includes the 'impairment of the capacity to enjoy life, or to enjoy a particular avocation'
and, in some cases, it constitutes a proper, separate element of damages.").
235. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 43, at 291-93.
236. New v. Armour Pharm. Co., 58 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1995).
237. 824 So. 2d 422, 423 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
238. Id. at 424.
239. Id. at 426.
240. Id.
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workplace."24' It noted further that the plaintiff "established to the trial
court's satisfaction that her injuries restricted her once-active lifestyle,
and she is entitled to compensation for this change in her life.
242
Underwood v. Atlanta & West Point Railroad Co. was an action for
injuries sustained by a taxi driver in a grade crossing accident. 243 The
plaintiff's wife was an invalid. Her condition existed before the accident
in question. At trial the plaintiff proposed to prove by his wife's
testimony that, prior to the accident, he played with his five children and
helped with their care as much as she did. He also sought to prove
thereby that "he helped his wife in and out of bed and [into] the bath
room, would come home during the day and put her in a wheelchair,"
and that "since the accident he can do none of these things, is ill and
indifferent with the children, can't stand to hear the baby cry and for the
children to make a fuss."'2' The trial court blocked that testimony on
the ground that evidence of the plaintiff's domestic circumstances in
such an action are irrelevant and immaterial.2 5 On appeal the court
held that:
While the fact that the plaintiff had an invalid wife and
five children, standing alone, does not constitute a basis
of damages recoverable by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's
mental distress resulting from his inability to care for his
invalid wife and to care for and play with his five
children, caused by or growing out of his bodily injury,
246
was a proper element of damage-pain and suffering.
Consider as well the case of Bartolone v. Jeckovich.247 It concerned a
plaintiff who was involved in a relatively minor collision. He sustained a
"whiplash" causing cervical and lower back strain.'48 He was not
hospitalized, but treated with muscle relaxants and physical therapy.
Subsequently, he suffered an acute psychotic breakdown from which he
had not recovered at the time the case was heard. The action was tried
on the theory that the accident aggravated a pre-existing paranoid
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 124 S.E.2d 758, 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962).
244. Id. at 768.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 769.
247. 481 N.Y.S.2d 545 (App. Div. 1984).
248. Id. at 546.
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schizophrenic condition that totally and permanently disabled the
plaintiff. When the accident occurred, the plaintiff, who was slightly
under age fifty, lived alone in one room and worked as a carpenter. He
was proud of his physique and his strength, working out regularly at a
local Y.M.C.A. On weekends he pursued nonphysical interests such as
painting and sculpture. He also sang and played the guitar and
trombone. The court described the evidence presented at trial about his
condition:
Three psychiatrists and one neurosurgeon testified
on behalf of plaintiff. From their testimony a strange
and sad profile emerged: Plaintiff's mother had died of
cancer when he was a very young boy. His sister had also
died of cancer. Probably as a consequence, plaintiff had
developed a fear and dislike of doctors and engaged in
body building in order to avoid doctors and ward off
illness. His bodily fitness was extremely important to
him because it provided him with a sense of control over
his life so that he was able to function in a relatively
normal way. He had adopted a life style in which he was
something of a "loner," but he was self-supporting, had
no complaints and lived a rather placid existence. After
the accident, although his physical injuries were minor,
he perceived that his bodily integrity was impaired and
that he was physically deteriorating. Because he had
such an intense emotional investment in his body, his
perception of this impairment made him incapable of his
former physical feats and he was thus deprived of the
mechanism by which he coped with his emotional
problems. As a consequence, he deteriorated
psychologically and socially as well. He increasingly
isolated himself and felt himself to be a victim of
powerful forces over which he had no control. It was the
consensus of plaintiff's medical experts that he had
suffered from a pre-existing schizophrenic illness which
had been exacerbated by the accident and that he was
now in a chronic paranoid schizophrenic state which is
irreversible. 249
249. Id.
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Finding the evidence credible and invoking the rule that a defendant
takes the plaintiff as he or she is found, the court had no difficulty in
affirming a substantial award for the plaintiff's emotional harm.25°
As any student of the subject is aware, the face of tort law has
evolved over the years-shifting the focus from formalistic limitations
on liability towards making the plaintiff whole. This focus on wholeness
inevitably has come to encompass parasitic emotional harms.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tort law places no impediments in the path of those who seek
recompense for emotional injuries caused by the intentional tort of
assault or resulting from a negligently inflicted physical injury.
Restrictions still exist as to intentional infliction of emotional distress
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. As noted, those
restrictions include a requirement:
* that the emotional distress be "severe";
" that the tortious conduct produce contact with the plaintiff;
* that the plaintiff sustain some physical manifestation of the
distress; and
* that the plaintiff be within the zone of danger of physical
harm.
When the emotional distress results from witnessing or learning of
physical harm to another person still other limitations are imposed. The
question is: why?
Assume a situation in which different people sustain the same type
of emotional distress resulting from particular tortious conduct:
1. The first is a byproduct of an assault.
2. The second is the result of intentional reckless infliction.
3. The third comes after the plaintiff walks away from an auto
accident without physical injury because her air bags have
inflated.
4. The fourth is like the third, but physical harm resulted to the
plaintiff and the emotional distress comes from the plaintiff's
concern about eventual recovery from the physical harm.
250. Id. at 546-47.
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5. The fifth is also like the third, but the distress comes only
from the plaintiff's concern with the safety of another
passenger in the vehicle.
Why do we say to the victim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress that she must prove the distress is severe, while the victim of an
assault need not do so? Why can one who is physically injured as a
result of another's negligence recover for emotional harm that is the
product of the injury while one who escapes physical harm in the same
incident cannot recover for the byproduct of the fear created by the
situation?
The reason could well be fear of "opening the flood gates" that will
eventually swamp the courts. Approaching my forty-fifth year at the
bar, I have heard and seen the floodgates argument used many times. In
fact I may have used it myself, when I first appeared to represent the
defense. It is clearly an argument of last resort when no other, logical
argument is available. Within my knowledge the floodgates have yet to
be breached or cause a flood.
The reason for the limits discussed above could well be concern over
the genuineness of the emotional distress claim. After all, there are no
lacerations or x-rays for jury display and the proof often comes from the
plaintiff's own mouth (or the mouth of a psychiatric expert). The case
of La Fleur v. Mosher2' offers cogent analysis. That case allowed
recovery for emotional distress to a fourteen-year-old child negligently
confined in a jail cell. A dissenting justice noted:
[I]n this case, the majority is impressed with the diagnosis
by a psychiatrist who opines the confinement caused the
emotional distress. Due to the nature of claims of
emotional disturbance without accompanying physical
injury, the discipline of medicine that will normally offer
such opinions will be psychiatrists. This court [has] ...
stated:
While some courts may have blind faith in all phases
of psychiatry, this court does not .... We commented
in an earlier case that this court has frequently been
dismayed by the examination of trial court records
which showed a marked propensity of those who
251. 325 N.W.2d 314 (Wis. 1982).
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purport to have psychiatric expertise to tailor their
testimony to the particular client whom they
represent.
The dissenter's lack of faith in the ability of opposing counsel to
demonstrate witness bias to a jury and his obvious disdain for the ability
of a jury to sort these things out are remarkable. The fact that expert
witnesses may disagree in a tort action or that, on occasion, there might
even be an "expert of the evening" should not be a surprise to anyone.
It happens all the time. Witness the famous insurance "bad faith" case
of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., which involved an emotional distress
component at the trial court level:
Security attempts to justify its rejection of a settlement
by contending that it believed Mrs. DiMare had no
chance of winning on the mental suffering issue. That
belief in the circumstances present could be found to be
unreasonable. Security was putting blind faith in the
power of its psychiatrists to convince the jury when it
knew that the accident could have caused the psychosis,
that its agents had told it that without evidence of prior
mental defects a jury was likely to believe the fall
precipitated the psychosis, and that Mrs. DiMare had
reputable psychiatrists on her side. Further, the company
had been told by a psychiatrist that in a group of 24
psychiatrists, 12 could be found to support each side.
This is the stuff of tort litigation. The fact that it exists provides no
reason to preclude the possibility of any recovery for the harm they
sustained to entire classes of tortiously injured persons. Courts still have
the inherent power to limit liability in individual cases for public policy
reasons.25 ' Surely this solution is much better than mass deprivation of
the right to pursue recovery. One can only hope that, in this area, the
life of the law could become logic.
252. Id. at 320 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting) (citing Steele v. State, 294 N.W.2d 2, 13 (1980)).
253. 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (emphasis added).
254. Compare In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) ("Kinsman No.
1"), with In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) ("Kinsman No. 2").
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APPENDIX A
ASSAULT-STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS
Alabama
In Alabama, the tort of assault was recognized very early on as
requiring
"an intentional, unlawful, offer to touch the person of
another in a rude or angry manner under such
circumstances as to create in the mind of the party
alleging the assault a well-founded fear of an imminent
battery, coupled with the apparent present ability to
effectuate the attempt, if not prevented." '255
Alaska
Alaska's highest court has recognized the definition of assault under
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 21.56 In an unpublished
decision, the Alaska Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to recover for
assault after the defendant stated: "This is my property and I'm going to
kill you and your dogs.,
257
Arizona
Arizona case law does not appear to discuss assault as a separate
tort. Nevertheless, the state does recognize assault and battery. 258 Thus,
it is fair to assume that an action for assault, absent an accompanying
battery, would be recognized there.
Arkansas
The Arkansas Supreme Court has allowed recovery for an assault.
For example, plaintiffs were able to recover for assault when two
assailants placed a pistol behind one of the plaintiff's ears, threatened to
blow his head off, and threatened to rape the other plaintiff.
259
255. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 150 So. 709, 710 (Ala. Ct. App. 1933).
256. Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 650 P.2d 343, 348 (Alaska 1982).
257. Schwartz v. Smith, No. S-10627, 2003 WL 22417514, at *2 (Alaska Oct. 22, 2003).
258. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Doe, 788 P.2d 121,123 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
259. Smith v. Hansen, 914 S.W.2d 285, 290 (Ark. 1996).
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California
California courts have recognized that the "tort of assault is
complete when the anticipation of harm occurs."''
Colorado
Colorado case law does recognize the tort of assault and battery."'
The state's legislature has established a statute of limitations for
assault.262 Thus, it is fair to assume that an action for assault, absent an
accompanying battery, would be recognized there.
Connecticut
In Connecticut, "A civil assault is the intentional causing of
imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact in another.
263
Delaware
Delaware case law does not appear to discuss assault as a separate
tort. Nevertheless, the state does recognize assault and battery.2'6 Thus,
it is fair to assume that an action for assault, absent an accompanying
battery, would be recognized there.
District of Columbia
The District of Columbia recognizes the distinct interests protected
by the tort of assault and has adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 21, which protects freedom from apprehension of harmful
contact. It has been held that "[a]n essential element of the ancient
tort of assault is the intentional putting another in apprehension of an
immediate and harmful or offensive conduct." 26
260. Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for S. Cal., 192 Cal. Rptr. 492, 498 (Ct. App. 1983).
261. White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 819 (Colo. 2000).
262. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-80-103(1)(a) (West 2006).
263. DeWitt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 501 A.2d 768, 770 (Conn. App. Ct.
1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965)).
264. Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. WSMW Indus., Inc., 426 A.2d 1363, 1366 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1980).
265. Saunders v. Nemati, 580 A.2d 660, 664 (D.C. 1990).
266. Madden v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 307 A.2d 756, 757 (D.C. 1973) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965)).
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Florida
Florida has recognized "that, as every law student should know by
his third week, the tort of assault does not require physical injury or
even touching. Its minimal essence is putting the victim in fear of bodily
harm."
267
Georgia
Georgia case law establishes that physical contact is not a necessary
element of assault: "[I]t is only necessary to show an intention to
commit an injury, coupled with an apparent ability to do so.'26
Hawaii
Hawaii case law does not appear to discuss assault as a separate tort.
Nevertheless, the state does recognize assault and battery. 69 Thus, it is
fair to assume that an action for assault, absent an accompanying
battery, would be recognized there.
Idaho
Idaho case law does not appear to discuss assault as a separate tort.
Nevertheless, the state does recognize assault and battery.2 7' Thus, it is
fair to assume that an action for assault, absent an accompanying
battery, would be recognized there.
Illinois
Illinois defines assault as an "intentional, unlawful offer of corporal
injury by force, or force unlawfully directed, under such circumstances
as to create a well-founded fear of imminent peril, coupled with the
apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt if not prevented.
2 7
In order to state a claim for assault, the plaintiff must allege a
"reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery., 272
267. Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1105 (Fla. 1989)
(Grimes, J., concurring).
268. Edwards v. Sabat, 589 S.E.2d 618, 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
269. Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652, 669 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1998).
270. White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108, 114 (Idaho 1990).
271. Parrish v. Donahue, 443 N.E.2d 786, 788 (Il. App. Ct. 1982).
272. Rosenberg v. Packerland Packing Co., 370 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (I11. App. Ct. 1977).
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Indiana
In Indiana, an assault "is effectuated when one acts intending to
cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or an
imminent apprehension of such contact. 2 73 Because "it is a touching of
the mind, as opposed to the body, the damages which are recoverable
for an assault are damages for mental trauma and distress. 2 74  For
instance, the Indiana Supreme Court held that a jury could reasonably
find assault when defendants surrounded the plaintiff's trailer and
threatened him with bodily harm and one of the defendants was armed
with a revolver in his holster.275
Iowa
Iowa case law does not appear to discuss assault as a separate tort.
Nevertheless, the state does recognize assault and battery. 6 Thus, it is
fair to assume that an action for assault, absent an accompanying
battery, would be recognized there.
Kansas
In Kansas, assault is defined as "an intentional threat or attempt,
coupled with apparent ability, to do bodily harm to another, resulting in
immediate apprehension of bodily harm. '' 277  Kansas follows the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 31 and holds that "words can
constitute assault if 'together with other acts or circumstances they put
the other in reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive
contact with his person.'
' 278
Kentucky
In Kentucky, "[a]ssault is a tort which merely requires the threat of
unwanted touching of the victim, while battery requires an actual
unwanted touching.
279
273. Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind. 1991) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 21 (1965)).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 30-31.
276. Borchard v. Anderson, 542 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Iowa 1996).
277. Taiwo v. Vu, 822 P.2d 1024, 1031 (Kan. 1991).
278. Vetter v. Morgan, 913 P.2d 1200, 1203-04 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
279. Banks v. Fritsch, 39 S.W.3d 474,480 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
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Louisiana
In Louisiana, to constitute an assault: "threats, coupled with the
present ability to carry out the threats, are sufficient when one is placed
in reasonable apprehension of receiving an injury."'  The concept of
assault, embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 21, has
been recognized in the state.2'
Maine
In Maine, "[a]bsent tactile contact, a person's mental tranquility is
also protected in the limited situation where a person intentionally or
recklessly places another in fear of imminent harmful or offensive
contact, thus fulfilling the requirements of the intentional tort of
assault." The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 21 has been
recognized in the state.283
Maryland
Maryland, citing section 21 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
defines tortious assault as "any unlawful attempt to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of another or to cause an
apprehension of such a contact."2"4
Massachusetts
Massachusetts defines assault as "an attempt or offer by one person
to do bodily injury to another by force or violence . . . [and] consists of
putting a person in fear of immediate bodily injury. '' 285 State law also
speaks of intentionally placing a person in apprehension of immediate
physical harm.286
280. Johnson v. English, 779 So. 2d 876, 880 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
281. Citizen v. Theodore Daigle & Bro., 418 So. 2d 598, 601 (La. 1982).
282. Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 806 n.3 (Me. 1986).
283. Hale v. Antoniou, No. CV-02-185, 2004 WL 1925551, at *3 (Me. Super. Ct. July 29,
2004).
284. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Mirabile, 449 A.2d 1176, 1183 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
285. Commonwealth v. Prater, 725 N.E.2d 233, 244 (Mass. 2000).
286. See Verma v. Anand Corp., No. 974763, 2000 WL 33171049, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Dec. 29, 2000); Laghetto v. Takacs, No. CA922978, 1994 WL 879841, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Jan. 14, 1994) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965)).
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Michigan
Michigan law recognizes that "[w]here there is only an assault, the
largest element of harm may be emotional." Michigan defines assault
as "any intentional unlawful offer of corporal injury to another person
by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another,
under circumstances which create a well-founded apprehension of
imminent contact, coupled with the apparent present ability to
accomplish the contact. ',2"' The Restatement (Second) of Torts section
21 has been adopted in Michigan. 9
Minnesota
Minnesota defines assault as a "wrongful threat, more than words
alone, with the present ability to carry such threat into effect and which
causes a reasonable apprehension of immediate harm or offensive
contact."
290
Mississippi
In Mississippi, "[a]n assault occurs where a person (1) acts intending
to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a
third person, or an imminent apprehension of such contact, and (2) the
other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.
' 291
Missouri
In Missouri, "an assault is any unlawful offer or attempt to injure
another with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt
under circumstances creating a fear of imminent peril.
' 21
Montana
Montana case law does not appear to discuss assault as a separate
tort. Nevertheless, the state does recognize assault and battery. 3 In
addition, the state has a statute of limitations specifically dealing with
287. 1 CHERYL GIRAULO ET AL., MICHIGAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE § 15 (2001).
288. Espinoza v. Thomas, 472 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
289. Mitchell v. Daly, 350 N.W.2d 772, 778-79 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Russell v. Bronson
Heating & Cooling, 345 F. Supp. 2d 761, 796 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
290. Lazover v. Clifford, No. C4-98-1123, 1999 WL 43329, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 2,
1999).
291. Morgan v. Greenwaldt, 786 So. 2d 1037, 1043 (Miss. 2001).
292. Adler v. Ewing, 347 S.W.2d 396, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
293. Weston v. Cole, 758 P.2d 289, 291 (Mont. 1988).
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actions for assault.294 Thus, it is safe to assume that an action for assault
alone would be recognized.
Nebraska
In Nebraska, it has been held that:
[T]he intentional tort of assault [is] a wrongful offer or
attempt with force or threats, made in a menacing
manner, with intent to inflict bodily injury upon another
with present apparent ability to give effect to the
attempt, without requiring that the one assaulted be
subjected to any actual physical injury or contact.295
Nevada
The Nevada Supreme Court has stated that "an assault, a tort that
does not require a physical impact, is in and of itself a predicate for an
award of nominal or compensatory damages without proof of 'serious
emotional distress."'' 96 As a tort that does not require physical impact,
assault "is in and of itself a predicate for an award of nominal or
compensatory damages without proof of 'serious emotional distress."' 2
A jury may therefore award nominal or compensatory damages for an
assault in which the only injury was mental suffering, insult, or hurt
feelings.29
New Hampshire
New Hampshire case law states that "allegations of an intentional
assault do not require expert testimony to prove damages for emotional
and mental suffering."299 A victim of assault may recover for emotional
distress "that he proves he actually suffered, if his damage is of a kind
that normally results from an assault and is normal and reasonable in its
extent. ' ' "
294. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-2-204(3) (2005).
295. Reavis v. Solminski, 551 N.W.2d 528, 536 (Neb. 1996).
296. Olivero v. Lowe, 995 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Nev. 2000).
297. Id.
298. See id.
299. Silva v. Warden, 839 A.2d 4,6 (N.H. 2003).
300. Id.
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New Jersey
New Jersey recognizes the tort of assault and with it the concept of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 21.30,
New Mexico
New Mexico law recognizes a civil action for assault.3°2
New York
In New York, "[t]o sustain a cause of action to recover damages for
assault, there must be proof of physical conduct placing the plaintiff in
imminent apprehension of harmful contact., 30 3 When the plaintiff did
not establish that any of the actions of the defendant put her in
"'imminent apprehension' of 'harmful or offensive contact"' the action
was properly dismissed.3 O
North Carolina
In North Carolina, "[t]he interest in freedom from apprehension of a
harmful or offensive contact with the person is protected by the action
for assault.,
315
North Dakota
North Dakota case law finds assault when one "willfully . . . places
another human being in immediate apprehension of bodily restraint or
harm."3°6 North Dakota recognizes emotional distress as "a constituent
element of damages only recoverable along with other damages in tort
actions for assault.,
30 7
Ohio
Ohio case law defines assault:
301. Earl v. Winne, 101 A.2d 535, 539 (N.J. 1953); Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109, 125
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
302. Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 91 P.3d 58, 70 (N.M. 2004); Mead v. O'Connor, 344
P.2d 478, 479 (N.M. 1959).
303. Bastein v. Sotto, 749 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539 (App. Div. 2002).
304. Hayes v. Schultz, 541 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (App. Div. 1989) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965)).
305. McCracken v. Sloan, 252 S.E.2d 250, 252 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
306. Blessum v. Shelver, 567 N.W.2d 844, 849 (N.D. 1997).
307. Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 920 (N.D. 1989).
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[A]s the willful threat or attempt to harm or touch
another offensively, which threat or attempt reasonably
places the other in fear of such contact. The threat or
attempt must be coupled with a definitive act by one who
has the apparent ability to do the harm or to commit the
offensive touching.'
Oklahoma
Oklahoma follows the definition of assault in Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 21.
Oregon
Oregon has recognized that assault is not the same as battery.1 ° It
has defined assault as "an intentional attempt to do violence to the
person of another coupled with present ability to carry the intention into
effect."3 .
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania defines assault as "an act intended to put another
person in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery, and which
succeeds in causing an apprehension of such battery. ,312
When a person approaches another with two associates
wielding chainsaws, screams 'Bring on the chainsaws!,' to
which the sawyers respond by dismembering the tree in
which the person sits, a factfinder could reasonably
conclude that an assault has occurred. Frankly, we are at
a loss to understand how a factfinder could arrive at any
other conclusion.313
308. Smith v. John Deere Co., 614 N.E.2d 1148,1154 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
309. Brown v. Ford, 905 P.2d 223, 229 (Okla. 1995).
310. Mays v. Huling Buick Co., 424 P.2d 679, 679 (Or. 1967).
311. Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co., 293 P.2d 717, 723 (Or. 1956).
312. Cucinotti v. Ortmann, 159 A.2d 216, 217 (Pa. 1960).
313. Sides v. Cleland, 648 A.2d 793, 796-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
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Rhode Island
Rhode Island has defined assault as "a physical act of a threatening
nature or an offer of corporal injury which puts an individual in
reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm." 314
South Carolina
Although no South Carolina case has been found dealing solely with
the tort of assault, the state does recognize an action for assault and
battery.3 5
South Dakota
South Dakota recognizes that a "claim of civil assault and battery
can be proved if the defendant: '(a) [intended] to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an
imminent apprehension of such a contact; and, (b) an offensive contact
with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.'
31 6
Tennessee
In Tennessee, "a defendant is not subject to liability for assault
unless he or she commits an intentional act creating a reasonable
apprehension of imminent physical harm on the part of the plaintiff." '317
Texas
Under Texas law, an action for assault has been recognized .
Specifically, the tort under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 21
has been recognized. 9
Utah
Utah case law recognizes a civil action for assault that requires: "1.
The defendant acted, intending to cause harmful or offensive contact
with the plaintiff, or imminent apprehension of such contact; and 2. As a
314. Proffitt v. Ricci, 463 A.2d 514, 517 (R.I. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 21 (1965)).
315. Bryant v. Smith, 198 S.E. 20,21 (S.C. 1938).
316. Stratmeyer v. Engberg, 649 N.W.2d 921, 925-26 (S.D. 2002) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965)).
317. Johnson v. Cantrell, No. 01A01-9712-CV-00690, 1999 WL 5083, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan. 7, 1999).
318. N. Side State Bank v. Hunter, 452 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
319. Lisanti v. Dixon, 147 S.W.3d 638, 645 (Tex. App. 2004).
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result, the plaintiff was thereby put in imminent apprehension of [harm]
[contact].""32 The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 21 has been
recognized in the state. 2 '
Vermont
In Vermont:
[i]f the party threatening the assault have [sic] the ability,
means, and apparent intention to carry his threat into
execution, it may in law constitute an assault .... An
assault is an unlawful physical force, partly or fully put in
motion, which creates a reasonable apprehension of
immediate physical injury to a human being.322
Virginia
In Virginia:
[t]o prove assault, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant "performed 'an act intended to cause either
harmful or offensive contact with another person or
apprehension of such contact, and that creates in the
other person's mind a reasonable apprehension of an
imminent battery.' There is no requirement that the
victim of such acts be physically touched."'3z
Washington
In Washington, the definition of assault under Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 21 has been recognized.32 ' Assault has also
been defined as "any such act that causes apprehension of a battery.
325
320. D.D.Z. v. Molerway Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(alterations in original).
321. Banks v. Shivers, 432 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah 1967).
322. Bishop v. Ranney, 7 A. 820, 821 (Vt. 1887) (citation omitted).
323. Bowie v. Murphy, 624 S.E.2d 74, 80 (Va. 2006) (citations omitted).
324. Wagner v. Patterson, 440 P.2d 162, 162 n.1 (Wash. 1968); Brower v. Ackerley, 943
P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
325. Barbu v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 53494-7-1, 2004 WL 2526672, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App.
Nov. 8, 2004).
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West Virginia
In West Virginia the definition of assault under section 21 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts has been recognized.326 The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that "[b]ecause an action
for assault and battery allows for recovery of damages due to resulting
emotional distress, a claim for the tort of outrageous conduct is
duplicitous of a claim for assault and battery, where both claims arise
from the same event.,
327
Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, "[an assault claim requires proof that the defendant
'either had an intent to cause physical harm to [the plaintiff] or an intent
to put [the plaintiff] in fear that physical harm was to be committed
upon [him or her]."' 3  It has also been noted that "[i]n the civil tort
realm, assault is defined as essentially a mental rather than a physical
invasion. , 329
Wyoming
In Wyoming, the supreme court has stated: "In our review of the
intentional torts pleaded ... we find that the elements of civil assault, as
recognized in Restatement (Second) of Torts [§ 21] ... are stated .... 330
326. W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 495 (W. Va. 2004).
327. Criss v. Criss, 356 S.E.2d 620, 620 (W. Va. 1987).
328. Walters v. Soriano, No. 2004AP2100, 2005 WL 2665339, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct.
20, 2005) (citing Wis. JI-Civil 2004 (2003) (assault)).
329. Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 565 N.W.2d 94, 96 n.3 (Wis. 1997).
330. Jung-Leonczynska v. Steup, 782 P.2d 578, 583 (Wyo. 1989).
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APPENDIX B
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION-STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS
Alabama
In order to prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Alabama, substantial evidence must be presented "that the
defendant's conduct (1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and
outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it." '331 The Alabama
Supreme Court "has consistently held that the tort of outrage is a very
limited cause of action that is available only in the most egregious
circumstances. 33 2 Consequently, in the vast majority of outrage cases
reviewed, the court has held that no jury question was presented.333 The
cases in which the Alabama Supreme Court has found a jury question
on an outrage claim have fallen largely within three categories: (1)
wrongful conduct in family burials; (2) insurance agents engaging in
heavy-handed, barbaric tactics to coerce the insured into settling a
claim; and (3) egregious sexual harassment. 334 The Alabama Supreme
Court has held that "[g]eneralized apprehensions and fears do not rise
to the level of the extreme, severe emotional distress required to
support a claim alleging the tort of outrage., 3' A plaintiff's fear alone,
without any corroborating clinical evidence, does not rise to the level of
severe emotional distress.336 For example, a nurse who was required to
undergo blood tests for HIV for one year after a doctor angrily threw a
surgical drape containing a patient's blood and surgical refuse did not
rise to the level of conduct required for the tort of outrage.3
37
Alaska
In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of
emotional distress in Alaska, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
331. Thomas v. BSE Indus. Contractors, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1041, 1043 (Ala. 1993).
332. Johnson v. Fambrough, 706 So. 2d 739, 741 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (citation
omitted).
333. Id.
334. Thomas, 624 So. 2d at 1044.
335. Grantham v. Vanderzyl, 802 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Ala. 2001); see also Thomas, 624 So.
2d at 1045.
336. Grantham, 802 So. 2d at 1081.
337. Id.
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"through extreme or outrageous conduct ... intentionally or recklessly
cause[d] severe emotional distress or bodily harm to another. 338 The
Supreme Court of Alaska has determined in only a few cases that a trial
court abused its discretion in holding that conduct was not sufficiently
outrageous to justify a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. These cases have included an employer pursuing a "two year
private vendetta" against an employee339 and an employer retaliating
against an anesthesiologist after the anesthesiologist announced plans to
open a clinic that would compete with his employer. ' The employer
placed the anesthesiologist under investigation in bad faith, denied him
staff privileges, and published in a national medical reporting system
that his privileges were revoked due to incompetence, negligence, and
malpractice.34'
Arizona
In Arizona, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
requires proof of three elements: (1) the defendant's conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant must either intend to cause
emotional distress or recklessly disregard the near certainty that
emotional distress will result from his conduct; and (3) severe emotional
distress must indeed occur as a result of the defendant's conduct.3 2
Following the Restatement approach, Arizona does not require bodily
injury in order to have a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. For example, a wife was awarded damages for emotional
distress after an escaped inmate broke into her home and shot her
husband in her presence. 4'
Arkansas
The Arkansas Supreme Court set out four factors needed to
establish a claim for outrage or the intentional infliction of emotional
distress:
(1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or
knew or should have known that emotional distress was
338. Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985).
339. King v. Brooks, 788 P.2d 707, 711 (Alaska 1990).
340. Odom v. Fairbanks Mem'l Hosp., 999 P.2d 123, 127 (Alaska 2000).
341. Id. at 127-28.
342. Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987).
343. Duke v. Cochise County, 938 P.2d 84, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
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the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was
"extreme and outrageous," was "beyond all possible
bounds of decency," and was "utterly intolerable in a
civilized community;" (3) the actions of the defendant
were the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) the
emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was so severe
that no reasonable person could be expected to endure
it.344
Arkansas courts have addressed the intentional infliction of
emotional distress in a cautious manner and have stated that recognition
of this tort is "not intended to 'open the doors of the courts to every
slight insult or indignity one must endure in life."'345 The tendency of
Arkansas courts to construe the tort of outrage very narrowly is
particularly evident in the employment context. For example, a
terminated employee's allegations that she was improperly written up
for performance problems, improperly placed on probation, and
wrongfully fired failed to state a claim for outrage. 46
California
The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress in
California are: "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant
with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of
causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or
extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of
the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.,
347
California requires that the conduct be intended to inflict injury or be
engaged in with the realization that injury will result. 348 The conduct
must also "be of a nature that is especially calculated to cause mental
distress of a very serious kind., 349  California limits recovery for
emotional distress suffered as the result of conduct directed at another
person to "the most extreme cases of violent attack, where there is some
especial likelihood of fright or shock."35 In these cases, "it is generally,
344. Faulkner v. Ark. Children's Hosp., 69 S.W.3d 393, 403-04 (Ark. 2002).
345. Dillard Dep't. Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 867 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Ark. 1993) (quoting
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988)).
346. Palmer v. Ark. Council on Econ. Educ., 40 S.W.3d 784, 791-92 (Ark. 2001).
347. Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 595 P.2d 975, 983 (Cal. 1979).
348. Ess v. Eskaton Props., Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 240, 247 (Ct. App. 2002).
349. Id. at 248.
350. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 4 n.5 (Cal. 1985).
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if not always, required that the plaintiff be present at the time the
outrageous conduct occurred."35 '
Colorado
The elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, or outrageous conduct, are "1. [tlhe defendant engaged in
extreme and outrageous conduct; 2. [t]he defendant engaged in the
conduct recklessly or with the intent of causing the plaintiff severe
emotional distress[;] and 3. [t]he plaintiff incurred severe emotional
distress which was caused by the defendant's conduct. 35 2  In the
examination of discrimination cases, the Colorado Court of Appeals has
stated that "to hold that every discrimination claim automatically
constitute[s] outrageous conduct would stretch the tort far beyond its
intended boundaries." '353 Thus, outrageous conduct was not found when
a truck driver alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
after he was fired because of having suffered a heart attack.354 A claim
for outrageous conduct was found when a car lessor's employees used
strong-armed tactics during negotiations, committed fraudulent acts,
and falsified documents related to the lease transaction.
Connecticut
In Connecticut:
In order for a plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability
under intentional infliction of emotional distress, four
elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that
the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he
knew or should have known that emotional distress was
the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct
was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the
emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.
356
351. Ess, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248.
352. Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 882 (Colo. 1994) (alteration in
original).
353. Bigby v. Big 3 Supply Co., 937 P.2d 794, 800 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
354. Id.
355. Roget v. Grand Pontiac, Inc., 5 P.3d 341, 346 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
356. Appleton v. Bd. of Educ., 757 A.2d 1059, 1062 (Conn. 2000) (citations omitted).
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The Connecticut Superior Court has stated that "[c]onduct on the
part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or
results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action
based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress." '357 For instance,
when a terminated employee sued his former employer for inquiring
into the employee's personal beliefs and attitudes and for harassing the
employee to change his mind regarding his refusal to sign false grant
documents, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was
not found.358
Delaware
Delaware follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46
word-for-word and defines intentional infliction of emotional distress as
"[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm."3 9  It is not enough that a
defendant acted with tortious or criminal intent, intended to inflict
emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by
malice or a degree of aggravation that would entitle the plaintiff to
punitive damages under another tort.36° In order for recklessness to
exist, two significant elements must be present.361 The first is the act
itself; the second is "the issue of foreseeability, or the perception [that]
the actor had or should have had of the risk of harm which his conduct
would create. 3 62 Intentional infliction of emotional distress was found
when an attorney intentionally and without notice to his client stopped
payment on a check endorsed to the client.363 The conduct was viewed
as outrageous in the context of an attorney-client relationship of "trust
and confidence.
364
357. Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 597 A.2d 846, 847 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991).
358. See Campbell v. Town of Plymouth, 811 A.2d 243,253 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
359. Avallone v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 931, 938 (D. Del. 1982).
360. See Mattern v. Hudson, 532 A.2d 85, 86 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987).
361. Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 530 (Del. 1987).
362. Id.
363. Cummings v. Pinder, 574 A.2d 843,845 (Del. 1990).
364. Id.
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District of Columbia
In order to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
District of Columbia requires that a plaintiff show "(1) 'extreme and
outrageous conduct' on the part of the defendant which (2) intentionally
or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff 'severe emotional distress."'36" 5
Following the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46, the conduct
must be so outrageous and extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency and be regarded as atrocious and intolerable in a civilized
community. 36  Intentional infliction of emotional distress was found
when an employer subjected an employee to nine months of loud and
piercing noise emitted by sound-screen devices, and the employer knew
that the employee had become seriously ill as a result.167 Outrageous
conduct was not found when an employee was demoted following an
investigation of sexual harassment charges that had been filed against
him.3"
Florida
In order to establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in Florida, the plaintiff must show that:
(1) the wrongdoer's conduct was intentional or reckless[,
that is], he intended his behavior when he knew or
should have known that emotional distress would likely
result; (2) the conduct was outrageous[, that is], beyond
all bounds of decency, atrocious and utterly intolerable
in a civilized community; (3) the conduct caused
emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was
severe.
369
Florida has adopted the definition of outrageous conduct offered in
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46.370 While Florida courts have
been hesitant to find outrageous conduct based solely on verbal abuse,
they did find that a prima facie case was established when an employer
365. Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 985 (D.C. 1984) (citations omitted).
366. Kerrigan v. Britches of Georgetowne, Inc., 705 A.2d 624, 628 (D.C. 1997).
367. Larijani v. Georgetown Univ., 791 A.2d 41, 44-45 (D.C. 2002).
368. Kerrigan, 705 A.2d at 628.
369. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Novotny, 657 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
370. See Johnson v. Thigpen, 788 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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repeatedly used language that ordinary people would find obscene and
lascivious in addition to evidence of offensive, repeated, and
unwelcomed physical contact with an employee.371 Florida does not
require physical injury to recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 3
72
Georgia
Four elements must be present to support a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in Georgia: (1) intentional or reckless
conduct; (2) that is extreme and outrageous; (3) a causal connection
between the wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's emotional distress; and
(4) the resulting emotional distress must be severe.3 73 Under Georgia
law, it is not enough for the defendant's conduct to be intentional,
willful, or wanton.374 To warrant recovery, the conduct must also be so
severe that it "naturally give[s] rise to such intense feelings of
humiliation, embarrassment, fright or extreme outrage as to cause
severe emotional distress. 3 75 Georgia outlines specific factors that may
contribute to outrageous conduct, including the existence of a special
relationship in which one person controls another, the actor's awareness
of the victim's particular susceptibility, and the severity of the
outrageous conduct as a matter of law.3 76  Following Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 46, the Georgia Court of Appeals has stated
that "plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be
hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts
that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. 3 77  Thus, outrageous
conduct was not found when an employer gave a harsh performance
evaluation the day an employee returned from extended psychiatric care
and when the employer continued the review despite tearful pleas from
the employee to postpone it.
3 78
371. See id. at 414.
372. See R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360,363 (Fla. 1995).
373. Clark v. Arras, 443 S.E.2d 277, 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
374. St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens, Inc. v. Radiology Prof'l Corp., 421 S.E.2d 731, 734 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1992).
375. Id.
376. Clark, 443 S.E.2d at 279.
377. Peoples v. Guthrie, 404 S.E.2d 442, 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
378. Jarrard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 529 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
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Hawaii
Hawaii did not adopt the approach set forth in section 46 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts until 2003.179 It now holds that the
elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: "1) that the
act allegedly causing the harm was intentional or reckless, 2) that the act
was outrageous, and 3) that the act caused 4) extreme emotional distress
to another."'38 This marks a significant change from Hawaii's previous
elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress which were: "(1)
that the act allegedly causing the harm was intentional; (2) that the act
was unreasonable; and (3) that the actor should have recognized that the
act was likely to result in illness." '381  In accordance with the
Restatement, Hawaii no longer requires bodily injury to establish severe
emotional distress.38
Idaho
In Idaho, intentional infliction of emotional distress has the
following elements: (1) the defendant's conduct was intentional or
reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) there was a
causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's
emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.'
Interestingly, the justification for an award of damages for emotional
distress "lie[s] not in whether distress was actually suffered by a plaintiff,
but rather the quantum of outrageousness of the defendant's
conduct.",384
Illinois
In Illinois there are three elements necessary to state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress:
First, the conduct involved must be truly extreme and
outrageous. Second, the actor must either intend that his
conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that
there is at least a high probability that his conduct will
379. See Hac v. Univ. of Haw., 73 P.3d 46,60-61 (Haw. 2003).
380. Id.
381. Id. at 59.
382. Id. at 60.
383. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 740 (Idaho 2003).
384. Id.
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cause severe emotional distress. Third, the conduct must
in fact cause severe emotional distress.385
The state has fully adopted the comments to Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 46. 6 It does not bar an action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress in a marital relationship or subject it to a
heightened threshold for establishing outrageous conduct. 7 The Illinois
Supreme Court has found a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress when a former wife sued her former husband for dozens of
episodes of physical and emotional abuse and her resulting loss of self-
esteem, difficulty in forming relationships, and post-traumatic stress
disorder.
Indiana
To establish liability for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Indiana, "a plaintiff must prove that a defendant (1) engaged
in 'extreme and outrageous' conduct that (2) intentionally or recklessly
(3) caused (4) severe emotional distress., 389 The basis for the tort is "the
intent to harm one emotionally. '' 391 Specifically, the Indiana Court of
Appeals has stated that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress applies in cases that involve "the invasion of a legal right which
by its very nature is likely to provoke an emotional disturbance."'3 91
Sufficient evidence of intentional infliction of emotional distress was
found when a deceased man's daughter sued the deceased's second wife
for disinterring the deceased's remains and removing the headstone
from his grave.392 The second wife knew family members customarily
visited the grave and when they arrived at the grave site, they suffered
severe emotional trauma when they discovered the grave had been
desecrated.393  Evidence of intentional infliction of emotional distress
was not found when a young boy was injured when he became entangled
in a fence at a city playground.3 94 The court held that the family failed to
385. McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988) (emphasis in original).
386. Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 507 (Ill. 1994).
387. Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 81 (I11. 2003).
388. Id. at 88-89.
389. Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 691 (Ind. 1997).
390. Munsell v. Hambright, 776 N.E.2d 1272, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
391. Mullen v. Cogdell, 643 N.E.2d 390, 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
392. Mitchell v. Stevenson, 677 N.E.2d 551, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
393. Id.
394. Rivera ex rel. Rivera v. City of Nappanee, 704 N.E.2d 131, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
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state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because
there were no allegations that the city intended to cause harm to the
family.395
Iowa
To assert a claim for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Iowa, a plaintiff must demonstrate four elements: "(1)
[o]utrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) [t]he defendant's intentional
causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional
distress; (3) [p]laintiff has suffered severe or extreme emotional distress;
and (4) [a]ctual proximate causation of the emotional distress by the
defendant's outrageous conduct."396 Iowa courts emphasize that "the
conduct must be extremely egregious; mere insult, bad manners, or hurt
feelings are insufficient."'3 97 Thus, intentional infliction of emotional
distress was not found when a university dean allegedly lost his temper
with a faculty member, yelling at her and using sexist and condescending
language.3 9
Kansas
Under Kansas law, the tort of outrage is the same at the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The elements of this claim
are: (1) the defendant's conduct was intentional or in reckless disregard
of the plaintiff; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) a causal
connection existed between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
mental distress; and (4) the plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and
severe.399  Prior to establishing a claim for outrage, two threshold
requirements must be met: (1) the defendant's conduct must be so
extreme and outrageous as to go beyond the bounds of decency and (2)
the plaintiff's emotional distress must be so extreme that the law must
intervene because "the distress inflicted was so severe that no
reasonable person should be expected to endure it.''°  The
overwhelming majority of Kansas cases have held in favor of the
defendants on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
395. Id. at 133.
396. Northrup v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193,197 (Iowa 1985).
397. Taggart v. Drake Univ., 549 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Iowa 1996).
398. See id.
399. Miller v. Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan & Glassman, 978 P.2d 922, 930 (Kan.
1999).
400. Id.
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"finding that the alleged conduct was not sufficiently 'outrageous' to
support the cause of action." '  For example, a mortuary's act of
allowing a decedent's son to see decedent's body in damaged and
lacerated condition was not extreme and outrageous enough to support
a claim of outrage.i Intentional infliction of emotional distress was
found when an employer refused to pay a former employee, shoved her,
locked her in a building, and filed intentionally false police reports
against her.43 The Kansas Supreme Court held that reasonable people
could regard the defendant's abuse of the criminal justice process as
atrocious and utterly intolerable behavior, and the outrage created by
the employer's conduct was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
severe and extreme emotional distress.'
Kentucky
Kentucky considers the tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress, to be a "gap-filler" tort intended to provide a remedy
when no other tort is adequate. 5 In order to recover under the tort of
outrage, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the wrongdoer's conduct was
intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was outrageous and intolerable
in that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency
and morality; (3) there was a causal connection between the
wrongdoer's conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional
distress was severe.0 Kentucky has been much more liberal than many
other states in finding intentional infliction of emotional distress. For
example, a supervisor calling an employee sexually explicit names and
making lewd comments was held to be sufficiently extreme and
outrageous as to give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.' Intentional infliction of emotional distress was
also found when a farm owner who boarded horses sold them for
slaughter and then lied to the owner about the horses' whereabouts. 
8
The Kentucky Court of Appeals also held that a jury could find
subjecting an African-American co-employee to extreme racial remarks,
401. See Wood v. City of Topeka, Kan., Topeka Hous. Auth., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1194
(D. Kan. 2000).
402. Ely v. Hitchcock, 58 P.3d 116, 125 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).
403. Taiwo v. Vu, 822 P.2d 1024, 1028-31 (Kan. 1991).
404. Id. at 1030.
405. Brewer v. Hillard, 15 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).
406. Id. at 6.
407. Id. at 6-8.
408. Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 811-12 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
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verbal abuse, intimidation, and harassment was sufficiently extreme and
outrageous so as to constitute intentional infliction of emotional
distress.4°9
Louisiana
In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress in
Louisiana:
[A] plaintiff must establish (1) that the conduct of the
defendant was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the
emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe;
and (3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe
emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress
would be certain or substantially certain to result from
his conduct.41 °
Further,
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with
an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he
intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that this
conduct has been characterized by "malice" or a degree
of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to
punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been
found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.411
In recent years, Louisiana courts have dealt with a large number of
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims arising in the
employment context. They have limited the cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress in a workplace setting to cases
that involve:
409. Wilson v. Lowe's Home Ctr., 75 S.W.3d 229, 238 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
410. White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991).
411. Goldberg v. Moses, 811 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
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[A] pattern of deliberate, repeated harassment over a
period of time. The distress suffered by the employee
must be more than a reasonable person could be
expected to endure. Moreover, the employer's conduct
must be intended or calculated to cause severe emotional
distress, not just some lesser degree of fright,
humiliation, embarrassment or worry.412
For example, an employer's understaffing of a department that
resulted in an employee's depression, stress, and persistent anxiety was
not found to be outrageous or intended to cause severe emotionald. 411
distress. In addition, a supervisor directing profanity at employees
who were sitting idly and referring to and castigating them with vulgar
words was not found to constitute intentional infliction of emotional
distress.414
Maine
To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the plaintiff must show that:
(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted
severe emotional distress or was certain or substantially
certain that such distress would result from his conduct;
(2) the conduct was so "extreme and outrageous" as to
exceed "all possible bounds of decency" and must be
regarded as "atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community"; (3) the actions of the defendant
caused the plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the
emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was "severe"
so that "no reasonable man could be expected to endure
it."
41 5
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has noted that "a plaintiff
need not prove that the defendant, in fact, wanted the resulting distress
to occur or foresaw that distress as a practically certain result of his
acts. 4 16 A person acts recklessly only "if he knows or has reason to
412. Id. at 1167 (citation omitted).
413. Richardson v. Home Depot USA, 808 So. 2d 544,546-48 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
414. White, 585 So. 2d at 1210-11.
415. Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 154 (Me. 1979) (citations omitted).
416. Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gervais, 715 A.2d 938, 941 (Me. 1998).
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know of facts giving rise to a high degree of risk of harm to another and
yet deliberately acts, or fails to act, in conscious disregard of that risk.,
417
Thus, an insurer was not found to have intentionally or recklessly
inflicted emotional distress when it investigated and denied coverage to
an insured.418
Maryland
A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has four
elements in Maryland: "(1) [t]he conduct must be intentional or
reckless; (2) [t]he conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) [t]here
must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the
emotional distress; (4) [t]he emotional distress must be severe.
41
1
Recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is extremely
limited in Maryland. The Court of Special Appeals has specifically
stated that "recovery [for intentional infliction of emotional distress]
will be meted out sparingly, its balm reserved for those wounds that are
truly severe and incapable of healing themselves. 4 20 Maryland courts
uphold claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress only for
truly egregious acts. 42' These cases have included a psychologist having
sexual relations with the plaintiff's wife while he was treating the couple
in marriage counseling,422 a physician not telling a nurse with whom he
had sexual intercourse that he had herpes, 23 and a worker's
compensation insurer insisting the a claimant submit to psychiatric
examination with the only purpose to harass her and to force her to
abandon her claim or commit suicide. 24
Massachusetts
To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in
Massachusetts, the plaintiff must show:
(1) that the defendant intended to inflict emotional
distress, or knew or should have known that emotional
417. Id.
418. Id. at 942.
419. Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977).
420. Miller v. Ratner, 688 A.2d 976, 996 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (emphasis omitted).
421. See id.
422. Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69, 75-77 (Md. 1991).
423. B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1180-82 (Md. 1988).
424. Young v. Hartford Accid. & Indem. Co., 492 A.2d 1270, 1277-79 (Md. 1985).
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distress was the likely result of his conduct,... (2) that
the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous,
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community, (3) [that] the actions
of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff's distress,
and (4) [that] the emotional distress suffered by the
plaintiff was severe and of such a nature that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.425
An extramarital affair, even if conducted for the purpose of hurting
the other spouse, does not rise to the level of outrageousness necessary
to support an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.4 26 A
parent and brother of a sexually abused child could not recover from the
abuser for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress when
they were not present, had no contemporaneous knowledge of the
event, and did not have severe emotional responses.427
Michigan
In Michigan, "[t]he tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
has four elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or
recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress., 4 28
Following Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46, Michigan courts
consider the duration and intensity of the distress in determining its
severity, and seeking medical treatment is not a condition precedent to
finding intentional infliction of emotional distress. 429  The Michigan
Court of Appeals held that a reasonable person could conclude that the
act of surreptitiously videotaping plaintiffs having sexual relations would
cause emotional distress. 3°  In addition, intentional infliction of
emotional distress was found when, during a two-year period, a doctor's
co-worker threatened the doctor's fiancde with physical harm, left
lingerie on the doctor's car and outside his home, and left a hatchet and
axe on the fianc6e's vehicle."' An employer's discrimination based
upon race and employees' associations with people of other races was
425. Quinn v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 338 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (alterations in original).
426. Id. at 340.
427. Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 517 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Mass. 1988).
428. Haverbush v. Powelson, 551 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
429. See id.
430. Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675,689-90 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
431. Haverbush, 551 N.W.2d at 209.
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not sufficiently extreme or outrageous to support a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 32
Minnesota
Following section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
Minnesota holds that intentional infliction of emotional distress consists
of four distinct elements: "(1) the conduct must be extreme and
outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (3) it must
cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be severe.,
433
Minnesota follows section 46 closely and defines outrageous conduct as
conduct that "passes the boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable
to the civilized community., 43 4 Similarly, emotional distress is severe if
"no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it. ' 43  The
Minnesota Court of Appeals allowed an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim go to the jury when the plaintiff saw his friend
436get run over and killed by an oil tanker driven by the defendant.
There was medical evidence that the plaintiff suffered nightmares,
paranoia, and nervousness as a result of the defendant leaving the
accident scene. The court held that "[a] jury should be given an
opportunity to determine whether [the defendant's] intentional conduct
surpassed the bounds of decency and whether his intentional act of
leaving the scene caused [the plaintiff] to suffer severe emotional
distress." 437
Mississippi
To prevail in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in
Mississippi, "the defendant's conduct must be 'wanton and willful [as to]
evoke outrage or revulsion.' 438 Following the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 46, the alleged conduct must be "'so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds
432. Graham v. Ford, 604 N.W.2d 713, 716-17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
433. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn.1983).
434. Haagenson v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 n.3
(Minn. 1979).
435. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
cmt. j (1965)).
436. lacona v. Schrupp, 521 N.W.2d 70, 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
437. Id.
438. Speed v. Scott, 787 So. 2d 626, 630 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Leaf River Forest Prods.,
Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So. 2d 648, 659 (Miss. 1995)).
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of decency.', 439 Actions that have been found to evoke such outrage
include plotting to hide the child of an unwed father while arranging for
the baby to be adopted while the father pursued a custody suit," and a
car dealership forging a customer's name on a sales contract and selling
the contract to a finance company, resulting in the customer's credit
being damaged."1  Mississippi courts have further stated that legal
redress results from the nature of the act itself, not the seriousness of the
consequences.442 In asserting a claim for mental anguish, whether as a
result of simple negligence or intentional, the emotional distress must be
proved to be a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's
conduct. 443 As long as there is outrageous conduct, no injury is required
for recovery.'
Missouri
In Missouri, the "tort has four elements: (1) the defendant must act
intentionally or recklessly, (2) [the defendant's] conduct must be
extreme and outrageous, and (3) the conduct must be the cause (4) of
severe emotional distress."" Missouri defines outrageous conduct
according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46. Missouri
courts have found conduct sufficiently outrageous to support a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress when a whistleblower sued
her employer for confiscating files from her office, altering vacation
records relating to her vacation time, making prank calls to her home,
and demoting her. '4
Montana
Under Montana law, an independent cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress arises "under circumstances where
serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was the reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligent or intentional act
or omission."" 7 Montana defines "serious or severe emotional distress"
439. Clark v. Luvel Dairy Prods., Inc., 821 So. 2d 827, 831 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting
Pegues v. Emerson Elec. Co., 913 F. Supp. 976, 982 (N.D. Miss. 1996)).
440. Smith v. Malouf, 722 So. 2d 490, 497-98 (Miss. 1998).
441. T.G. Blackwell Chevrolet Co. v. Eshee, 261 So. 2d 481, 484-85 (Miss. 1972).
442. Brown v. Inter-City Fed. Bank for Sav., 738 So. 2d 262, 265 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
443. Adams v. U.S. Homecrafters, Inc., 744 So. 2d 736, 743 (Miss. 1999).
444. Id. at 742.
445. Boes v. Deschu, 768 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
446. Polk v. Inroads/St. Louis, Inc. 951 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
447. Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 418 (Mont. 1995).
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according to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46, comment j.
Whether a tortfeasor's conduct is "extreme and outrageous" is not
controlling under Montana law. The difference between negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress does not lie in the elements of
the tort, "but in the nature and culpability of the defendant's
conduct."'
Nebraska
To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Nebraska, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) that there
has been intentional or reckless conduct, (2) that the conduct was so
outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency and is to be regarded as atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community; and (3) that the conduct
caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person should be
expected to endure it."9 The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that a
decedent's estate may recover for the decedent's conscious pain,
suffering, and mental distress that resulted from the apprehension or
fear of impending death. 5' The Nebraska Supreme Court has also held
that a "sexual relationship between two consenting adults is not
outrageous conduct such as to give rise to a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress..''451 For example, a priest's sexual
relationship with a member of his church who also received emotional
counseling from him at the time did not give rise to a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.4"2
Nevada
To establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Nevada, the plaintiff must establish the following: "(1)
extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of, or reckless
disregard for, causing emotional distress, (2) the plaintiff's having
suffered severe or extreme emotional distress and (3) actual or
proximate causation., 453 "Nevada does not recognize a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment
448. Id. at 429.
449. Dale v. Thomas Funeral Home, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 805, 807-08 (Neb. 1991).
450. Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25, 25 (Neb. 1989).
451. Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha, 508 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Neb. 1993).
452. See id.
453. Star v. Rabello, 625 P.2d 90, 92 (Nev. 1981).
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termination context. 454  While Nevada does not have an explicit
physical injury or manifestation requirement to recover for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the Supreme Court of Nevada has stated
that "[t]he less extreme the outrage, the more appropriate it is to
require evidence of physical injury or illness from the emotional
distress. , 411 Insomnia, embarrassment, and physical or emotional
discomfort, without more, are insufficient to establish a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.456
New Hampshire
New Hampshire did not recognize a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress until 1991 when it adopted Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 46.4  Since this time, New Hampshire courts
have rarely dealt with claims alleging the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. A claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress was found when an employer abused her position of power and
threatened to monitor an employee's conversations and discipline her
without cause, and the employer continued the threats after receiving
notice that the employee was susceptible to emotional distress.458
New Jersey
In order to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in New Jersey, the "plaintiff must establish
intentional and outrageous conduct by the defendant, proximate cause,
and distress that is severe., 459  While New Jersey has adopted the
definition of outrageous conduct offered in Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 46, unlike other states, New Jersey has offered a definition
of severe emotional distress. New Jersey defines severe emotional
distress as " 'any type of severe and disabling emotional or mental
condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by
professionals trained to do so."' 6° In order to constitute actionable
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the defendant's conduct must
454. Brooks v. Hilton Casinos, Inc., 959 F.2d 757, 766 (9th Cir. 1992).
455. Nelson v. City of Las Vegas, 665 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Nev. 1983).
456. Chowdhry v. NLVH, Inc., 851 P.2d 459, 462 (Nev. 1993).
457. Morancy v. Morancy, 593 A.2d 1158, 1158-59 (N.H. 1991).
458. Karch v. Baybank FSB, 794 A.2d 763, 770-71 (N.H. 2002).
459. Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988).
460. Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 697 (N.J. 1998) (quoting Poole v. Copland, Inc.,
481 S.E.2d 88, 93 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)).
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be sufficiently severe to "cause genuine and substantial emotional
distress or mental harm to average persons."46 ' While many jurisdictions
have concluded that racial slurs uttered by an employer do not
constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey found that a sheriff calling an African-American
employee "jungle bunny" could cause severe emotional distress to the
average African-American.4 62 The court noted that a racial slur spoken
on the street does not constitute outrageous conduct, but "a jury could
reasonably conclude that the power dynamics of the workplace
contribute to the extremity and the outrageousness of defendant's
conduct."4
63
New Mexico
Following Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46, New Mexico
law states that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
arises when "a defendant intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress through extreme and outrageous conduct. ' '464 To
recover emotional stress damages, the harm must be "severe." Severe
means that "'a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be
unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the
circumstances.' 65 The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that an
employer's discharge of an employee while she was recuperating from
surgery could constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.466  A
mortuary's conduct of disturbing the grave of the plaintiffs' mother and
exposing her remains was not found to be extreme or outrageous and
plaintiffs' mental distress was not found to be sufficiently severe to give
467rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
New York
To establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress under New York law, the plaintiff "must demonstrate wrongful
conduct on the part of [the defendant] that was 'intentionally or
461. Decker v. Princeton Packet, Inc., 561 A.2d 1122, 1128 (N.J. 1989).
462. Taylor, 706 A.2d at 695.
463. Id.
464. Jaynes v. Strong-Thorne Mortuary, Inc., 954 P.2d 45, 50 (N.M. 1997).
465. Id. (quoting Folz v. State, 797 P.2d 246, 254 (N.M. 1990)).
466. Stock v. Grantham, 964 P.2d 125, 136 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
467. Jaynes, 954 P.2d at 50.
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recklessly' calculated to cause [the plaintiff] emotional distress."' '
Following Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46, the misconduct
must be "'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' ' 469 New York courts
have been extremely hesitant to find outrageous conduct. One court did
find that a jury could rationally conclude that a neighbor's conduct was
extreme and outrageous when he used vulgar language and made
outrageous threats to the plaintiff and his young daughters when the
plaintiff was recovering from major surgery and suffering the physical
and emotional effects of cancer.470
North Carolina
The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress in North
Carolina are: "'1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant 2)
which is intended to and does in fact cause 3) severe emotional
distress.' 47 1 Severe emotional distress is defined in North Carolina as
"'neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of
severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be
generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do
SO. ' ' ' 472 North Carolina courts have consistently found valid claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress in sexual harassment cases
when there is an unfair power relationship; explicitly obscene language;
sexual advances toward plaintiff; and inappropriate touching.473
North Dakota
In North Dakota, "[t]he elements of an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress are extreme and outrageous conduct that
is intentional or reckless and causes severe emotional distress., 474 "The
'extreme and outrageous' threshold is narrowly limited to conduct that
exceeds 'all possible bounds of decency,' and which would arouse
468. Brown v. City of New York, 306 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting
Fischer v. Maloney, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (N.Y. 1978)).
469. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
470. Stram v. Farrell, 646 N.Y.S.2d 193,194, 196 (App. Div. 1996).
471. Waddle v. Sparks, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. 1992) (quoting Dickens v. Puryear, 276
S.E.2d 325 (N.C. 1981)).
472. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc.,
395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990)).
473. See Guthrie v. Conroy, 567 S.E.2d 403,409 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
474. Zuger v. State, 673 N.W.2d 615, 621 (N.D. 2004).
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resentment against the actor and lead to an exclamation of
'Outrageous!' by an average member of the community., 47  North
Dakota has upheld a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
in very few cases. The state's supreme court allowed an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim to go to the jury when an employee
alleged that her supervisor discriminated against her, oppressed her
repeatedly on the basis of gender, refused to discuss her employment
situation, and knew of her unstable and deteriorating emotional
476
condition.
Ohio
The Ohio Supreme Court held that in order to prove intentional
infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the
defendant intended to cause the plaintiff serious emotional distress, (2)
that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, and (3) that
the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of plaintiff's serious
emotional distress." Unlike Restatement (Second) of Torts section
46, Ohio does not include reckless conduct in its elements for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. In defining "extreme and outrageous"
conduct, the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the definition provided in
section 46, and stated that "[l]iability has been found only where the
conduct has been so outrageous . . .[that it goes] beyond all possible
bounds of decency" and is so atrocious that it is "utterly intolerable in a
civilized community., 47 Furthermore, "[o]nly the most extreme wrongs,
which do gross violence to the norms of a civilized society, will rise to
the level of outrageous conduct., 479 The Ohio Court of Appeals found a
genuine issue of material fact as to the outrageousness of intentional
conduct when an employer fired an employee when he did not return to
work at the end of twelve weeks of medical leave following a dock
leveler collapse on the employee's head that caused serious injuries.
The employee became very upset after the employer's numerous phone
calls and lack of understanding in repeatedly asking the employee to
return to work.4'
475. Id. at 622.
476. Swenson v. N. Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 183 (N.D. 1993).
477. Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ohio 1994).
478. Reamsnyder v. Jaskolski, 462 N.E.2d 392, 394 (Ohio 1984).
479. Brown v. Denny, 594 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
480. Rigby v. Fallsway Equip. Co., 779 N.E.2d 1056, 1058-59 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
481. Id. at 1065.
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Oklahoma
"To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress
[in Oklahoma], a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant's conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (3) the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff emotional
distress; and (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe." The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma has held that an emotional distress claim
was warranted to go to the jury when following an employee's
termination of a consensual sexual relationship with the business owner,
the owner harassed the employee for two years with letters, phone calls,
and visits to her home and workplace."" In employment cases in which
the plaintiff-employee alleged that the employer mimicked and ridiculed
the employee;' made lewd remarks and embarrassed the employee; 5
and used derogatory sexual comments,86 Oklahoma courts have not
found intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Oregon
Oregon has adopted elements of Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 46, but has not adopted it in toto as Oregon law.8 7
"To state a claim for intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead that (1) the
defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress on
the plaintiff, (2) the defendant's acts were the cause of
the plaintiff's severe emotional distress, and (3) the
defendant's acts constituted an extraordinary
transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable
conduct." ' 8
Following the commentary with section 46, a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress can arise when the defendant "'desires to
inflict severe emotional distress"' or when the defendant knows "'such
482. Computer Publ'ns, Inc. v. Welton, 49 P.3d 732, 735 (Okla. 2002).
483. Id. at 736.
484. Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 76-77 (Okla. 1986).
485. Anderson v. Okla. Temp. Servs., Inc., 925 P.2d 574, 577 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996).
486. Mirzaie v. Smith Cogeneration, Inc., 962 P.2d 678, 682-84 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998).
487. Delaney v. Clifton, 41 P.3d 1099, 1104 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
488. McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841, 849 (Or. 1995) (quoting Sheets v. Knight,
779 P.2d 1000 (Or. 1989)).
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distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct.' ', 489
Oregon courts look particularly closely at the setting in which the
conduct occurred as well as the relationships between the parties to
determine the degree of offensiveness of the conduct." The Oregon
Court of Appeals upheld a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress when a physically disabled bus passenger sued the metropolitan
transportation district for a bus driver allegedly belittling, berating, and
insulting the passenger.49' The Oregon Supreme Court has declined to
.resolve the question of whether third-party claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress generally should be acknowledged in
Oregon.492
Pennsylvania
There is much controversy over whether Pennsylvania jurisprudence
recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. It is
clear that in order to state such a claim, the elements of section 46 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts must be satisfied: "(1) One who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for
such bodily harm."'4 93 In addition, the plaintiffs must allege physical
injury.94  Pennsylvania bars recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress when a third-party does not have contemporaneous
observation of the tort allegedly committed upon a relative and holds
that presence is required to pursue a tort for severe emotional distress.495
Rhode Island
To impose liability based upon the intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Rhode Island, "(1) the conduct must be intentional or in
reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (2)
the conduct must be extreme and outrageous, (3) there must be a causal
connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress,
489. Id. at 853. (emphasis omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
cmt. i (1965)).
490. See Delaney, 41 P.3d at 1106.
491. Williams v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 958 P.2d 202, 203, 205 (Or. Ct. App.
1998).
492. Delaney, 41 P.3d at 1110, rev. denied, 54 P.3d 1041 (Or. 2002).
493. Hunger v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, 670 A.2d 173, 177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
494. Hart v. O'Malley, 647 A.2d 542, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
495. Taylor v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 754 A.2d 650,653 (Pa. 2000).
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and (4) the emotional distress in question must be severe." '96 Rhode
Island requires at least some proof of medically established physical
symptomatology for both negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.4 97 The proof of physical symptomatology is a relaxed
standard in Rhode Island. For example, a plaintiff was found to have
established physical symptomatology based upon his own testimony
about emotional distress and humiliation despite the absence of a
medical expert.498
South Carolina
To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in
South Carolina, a plaintiff must establish that:
(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted
severe emotional distress or was certain or substantially
certain that such distress would result from his conduct;
(2) the [defendant's] conduct was so "extreme and
outrageous" at to exceed "all possible bounds of
decency" and must be regarded as "atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community"; (3) the actions of
the defendant caused the plaintiff's emotional distress;
and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff
was "severe" so that "no reasonable [person] could be
expected to endure it.
'4 99
The majority of South Carolina cases finding outrageous conduct
generally require "hostile or abusive encounters" or "coercive or
oppressive conduct."5' ° The South Carolina Supreme Court has held
that a jury could find outrageous conduct when an employer forced an
employee to perform activities in public which exposed her incontinence
problem.0 1 A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was
also upheld when a homebuyer repeatedly subjected a real estate agent
to public brow beatings, obscenities, and threats over a two-year period
496. Champlin v. Wash. Trust Co., 478 A.2d 985, 989 (R.I. 1984).
497. Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 863 (R.I. 1998).
498. Adams v. Uno Rests., Inc., 794 A.2d 489, 492-93 (R.I. 2002).
499. Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.E.2d 776, 778 (S.C. 1981) (citations omitted).
500. Gattison v. S.C. State Coll., 456 S.E.2d 414, 417 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995); Wright v.
Sparrow, 381 S.E.2d 503, 506 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
501. McSwain v. Shei, 402 S.E.2d 890, 892 (S.C. 1991).
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and entered her home without permission and verbally attacked her in
front of her guests."°
South Dakota
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is proved in
South Dakota by establishing that the defendant "(1) by extreme and
outrageous conduct, (2) acted intentionally or recklessly to cause the
plaintiff severe emotional distress, (3) which conduct in fact caused the
plaintiff severe distress, and (4) the plaintiff suffered an extreme,
disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct.""5 3 In South
Dakota, "[tihe tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
requires no proof of physical injury or actual pecuniary loss.""
Following comment d in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46,
the conduct necessary to form intentional infliction of emotional distress
must be "'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."'5 5 South Dakota has
found outrageous conduct when a husband made public accusations of
child abuse that caused his wife to lose her job."° A jury also believed
that a former husband arranging to have his former wife criminally
prosecuted on a bogus theft charge, harassing her, and sending her
threatening letters constituted outrageous conduct.'0
Tennessee
Under Tennessee law, there are three essential elements to a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress: "(1) the conduct
complained of must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be
so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society; and (3) the
conduct complained of must result in serious mental injury., 508
Tennessee has adopted the definition of outrageous conduct given in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. °9 The Supreme Court of Tennessee
held that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was
502. Ford, 276 S.E.2d at 779-80.
503. Henry v. Henry, 604 N.W.2d 285,288 (S.D. 2000).
504. Id.
505. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
506. Christians v. Christians, 637 N.W.2d 377, 382-83 (S.D. 2001).
507. Henry, 604 N.W.2d at 287.
508. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997).
509. Id. at 622-23.
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sufficiently alleged when employees of a funeral home made upsetting
comments to a deceased individual's children regarding the condition of
the decedent's body after it was embalmed. 10
Texas
In order to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Texas, a plaintiff must establish that "(1) the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly, (2) the [defendant's] conduct was 'extreme
and outrageous,' (3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff
emotional distress, and (4) the resulting emotional distress was
severe." 511 Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires either
that the actor intends to cause severe emotional distress or severe
emotional distress is the primary risk created by the actor's reckless
conduct. 512 Texas has adopted the definition of outrageous conduct
offered in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46 and the Supreme
Court of Texas has directed its courts to consider both the conduct's
context and the parties' relationship."3 Thus, evidence of physical and
emotional abuse was sufficient to support the finding that a husband
caused his wife severe emotional distress and that his behavior was
extreme and outrageous54
Utah
Utah bases a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress on
two elements. A plaintiff must show that the defendant:
[I]ntentionally engaged in some conduct toward the
plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional
distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person would have
known that such would result; and his actions are of such
a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable
in that they offend against the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality.",
510. Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87, 87 (Tenn. 2004).
511. Standard Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. 1998).
512. Id. at 63.
513. See GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611-12 (Tex. 1999).
514. Toles v. Toles, 45 S.W.3d 252, 262-63 (Tex. App. 2001).
515. Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 30 (Utah 2003)
(citations omitted).
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A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was found when
an attorney used his fiduciary position and information gained while
representing his client in a divorce to lure the client into a sexual
relationship. 16
Vermont
To prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiffs must
show "'outrageous conduct, done intentionally or with reckless
disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, resulting in
the suffering of extreme emotional distress, actually or proximately
caused by the outrageous conduct.' 5 17 Following Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 46, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's
conduct was so outrageous as to surpass "'all possible bounds of
decency"' and "'be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.' 5 18 A claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress was upheld when an employer summoned an employee to a
three-hour meeting without notice and without break for rest or food,
repeatedly badgered the employee to amend and sign a statement
regarding the employer's allegations of theft, and terminated the
employee immediately after the meeting despite the employee's
eighteen years of service. 19
Virginia
In Virginia, a plaintiff who seeks to recover damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress must show that the wrongdoer's conduct
is intentional or reckless; the conduct is outrageous and intolerable; the
alleged conduct and emotional distress are causally connected; and the
distress is severe. 2° Liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress "arises only when the emotional distress is extreme, and only
where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable person could
be expected to endure it."52' Following section 46 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, Virginia defines emotional distress as "the suffering
or mental anguish that arises from being placed in reasonable fear of
516. Walter v. Stewart, 67 P.3d 1042,1048-49 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
517. Crump v. P & C Food Mkts, Inc., 576 A.2d 441, 448 (Vt. 1990) (quoting Birkenhead
v. Coombs, 465 A.2d 244, 247 (Vt. 1983)).
518. Demag v. Am. Ins. Cos., 508 A.2d 697, 699 (Vt. 1986) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
519. Crump, 576 A.2d at 448-49.
520. Jordan v. Shands, 500 S.E.2d 215, 218-19 (Va. 1998).
521. Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (Va. 1991).
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death or bodily injury and is so severe that no reasonable person could
be expected to endure it. 522 It does not require that a plaintiff be
present during the outrageous conduct in order to recover for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 23 For instance, a mother did
not have to be present during the sexual abuse of her daughter in order
to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 11
Washington
To prevail on a claim for outrage, a plaintiff must prove three
elements: "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or
reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) severe emotional
distress on the part of the plaintiff. 5 25  Following the comments in
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46, Washington holds that
plaintiffs who were not present when the allegedly outrageous conduct
occurred cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 26  In addition, Washington does not require objective
symptomatology in terms of physical injury or bodily harm to establish
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 27 A claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was found when a manufacturer's
employees were exposed to toxic chemicals at the workplace and the
employer conducted human experimentation. 52 The Supreme Court of
Washington has also held that an employer can be held vicariously liable
for intentional infliction of emotional distress when an employee's
conduct is sufficiently outrageous.
529
West Virginia
In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim for intentional or
reckless infliction of emotional distress in West Virginia, four elements
must be established. It must be shown:
(1) that the defendant's conduct was atrocious,
intolerable, and so extreme and outrageous as to exceed
522. Woolfolk v. Virginia, 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
523. See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 950 (4th Cir. 1988).
524. Id.
525. Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 337 (Wash. 1998).
526. Id. at 338.
527. Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 633 (Wash. 2003).
528. Birklid v. Boeing Co., 904 P.2d 278, 288-89 (Wash. 1995).
529. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 619-20 (Wash. 2002).
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the bounds of decency; (2) that the defendant acted with
the intent to inflict emotional distress, or acted recklessly
when it was certain or substantially certain emotional
distress would result from his conduct; (3) that the
actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer
emotional distress; and, (4) that the emotional distress
suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it.53°
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has held that a
corporation cannot recover for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.5 3' But, an employer may be liable for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for failing to stop a supervisor's
outrageous conduct despite repeated requests.532 The employer may be
liable whether the supervisor "caused, contributed to, or acquiesced in
the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress upon an
employee.
' '1
3
Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, a person may recover damages for the intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress upon him or her by another. Four
factors must be established for an injured person to recover: "[(1)] That
the conduct was intended to cause emotional distress, [(2)] That the
conduct was extreme and outrageous, [(3)] That the conduct was a cause
of the person's emotional distress, and [(4)] That the emotional distress
was extreme and disabling."5 4 Recklessness on the part of a defendant
will not support such an action, since Wisconsin does not recognize
recklessness as a separate form of tortious conduct.535 Wisconsin
requires that there be "something more than a showing that the
defendant intentionally engaged in the conduct that gave rise to
emotional distress in the plaintiff; the plaintiff must show that the
conduct was engaged in for the purpose of causing emotional
530. Travis v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 504 S.E.2d 419,425 (W. Va. 1998).
531. Chamberlaine & Flowers, Inc. v. Smith Contracting, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 414, 417 (W.
Va. 1986).
532. Travis, 504 S.E.2d at 431-32.
533. Id. at 432.
534. Wis. JI-Civil 2725 (2006).
535. Alsteen v. Gehl, 124 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Wis. 1963).
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distress." '536 Thus, when an owner of a dog brought action against the
city police department for shooting and killing the dog, the owner failed
to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
because there was no evidence that the officer acted with the purpose of
causing the owner emotional harm.537
Wyoming
Wyoming has adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress as defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46:
"[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm., 538 While Wyoming acknowledges
that certain conduct in employment situations may be outrageous
enough to provide a terminated employee with a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, "if an employee's mental distress is
caused solely by a termination that was permitted by the contract, then
the employer has a complete defense even if the employer knows that
the termination will cause the employee emotional distress."539
Wyoming has adopted the third party intentional infliction of emotional
distress cause of action found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 46(2) and does not require that the conduct be repetitive or
recurrent before it can be considered extreme and outrageous. The
plaintiff must show that the behavior was "beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and [would be] regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community."5" A third party does not necessarily have to
visually observe the outrageous conduct, but "must simply show his
'sensory and contemporaneous observance' of the defendant's acts." '541
Thus the claimant is not required to have seen the outrageous acts and
may recover "if he gained personal and contemporaneous knowledge of
them through the use of his remaining senses."'542
536. Rabideau v. City of Racine, 2001 WI 57, 1 36, 243 Wis. 2d 486, 36, 627 N.W.2d
795, 36.
537. Id.
538. Trabing v. Kinko's, Inc., 57 P.3d 1248, 1256 (Wyo. 2002).
539. Id.
540. Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013,1020 (Wyo. 2002).
541. Id. at 1024.
542. Id.
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APPENDIX C
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION-STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS
Alabama
Alabama follows the "zone-of-danger" test, limiting recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress to plaintiffs who sustain a
physical injury as a result of a defendant's conduct or who are placed in
immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct." 3 The state appears
not to have dealt with a bystander situation.
Alaska
Persons in Alaska can recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress they suffer under limited circumstances. "Generally, damages
are not awarded ... in the absence of physical injury."5'4 In bystander
situations: "(1) the plaintiff [must be] located near the scene of the
accident, (2) the shock [must result] from a direct emotional impact
from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, and
(3) a close relationship [must exist] between plaintiff and victim. 5 5
Arizona
In Arizona, to recover for the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress, the shock or mental anguish of the plaintiff must
manifest itself as a physical injury.5 46 Without that, damages are too
speculative.5 47 In bystander situations, "the emotional distress must
result from witnessing an injury to a person with whom the plaintiff has
a close personal relationship, either by consanguinity or otherwise.
5 41
Arkansas
A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in not
recognized in Arkansas.5 49 In wrongful death cases, however, the state's
543. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 752 So. 2d 1201, 1203 (Ala. 1999).
544. Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 165 (Alaska 2002).
545. Id.
546. Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979).
547. Id. at 669-70.
548. Id. at 670.
549. Mechs. Lumber Co. v. Smith, 752 S.W.2d 763,765 (Ark. 1988).
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death statute is the sole means of recovery for mental anguish in the
death of a loved one.550
California
In California, "[a] cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress requires that a plaintiff show '(1) serious emotional
distress, (2) actually and proximately caused by (3) [the] wrongful
conduct (4) [of] a defendant who should have foreseen that the conduct
would cause such distress."'551 In bystander situations, recovery may be
had if, but only if, the plaintiff:
(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at
the scene of the injury producing event at the time it
occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the
victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional
distress-a reaction beyond that which would be
anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an
552abnormal response to the circumstances. -
Colorado
In Colorado, to establish a case of negligent infliction of emotional
distress, a plaintiff is
required to present evidence from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that defendant's negligence
subjected [the plaintiff] to an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm and caused [the plaintiff] to be put in fear for [his
or her] own safety, that plaintiff's fear was shown by
physical consequences or long-continued emotional
disturbance, and that plaintiff's fear was the cause of the
damages [he or she] claimed.5 3
The state courts have yet to rule on the bystander situation except to
hold that no recovery would be allowed in a case in which the bystander
550. Waldrip v. McGarity, 605 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Ark. 1980).
551. Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Brooks v. United
States, 29 F. Supp. 2d 613, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1998)).
552. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989) (footnotes omitted).
553. Scharrel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 949 P.2d 89, 93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
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was not within the zone of danger and did not fear for his or her own
safety.
5 4
Connecticut
To recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress in
Connecticut, the plaintiff must prove that "(1) the defendant's conduct
created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress;
(2) the plaintiff's distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was
severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the
defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress." '555 In
bystander situations, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) he or she is closely related to the injury victim, such
as the parent or the sibling of the victim; (2) the
emotional injury of the bystander is caused by the
contemporaneous sensory perception of the event or
conduct that causes the injury, or by arriving on the
scene soon thereafter and before substantial change has
occurred in the victim's condition or location; (3) the
injury of the victim must be substantial, resulting in his or
her death or serious physical injury; and (4) the
bystander's emotional injury must be serious, beyond
that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness
and which is not the result of abnormal response.
55 6
Delaware
When negligence causes fright in a person within the immediate area
of physical danger from that negligence, which in turn produces physical
consequences such as would be elements of damages if a bodily injury
had been suffered, the injured party is entitled to recover for the
emotional harm. 57 Such a rule would not be extended to cover the
bystander situation, unless the bystander was within the zone of danger
to the victim of the tortious conduct.558 When "negligent conduct results
554. James v. Harris, 729 P.2d 986, 987 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
555. Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 815 A.2d 119, 127 (Conn. 2003).
556. Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 865 (Conn. 1996).
557. Robb v. Pa. R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 714-15 (Del. 1965).
558. Mancino v. Webb, 274 A.2d 711,714 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
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only in emotional disturbance no bodily injury or sickness being present,
there can be no recovery."" 9
District of Columbia
To recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the
absence of a direct physical injury, a plaintiff must show that he or she
was within the zone of physical danger caused by the tortfeasor's
negligence so as to fear for his or her own safety. 6° Bystanders who are
not within the zone of danger appear to have no recourse.56
Florida
Florida had applied the impact rule in most negligent infliction of
emotional distress cases. 62 However, in bystander situations, "a claim
exists for damages flowing from a significant discernible physical injury
when such injury is caused by psychic trauma resulting from negligent
injury imposed on another who, because of his relationship to the
injured party and his involvement in the event causing that injury, is
foreseeably injured." '563 Thereafter, the court refused to apply the
impact rule in an action for emotional damages resulting from the birth
of a stillborn child because of the defendant's negligence5 and held that
the impact rule does not apply to the tort of wrongful birth, noting that
the impact rule does not generally apply in recognized torts where the
damages "are predominately emotional, such as defamation or invasion
of privacy."565
Georgia
In Georgia, a claim based on the negligent infliction of emotional
distress requires: "(1) a physical impact to the plaintiff; (2) the physical
impact causes physical injury to the plaintiff; and (3) the physical injury
559. Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824, 825 (D. Del. 1965) (emphasis omitted); see
also Newman v. Exxon Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1146,1149 (D. Del. 1989).
560. Kaiser v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 150, 156 (D.D.C. 1991); Jane W. v. President
& Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 863 A.2d 821, 826 (D.C. 2004); Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia,
728 A.2d 70, 77 (D.C. 1999); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1067 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
561. See Williams, 572 A.2d at 1067.
562. Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 358 (Fla. 2002).
563. Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1985).
564. Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705, 708 (Fla. 1997).
565. Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 422 (Fla. 1992).
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to the plaintiff causes the plaintiff's mental suffering or emotional
distress. 5 66 However, its supreme court has stated that:
When . . . a parent and child sustain a direct physical
impact and physical injuries through the negligence of
another, and the child dies as the result of such
negligence, the parent may attempt to recover for serious
emotional distress from witnessing the child's suffering
and death without regard to whether the emotional
trauma arises out of the physical injury to the parent.
This is in accord with the precepts of the impact
approach and appropriately restricts recovery to those
directly affected by the defendant's negligent act or
omission.
5 67
Hawaii
Hawaii has abandoned impact and zone of danger rules, holding
merely "that there is a duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of
serious mental distress. ' 5 8 Although the duty to refrain from negligent
infliction of severe emotional distress exists in bystander situations
regardless of the absence of physical impact, resulting physical injury, or
blood relationship, the plaintiff must, however, be located within a
reasonable distance from the actual scene of the accident.569 Thus, a
person located in California at the time of an automobile accident had
no cause of action for negligent infliction of serious mental distress. 70
Idaho
It is beyond dispute that in Idaho no cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress will arise unless there is "both an
allegation and proof that a party claiming negligent infliction of
emotional distress suffered a physical injury, i.e., a physical
manifestation of an injury caused by the negligently inflicted emotional
distress. '5 71 "Physical manifestations of the emotional injury enable a
plaintiff to posit a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress"
566. Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 82, 85 (Ga. 2000).
567. Id. at 86-87 (citation omitted).
568. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970).
569. Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 532 P.2d 673, 675 (Haw. 1975).
570. Id. at 676.
571. Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87, 95 (Idaho 1990) (emphasis added).
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and can be established by lay testimony. 7 It appears that a bystander
situation has not been considered by Idaho appellate courts.
Illinois
In Illinois one who is in a "zone of physical danger and who, because
of the defendant's negligence, has reasonable fear for his own safety is
given a right of action for physical injury or illness resulting from
emotional distress. 5 73 The rule does not require that the plaintiff suffer
a physical impact or injury at the time of the negligent act, but it does
require that he or she must have been in such proximity to the
consequences of the tortious act that there was a high risk to him or her
of physical impact.17' The plaintiff "must show physical injury or illness
as a result of the emotional distress caused by the defendant's
negligence.575 The zone of danger rule and the requirement of physical
injury or illness also apply to bystander situations.5 76
Indiana
In Indiana, when one sustains "a direct impact by the negligence of
another and, by virtue of that direct involvement sustains emotional
trauma which is serious in nature and of a kind and extent normally
expected to occur in a reasonable person," that person may maintain an
action to recover for that emotional trauma without regard to whether
that trauma arose out of or accompanied any physical injury.5 77 In
bystander situations, when:
[T]he direct impact test is not met, the bystander may
nevertheless establish "direct involvement" by proving
that [he or she] actually witnessed or came on the scene
soon after the death or severe injury of a loved one with
a relationship to the plaintiff analogous to a spouse,
parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, or sibling caused
by the defendant's negligent or otherwise tortious
conduct.
5 78
572. Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sch. Dist. No. 231, 775 P.2d 640, 646 (Idaho 1989).
573. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983).
574. See id.
575. Id.
576. See id.
577. Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ind. 1991).
578. Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ind. 2000).
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Iowa
At one time it appeared that Iowa would not allow recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress in any type of case."'
However, the Iowa Supreme Court subsequently held that a bystander
could recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing the peril to a
victim caused by the negligence of another when:
1. The bystander was located near the scene of the
accident. 2. The emotional distress resulted from a direct
emotional impact from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as
contrasted with learning of the accident from others after
its occurrence. 3. The bystander and the victim were
husband and wife or related within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity. 4. A reasonable person in the
position of the bystander would believe, and the
bystander did believe, that the direct victim of the
accident would be seriously injured or killed. 5. The
emotional distress to the bystander must be serious.?8
It would thus appear that in non-bystander situations recovery for
serious emotional distress would be allowed if the plaintiff was in harm's
way and feared for his or her safety.
Kansas
Generally, "[t]here may be no recovery in Kansas for emotional
distress unless that distress results in 'physical impact': an actual physical
injury to the plaintiff."'58' Generalized physical symptoms of emotional
distress such as headaches and insomnia are insufficient to state a cause
of action.5" It appears that Kansas courts have yet to consider negligent
infliction in a bystander situation.
579. See Wambsgans v. Price, 274 N.W.2d 362, 365 (Iowa 1979).
580. Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981); see also Baas v. Hoye, 766 F.2d
1190, 1196-97 (8th Cir. 1985); Pollock v. Ottumwa Reg'l Mobile Intensive Care Servs., Nos. 0-
631, 00-0040, 2000 WL 1825444, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2000).
581. Anderson v. Scheffler, 752 P.2d 667, 669 (Kan. 1988); see also Hoard v. Shawnee
Mission Med. Ctr., 662 P.2d 1214, 1219-20 (Kan. 1983) (citing exceptions to the general rule
in Kansas).
582. Hopkins v. State, 702 P.2d 311, 319-20 (Kan. 1985).
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Kentucky
For a long time Kentucky courts have held that an action will not lie
for fright, shock, or mental anguish that is not accompanied by physical
contact or injury. 83 The reason advanced is that "such damages are too
remote and speculative, are easily simulated and difficult to disprove,
and there is no standard by which they can be justly measured."584
Louisiana
The state appears to generally require a physical manifestation of
injury to recover for accompanying emotional distress when negligently
inflicted, indicating that there is no independent tort for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. "[I]f the defendant's conduct is merely
negligent and causes only mental disturbance, without accompanying
physical injury, illness or other physical consequences, the defendant is
not liable for such emotional disturbance. ',1 85 However, "[t]here may be
[exceptions], but all of these categories have in common the especial
likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the
special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not
spurious. ' 6 As to bystander situations, the matter appears to have
been handled by statute. The Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.6
provides:
A. The following persons who view an event causing
injury to another person, or who come upon the scene of
the event soon thereafter, may recover damages for
mental anguish or emotional distress that they suffer as a
result of the other person's injury:
(1) The spouse, child or children, and grandchild or
grandchildren of the injured person, or either the
spouse, the child or children, or the grandchild or
grandchildren of the injured person.
(2) The father and mother of the injured person, or
either of them.
(3) The brothers and sisters of the injured person or
any of them.
583. See Wilhoite v. Cobb, 761 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
584. Morgan v. Hightower's Adm'r., 163 S.W.2d 21, 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1942).
585. Moresi v. State, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095 (La. 1990).
586. Id. at 1096.
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(4) The grandfather and grandmother of the injured
person, or either of them.
B. To recover for mental anguish or emotional distress
under this Article, the injured person must suffer such
harm that one can reasonably expect a person in the
claimant's position to suffer serious mental anguish or
emotional distress from the experience, and the
claimant's mental anguish or emotional distress must be
severe, debilitating, and foreseeable. Damages suffered
as a result of mental anguish or emotional distress for
injury to another shall be recovered only in accordance
with this Article.587
Maine
The non-bystander who claims "negligent infliction of emotional
distress may recover when the defendant's negligence was directed at
the victim; namely, that the defendant owed the victim an independent
duty of care and that the defendant should have foreseen that mental
distress would result from his negligence. ' 8 However, the bystander
or, as the court calls the person, an "indirect victim,"
who witnesses another person being harmed by a
tortfeasor's [negligence] may recover for serious mental
distress only if "[t]he psychic injury may be deemed
foreseeable when the plaintiff bystander was present at
the scene of the accident, suffered mental distress as a
result of observing the accident and ensuing danger to
the victim, and was closely related to the victim."589
Maryland
In Maryland, recovery may be had for negligent infliction of
emotional distress that results in "physical injury." The requisite
"physical injury" resulting from emotional distress may be proved in one
of four ways. The first three involve "manifestations of a physical injury
through evidence of an external condition or by symptoms of a
pathological or physiological state. Proof of a 'physical injury' is also
587. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.6 (1997); see Kipps v. Caillier, 197 F.3d 765, 770-71
(5th Cir. 1999); Maney v. Evans, 780 So. 2d 1136, 1139 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
588. Michaud v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 715 A.2d 955, 959 (Me. 1998).
589. Id. (quoting Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438 (Me.
1982)).
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permitted by evidence indicative of a 'mental state,"' using the term
physical "to represent that the injury for which recovery is sought is
capable of objective determination."59 In bystander situations, the state
appears to also subscribe to the zone of danger requirement.
591
Massachusetts
In order to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress in
Massachusetts, a plaintiff must prove "'(1) negligence; (2) emotional
distress; (3) causation; (4) physical harm manifested by objective
symptomatology; and (5) that a reasonable person would have suffered
emotional distress under the circumstances of the case.', 5 92 "Only a
bystander plaintiff who is closely related to a third person directly
injured by a defendant's tortious conduct, and suffers emotional injuries
as the result of witnessing the accident or coming upon the third person
soon after the accident, states a claim for which relief may be
granted.,
59
Michigan
In Michigan, "where a definite and objective physical injury is
produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused by
defendant's negligent conduct," the plaintiff may recover damages "for
such physical consequences to himself notwithstanding the absence of
any physical impact upon plaintiff at the time of the mental shock., 594 In
a bystander case,
the elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress
are: (1) serious injury threatened or inflicted on a person,
not the plaintiff, of a nature to cause severe mental
disturbance to the plaintiff, (2) shock by the plaintiff
from witnessing the event that results in the plaintiff's
actual physical harm, (3) close relationship between the
plaintiff and the injured person (parent, child, husband,
or wife), and (4) presence of the plaintiff at the location
of the accident at the time the accident occurred or, if not
590. Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 733-34 (Md. 1979); see also Bowman v. Williams,
165 A. 182, 184 (Md. 1933).
591. Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, Inc., 719 A.2d 119, 132 (Md. 1998).
592. Rodriguez v. Cambridge Hous. Auth., 823 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Mass. 2005) (quoting
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982)).
593. Migliori v. Airborne Freight Corp., 690 N.E.2d 413,415 (Mass. 1998).
594. Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Mich. 1970).
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presence, at least shock "fairly contemporaneous" with
the accident.9
Minnesota
In Minnesota a plaintiff must "satisfy the three elements of a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress: (1) the plaintiff was in the
zone of danger of physical impact; (2) reasonably feared for her own
safety; and (3) has severe emotional distress with physical
manifestations." '596 In addition to those three elements, in bystander
cases a plaintiff "may recover damages for distress caused by fearing for
the safety of or by witnessing serious bodily injury to one with whom the
plaintiff has a close relationship when such serious bodily injury was
caused by the defendant's negligent conduct."597
Mississippi
In Mississippi, "'a plaintiff therefore may not recover emotional
distress damages resulting from ordinary negligence without proving
some sort of physical manifestation of injury or demonstrable physical
harm."'598 In bystander situations:
the courts will take into account such factors as the
following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the
scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a
distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from
others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the
victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence
of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship. 99
Missouri
Missouri courts will not recognize a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress without contemporaneous physical
595. Hesse v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 642 N.W.2d 330, 337 (Mich. 2002).
596. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Minn. 2005).
597. Id.
598. Wilson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 883 So. 2d 56, 65 (Miss. 2004) (quoting
American Bankers' Ins. Co. v. Wells, 819 So. 2d 1196, 1209 (Miss. 2001)).
599. Entex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d 437, 444 (Miss. 1982).
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trauma. To recover for emotional distress the plaintiff must show that:
"(1) the defendant should have realized that his conduct involved an
unreasonable risk of causing the distress; and (2) the emotional distress
or mental injury must be medically diagnosable and must be of sufficient
severity so as to be medically significant."" In bystander cases:
a plaintiff states a cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress upon injury to a third person only
upon a showing: (1) that the defendant should have
realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk
to the plaintiff, (2) that plaintiff was present at the scene
of an injury producing, sudden event, (3) and that
plaintiff was in the zone of danger, i.e., placed in a
reasonable fear of physical injury to his or her own
person."°
Montana
In Montana, "[a] cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress will arise under circumstances where serious or severe
emotional distress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant's negligent act or omission." As to
bystander situations:
1. The shock must result from a direct emotional impact
upon the plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous perception of the accident, as
contrasted with learning of the accident from others after
its occurrence. 2. The plaintiff and victim must be closely
related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship
or the presence of only a distant relationship. 3. Either
death or serious physical injury of the victim must have
occurred as a result of the defendant's negligence. 6 3
Nebraska
To recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff
must prove that he or she was within the zone of danger of the
600. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
601. Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Mem'l. Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595, 599-600 (Mo. 1990).
602. Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 425 (Mont. 1995).
603. Versland v. Caron Transp., 671 P.2d 583, 588 (Mont. 1983).
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defendant's negligence and that the emotional distress is severe.' In
bystander situations, the three evidentiary requirements for a plaintiff
seeking recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress have
been stated most recently as: "(1) a seriously injured victim as the result
of the proven negligence of the defendant, (2) an intimate familial
relationship with the victim, and (3) emotional distress so severe that no
person could be expected to endure it."6 5
Nevada
"[I]n cases in which emotional distress damages are not secondary to
physical injuries, but rather, precipitate physical symptoms, either a
physical impact must have occurred or, in the absence of physical
impact, proof of 'serious emotional distress' causing physical injury or
illness must be presented" and the harm occasioned by the defendant's
negligence must be foreseeable to be compensable. 66 In bystander
situations, (1) the plaintiff must have been located near the scene of the
accident as contrasted to being a distance away from it; (2) the shock
must have resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from
the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as
contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence;
and (3) the plaintiff and the victim must have been closely related, as
contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a
distant relationship. 67
New Hampshire
In New Hampshire, to recover for emotional distress under a
traditional negligence theory, plaintiffs must demonstrate physical
symptoms of their distress regardless of physical impact.60 In bystander
situations, the plaintiff must "witness or contemporaneously sensorially
perceive a serious injury" to the other and suffer serious mental and
emotional harm that is accompanied by objective physical symptoms.609
Any action for "negligent infliction of emotional distress must be based
604. Hamilton v. Nestor, 659 N.W.2d 321, 326-27 (Neb. 2003).
605. Vosburg v. Cenex-Land O'Lakes Agronomy Co., 513 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Neb. 1994).
606. Olivero v. Lowe, 995 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Nev. 2000).
607. State v. Eaton, 710 P.2d 1370, 1377-78 (Nev. 1985).
608. O'Donnell v. HCA Health Servs. of N.H., Inc., 883 A.2d 319, 324 (N.H. 2005).
609. Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 308 (N.H. 1979).
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on the criteria of foreseeability outlined in this opinion and on the
causal negligence of the defendant."6 '
A bright line rule that includes only individuals related
by blood or marriage is overinclusive because it permits
recovery when the suffering accompanies a legal or
biological link between bystander and victim, regardless
of whether the relationship between the two is estranged,
alienated, or in some other way removed. Conversely,
the [rule] is underinclusive because it arbitrarily denies
court access to persons with valid claims that they could
prove.
New Jersey
In New Jersey, the elements of the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress are: (1) the defendant owed a duty of reasonable care
to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff
suffered severe emotional distress; and (4) the defendant's breach of
duty was the proximate cause of the injury.6 2 In bystander situations,
the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires
proof of: "(1) the death or serious physical injury of another caused by
the defendant's negligence; (2) a marital or intimate, familial
relationship between the plaintiff and the injured person; (3)
observation of the death or injury at the scene of the accident; and (4)
resulting severe emotional distress., 613  However, an "unmarried
cohabitant should be afforded the protections of bystander liability for
the negligent infliction of emotional injury. The basis for that protection
is the existence of an intimate familial relationship with the victim of the
defendant's negligence., 61
4
New Mexico
Apart from bystander liability, there exists no recognized cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in New Mexico.615 In
a bystander situation, for a plaintiff to recover,
610. Id.
611. Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255, 1261 (N.H. 2003).
612. Decker v. Princeton Packet, Inc., 561 A.2d 1122, 1128 (N.J. 1989).
613. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (N.J. 1980).
614. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994).
615. Jaynes v. Strong-Thorne Mortuary, Inc., 954 P.2d 45, 50 (N.M. 1997).
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[(1)] [t]here must be a marital or intimate family
relationship between the victim and the plaintiff, limited
to husband and wife, parent and child, grandparent and
grandchild, brother and sister, and to those persons who
occupy a legitimate position in loco parentis; [(2)] [t]he
shock to the plaintiff must be severe and must result in a
direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the
contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident, as
contrasted with learning of the accident by means other
than contemporaneous sensory perception or learning of
the accident after its occurrence; [(3)] [t]here must be
some physical manifestation of, or physical injury to the
plaintiff resulting from the emotional injury; and, [(4)]
[t]he accident must result in physical injury or death to
the victim.616
New York
In New York:
The circumstances under which recovery may be had for
purely emotional harm are extremely limited and, thus, a
cause of action seeking such recovery must generally be
premised upon a breach of a duty owed directly to the
plaintiff which either endangered the plaintiff's physical
safety or caused the plaintiff fear for his or her own
physical safety.617
In bystander situations:
[T]he plaintiff may recover, as a proper element of his or
her damages, damages for injuries suffered in
consequence of the observation of the serious injury or
death of a member of his or her immediate family-
assuming, of course, that it is established that the
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor bringing
about such injury or death.
616. Folz v. State, 797 P.2d 246, 257 (N.M. 1990).
617. Lancellotti v. Howard, 547 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (App. Div. 1989).
618. Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 848 (N.Y. 1984).
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North Carolina
In either direct victim and bystander situations, North Carolina
appears to require proof of only three elements to recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress: "(1) the defendant negligently engaged
in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would
cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress ... and (3) the conduct did
in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress. ' ' 619 In bystander
situations, the second element would obviously be impacted by the
relationship between the bystander and the person who sustained
physical injury as well as the proximity of the bystander to the injury
causing situation.620
North Dakota
North Dakota follows the zone of danger test and requires that a
plaintiff seeking to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress
must also establish that it resulted in "bodily harm., 621 In bystander
situations, the zone of danger test also applies.622
Ohio
Although the Ohio Supreme Court observed that physical harm that
results in serious emotional distress can assist a jury in determining
whether the claim is compensable, it found that such a limitation "may
prevent a worthy plaintiff from recovering from a blameworthy
defendant. 
'62 3
We believe that a cause of action for the negligent
infliction of serious emotional distress may be stated
where the plaintiff-bystander reasonably appreciated the
peril which took place, whether or not the victim suffered
actual physical harm, and, that as a result of this
cognizance or fear of peril, the plaintiff suffered serious
emotional distress.624
619. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C.
1990).
620. Id. at 98.
621. Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 921 (N.D. 1989) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS § 436A (1965)).
622. Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972).
623. Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 764-65 (Ohio 1983).
624. Id. at 767.
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"[S]erious emotional distress may be found where a reasonable person,
normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the
mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case.
6 25
Oklahoma
Negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort
in Oklahoma. Before damages for mental suffering may be collected, a
plaintiff must establish, just as in any other negligence case, "a duty on
the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury; a failure of
the defendant to perform the duty; and an injury to the plaintiff
resulting from the failure." '626 However, a person alleging negligent
infliction of emotional distress as a bystander is not entitled to recover
under Oklahoma law.627
Oregon
In Oregon, a person may not recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress if he or she is not also physically injured, threatened
with physical injury, or physically impacted by the tortious conduct.628
The rule, however, has exceptions. Under one, recovery may occur if
"the defendant's conduct infringed on some legally protected interest
apart from causing the claimed distress" suffered by the plaintiff.
6 29
"[T]he term 'legally protected interest' refers to an independent basis of
liability separate from the general duty to avoid foreseeable risk of
harm,"63 and "[t]he identification of such a distinct source of duty is the
sine qua non of liability for emotional distress damages unaccompanied
by physical injury.""63 Absent such proof in a bystander situation, the
Oregon court has refused to adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 436.632
625. Id. at 765.
626. Kraszewski v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Okla., Inc., 916 P.2d 241, 245 (Okla. 1996).
627. Slaton v. Vansickle, 872 P.2d 929, 931 (Okla. 1994).
628. Hammond v. Cent. Lane Commc'n Ctr., 816 P.2d 593,596 (Or. 1991).
629. Id.
630. Phillips v. Lincoln County Sch. Dist., 984 P.2d 947, 949 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
631. Curtis v. MRI Imaging Servs. II, 941 P.2d 602, 608 (Or. Ct. App. 1997), affd on
other grounds, 956 P.2d 960, 964 (Or. 1998).
632. Hammond, 816 P.2d at 597-98.
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Pennsylvania
The general rule "in Pennsylvania has been that, except in limited
circumstances, a claimant may not recover damages for negligently
inflicted emotional distress in the absence of a physical manifestation of
the emotional distress allegedly suffered." 633 In bystander situations a
three-part test is applied:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the
accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away
from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct
emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as
contrasted with learning of the accident from others after
its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were
closely related.6
Rhode Island
In Rhode Island, only two groups of plaintiffs are able to recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress: "'those within the 'zone-of-
danger' who are physically endangered by the acts of a negligent
defendant, and bystanders related to a victim whom they witness being
injured. In addition, plaintiffs must [also] . .. suffer serious emotional
injury that is accompanied by physical symptomatology.' '' 635  In
bystander situations:
[I]n order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, a party must (1) be a close relative of the victim,
(2) be present at the scene of the accident and be aware
that the victim is being injured, and (3) as a result of
experiencing the accident, suffer serious emotional injury
that is accompanied by physical symptomatology.636
South Carolina
A South Carolina plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress with proof that bodily injury was proximately caused
633. Houston v. Texaco, Inc., 538 A.2d 502, 504 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
634. Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 685 (Pa. 1979).
635. Perrotti v. Gonicberg, 877 A.2d 631, 636-37 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Jalowy v. Friendly
Home, Inc., 818 A.2d 698, 710 (R.I. 2003)).
636. Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1052 (R.I. 1994).
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by the emotional trauma.637 In bystander situations, recovery may be
had with proof of the following elements:
(a) the negligence of the defendant must cause death or
serious physical injury to another; (b) the plaintiff
bystander must be in close proximity to the accident; (c)
the plaintiff and the victim must be closely related; (d)
the plaintiff must contemporaneously perceive the
accident; and (e) the emotional distress must both
manifest itself by physical symptoms capable of objective
diagnosis and be established by expert testimony.
South Dakota
South Dakota law recognizes a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, but requires "'manifestation of physical
symptoms."'63 9 It also:
[R]ecognizes a bystander's claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress caused by contemporaneous
observation of the serious injury or death of a third party
with whom the bystander has a close relationship. The
bystander must be within the zone of danger. However,
the emotional distress suffered may be caused by fear for
the third person and need not be caused by the
bystander's fear for his or her own safety. The
negligently inflicted emotional distress must be
accompanied with physical manifestations. 640
Tennessee
In order to make a case for negligent infliction of emotional distress
in Tennessee, the plaintiff must prove the elements of duty, breach of
duty, injury or loss, causation in fact, and proximate cause. 641 Further,
when there is no physical injury, recovery is limited to serious or severe
emotional injury supported by expert medical or scientific proof.
637. Strickland v. Madden, 448 S.E.2d 581, 584 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
638. Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 336 S.E.2d 465, 467 (S.C. 1985).
639. Maryott v. First Nat'l Bank of Eden, 624 N.W.2d 96, 104 (S.D. 2001) (quoting Stene
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 N.W.2d 399, 404 (S.D. 1998)).
640. Nielson v. AT&T Corp., 597 N.W.2d 434, 442 (S.D. 1999).
641. Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996).
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Furthermore, in order to guard against trivial or fraudulent actions,
recovery is provided only for "serious" or "severe" emotional injury.14'
To recover for emotional injuries sustained in a bystander situation, the
plaintiff must establish that defendant's negligence was the cause in fact
of the third person's death or injury as well as plaintiff's emotional
injury and that the third person's death or injury and plaintiff's
emotional injury were proximate and foreseeable results of defendant's
negligence.643 "Establishing foreseeability, and therefore a duty of care
to plaintiff, requires consideration of a number of relevant factors. The
plaintiff's physical location at the time of the event or accident and
awareness of the accident are essential factors." 64
Texas
In Texas, there is no general duty not to negligently inflict emotional
distress. "A claimant may recover mental anguish damages only in
connection with defendant's breach of some other legal duty." 645
"Where emotional distress is a recognized element of damages for
breach of a legal duty, the claimant may recover without demonstrating
a physical manifestation of the emotional distress.",
646
Texas has adopted the bystander rules originally
promulgated by the California Supreme Court in Dillon
v. Legg: (1) [w]hether plaintiff was located near the scene
of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance
away from it; (2) [w]hether the shock resulted from a
direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory
and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as
contrasted with learning of the accident from others after
its occurrence; and (3) [w]hether plaintiff and the victim
were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any
relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship. 647
642. Id.
643. Ramsey v. Beavers, 931 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tenn. 1996).
644. Id.
645. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993); see also Charles E. Cantu, An
Essay on the Tort of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Texas: Stop Saying it Does
Not Exist, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 455, 466 (2002).
646. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 598.
647. Id. (citation omitted).
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Utah
To prove negligent infliction of emotional distress in Utah, the
plaintiff must have been placed in actual physical peril and must prove
actual illness or bodily harm.6 8  The emotional distress must be so
severe that a reasonable person, normally constituted, would not be able
to adequately cope with it.69  The "illness" may be mental illness
stemming from the negligent act; however, such illness must be
established by expert testimony.65° As to bystander situations, Utah
follows Restatement (Second) of Torts section 313.65 '
Vermont
To establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in
Vermont, "a plaintiff must make [an initial] showing that the he, [she] or
someone close to him [or her] faced physical peril. The prerequisites for
establishing a claim differ according to whether the plaintiff suffered a
physical impact from an external force." '652 If the plaintiff has not
suffered an impact as a result of the negligence, "he must show that: (1)
he was within the 'zone of danger' of an act negligently directed at him
by defendant, (2) he was subjected to a reasonable fear of immediate
personal injury, and (3) he in fact suffered substantial bodily injury or
illness as a result.,
653
[A]fter witnessing a person closely related to the plaintiff
suffer critical injury or death as a result of defendant's
negligent conduct, [recovery] is premised upon the
traditional negligence test of foreseeability. A plaintiff is
required to prove under this test that his or her serious
emotional distress was reasonably foreseeable, that the
defendant's negligent conduct caused the victim to suffer
critical injury or death, and that the plaintiff suffered
serious emotional distress as a direct result of witnessing
the victim's critical injury or death.654
648. Straub v. Fisher & Paykel Health Care, 990 P.2d 384, 387 (Utah 1999); Harnicher v.
Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 69 (Utah 1998).
649. Harnicher, 962 P.2d at 70.
650. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 975 (Utah 1993).
651. Harnicher, 962 P.2d at 69 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313
(1965)).
652. Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 730 A.2d 1086, 1092 (Vt. 1999) (citations omitted).
653. Id.
654. Leo v. Hillman, 665 A.2d 572,577 (Vt. 1995).
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Virginia
In Virginia, when conduct is merely negligent and physical impact is
lacking, there can be no recovery for free standing emotional
disturbance.655
We hold, however, that where the claim is for emotional
disturbance and physical injury resulting therefrom,
there may be recovery for negligent conduct,
notwithstanding the lack of physical impact, provided the
injured party properly pleads and proves by clear and
convincing evidence that his physical injury was the
natural result of fright or shock proximately caused by
the defendant's negligence.656
The Virginia Supreme Court has not endorsed a plaintiff's action of
emotional distress resulting from fright or shock due to negligent
infliction of physical injury to a third person. 657 The only exceptions
allowed are parents' malpractice claims for wrongful birth of a child or
the birth of a severely injured child inflicted during the delivery.658
Washington
Washington allows a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, dispensing with the requirement that the plaintiff be within the
zone of danger. Instead, the court evaluates the claim based on the
general tort principles of duty and foreseeability and requires that
plaintiffs demonstrate objective symptoms of their emotional injury.659
In bystander cases, when the plaintiff-relative is not present at the scene
of the accident or does not arrive shortly thereafter, the harm is
unforeseeable as a matter of law and no recovery is allowed.6 °
West Virginia
In West Virginia, a person may recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, without accompanying physical injury, by showing
facts sufficient to guarantee that emotional damages claim is not
655. Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (Va. 1973).
656. Id.
657. Litton v. Cann, No. L98-19, 1998 WL 1765700, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 1998).
658. Id.
659. Hegel v. McMahon, 960 P.2d 424,427 (Wash. 1998).
660. Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 787 P.2d 553, 557 (Wash. 1990).
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"spurious." 66 "The seriousness of this distress must be proved through
the use of medical and psychiatric evidence." 662 In bystander situations:
[P]laintiff's right to recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, after witnessing a person closely
related to the plaintiff suffer critical injury or death as a
result of defendant's negligent conduct, is premised upon
the traditional negligence test of foreseeability. A
plaintiff is required to prove under this test that his or
her serious emotional distress was reasonably
foreseeable, that the defendant's negligent conduct
caused the victim to suffer critical injury or death, and
that the plaintiff suffered serious emotional distress as a
direct result of witnessing the victim's critical injury or
death. In determining whether the serious emotional
injury suffered by a plaintiff in a negligent infliction of
emotional distress action was reasonably foreseeable to
the defendant, the following factors must be evaluated:
(1) whether the plaintiff was closely related to the injury
victim; (2) whether the plaintiff was located at the scene
of the accident and is aware that it is causing injury to the
victim; (3) whether the victim is critically injured or
killed; and (4) whether the plaintiff suffers serious
emotional distress.
663
Wisconsin
Wisconsin has the most liberal requirements for a claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress: "(1) that the defendant's conduct in the
underlying accident fell below the applicable standard of care; (2) that
the plaintiff suffered an injury [of] severe emotional distress; and (3)
that the defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's
injury." 6  "The factfinder determines cause-in-fact. The court
determines whether considerations of public policy relieve the
defendant of liability in a particular case. These public policy
considerations are an aspect of legal cause, not cause-in-fact." 66' In
bystander situations:
661. Marlin v. Bill Rich Constr., Inc., 482 S.E.2d 620, 637 (W. Va. 1996).
662. Stump v. Ashland, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 41, 53 (W. Va. 1997).
663. Jones v. Sanger, 512 S.E.2d 590, 592 (W. Va. 1998).
664. Rabideau v. City of Racine, 2001 WI 57, 20, 243 Wis. 2d 486, 20, 627 N.W.2d
795, 20 (citations omitted).
665. Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432,434 (1994).
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to determine on the basis of public policy considerations
whether to preclude liability for severe emotional
distress to a bystander a court must consider three
factors: the severity of the injury to the victim, the
relationship of the plaintiff to the victim [limited to
spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild or sibling],
and the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the
plaintiff's discovery of the injury."""
Wyoming
Although negligent infliction of emotional distress in a non-
bystander setting has not been addressed by the Wyoming Supreme
Court, its decisions in bystander cases make it evident that there would
be no limitation on recovery in non-bystander cases. In bystander cases:
[P]laintiffs who may bring an action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress consists of those who
could bring, at least under some set of circumstances, a
wrongful death action for the primary victim's death
[spouses, children, parents, and siblings]. The primary
victim must die, or suffer serious bodily injury as that
term is defined in the Wyoming Criminal Code. The
plaintiff must observe either the infliction of the fatal or
harmful blow or observe the results of the blow after its
occurrence without material change in the condition and
location of the victim. Once these conditions are
satisfied, the case can go forward under normal
negligence principles. The defendant must have been
negligent and his negligence must be the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's mental injuries."
666. Id. at 445.
667. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 200-01 (Wyo. 1986).
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APPENDIX D
PARASITIC EMOTIONAL DISTRESS-STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS
Alabama
In Alabama, "[t]raditionally, damages for mental anguish alone have
not been recoverable in this jurisdiction. However, if the mental
suffering has been accompanied by some physical injury, damages for
mental suffering have been allowed." ' The term "parasitic" has also
been used to describe this harm.69
Alaska
Damages in Alaska for mental suffering from a negligently inflicted
harm are recognized by statute: "In an action to recover damages for
personal injury or wrongful death, all damage claims for noneconomic
losses shall be limited to compensation for pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of
life, loss of consortium, and other nonpecuniary damage., 670 The term
"parasitic" has also been employed.67'
Arizona
In Arizona, damages have been allowed for "loss of enjoyment of
life" described as the inability of the plaintiff, as a result of the
defendant's negligence, "to participate in and derive pleasure from the
normal activities of daily life, or for the individual's inability to pursue
his talents, recreational interests, hobbies, or avocations., 672 The term
"hedonic" has also been employed.673
668. Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 372 (Ala. 1981) (citing W. Union
Tel. Co. v. Jackson, 50 So. 316 (Ala. 1909) and E. Ala. Express Co. v. Dupes, 124 So. 2d 809
(Ala. 1960) (plaintiff who sustained whiplash and fracture allowed to recover for her "worry"
about the future result of her injury)).
669. Id. at 373.
670. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010(a) (2006); see also Buoy v. Era Helicopters, Inc., 771
P.2d 439, 442 (Alaska 1989).
671. Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 202 (Alaska 1995).
672. Ogden v. J.M. Steel Erecting, Inc., 31 P.3d 806, 813 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
673. Id.
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Arkansas
In Arkansas, the validity of damages in a negligence action for loss
of enjoyment of life has been recognized.74  Awards for "pain and
suffering" damages have also been generally allowed,675 with no distinct
rule as to measuring those damages,676 and the awards left to the "sound
discretion of a trial jury and the conclusion reached by it should not be
disturbed unless the award is clearly excessive. ' ' 677  The terms
"hedonic"' 67 8 and "parasitic, ' 679 have also been used.
California
California decisions seldom employ "enjoyment of life," "yet
achieve a result consistent with it. No California rule restricts a
plaintiff's attorney from arguing this element to a jury. Damage for
mental suffering supplies an analogue." 68 The terms "hedonic"' and
"parasitic ' 6" have also been employed.
Colorado
In Colorado, it is well accepted "that a plaintiff, in a personal injury
action, could seek damages for loss of enjoyment of life, emotional
stress, permanent disability, and loss of earning capacity, as well as
medical expenses and pain and suffering, these damages would be
awarded as compensation for the single claim of personal injury."683 The
term "hedonic damages" has also been used.i
Connecticut
"Under Connecticut law, any pain, suffering, emotional stress, loss
of enjoyment of life's activities ... are items that must be compensated
for in addition to the costs of the care and the treatment of these painful
674. W. Union v. Vostatek, 788 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Ark. 1990).
675. Hamby v. Haskins, 630 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Ark. 1982).
676. See Morrison v. Lowe, 625 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Ark. 1981).
677. Hamby, 630 S.W.2d at 40 (citing Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Hendrix, 277 S.W. 337 (Ark.
1925).
678. Durham v. Marberry, 156 S.W.3d 242,246 (Ark. 2004).
679. McQuay v. Guntharp, 963 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Ark. 1998).
680. Huff v. Tracy, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553 (Ct. App. 1976).
681. Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 578 (Ct. App. 1998).
682. Fluharty v. Fluharty, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 252 (Ct. App. 1997).
683. Artery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 984 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
684. Scharrel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 949 P.2d 89, 92 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
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conditions. In short, the law requires the plaintiff to recover monetary
compensation for both." 5 The term "parasitic" has also been used. 686
Delaware
In Delaware:
[D]amages are recoverable for pain and suffering and for
permanent injuries. If plaintiff establishes that his finger
is permanently impaired, he will be entitled to recover a
reasonable sum to compensate him for the impairment or
disability. In evaluating the degree of impairment and in
assessing damages, the jury may take into consideration
all of the activities-business, pleasure and otherwise-
which the impairment impedes or prevent.687
Florida
In Florida, "[d]isability, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the
enjoyment of life are important elements of damages."'  The term
"parasitic" has also been employed. 9
Georgia
In Georgia, the right to recover for a variety of mental anguish
harms, including the capacity to enjoy life, appears to be recognized as a
proper element of pain and suffering damages.6 °
Hawaii
In Hawaii, "[g]eneral damages 'encompass all the damages which
naturally and necessarily result from a legal wrong.. .' [including] 'pain
and suffering, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment which cannot be
685. Pulaski v. Healthsouth Rehab. Ctr. of Conn., LLC, No. CV020079543S, 2005 WL
941419, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2005).
686. Montinieri v. S. New England Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978).
687. Winter v. Pa. R.R., 68 A.2d 513, 515 (Del. Super. Ct. 1949).
688. Capone v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 233 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
689. Rowell v. Holt, 850 So. 2d 474,478 (Fla. 2003).
690. See Underwood v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R., 124 S.E.2d 758, 769 (Ga. Ct. App.
1962).
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measured definitively in monetary terms."'6 9' The terms "hedonic"692
and "parasitic"693 have been used.
Idaho
It appears that in Idaho, loss of enjoyment of life is a proper element
of damages in an action for personal injuries."
Illinois
In Illinois, loss of enjoyment of life may be treated as a factor in
determining the extent of the injuries and damages in general or for pain
and suffering.695 On the other hand, "Illinois courts have also found that
disability damages include damages for loss of a normal life." ''  The
terms "hedonic ' 97 and "parasitic"698 have also been used.
Indiana
In Indiana, "trial courts should instruct juries in personal injury cases
that they may consider 'the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injury
and the effect of the injury itself on the plaintiff's ability to function as a
whole person.'''699  In other words, courts will allow a separate and
distinct award for parasitic emotional damages. The terms "parasitic"7°°
and "hedonic ' 7°1 have also been used.
Iowa
In Iowa, "[o]ne component of pain and suffering is loss of enjoyment
of life. Evidence concerning other medical conditions that have and will
impact [the claimant's] physical and mental well-being and his ability to
691. Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1153 (Haw. 2004) (quoting Dunbar v. Thompson,
901 P.2d 1285, 1294 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995)); see also Sprague v. Cal. Pac. Bankers & Ins. Ltd.,
74 P.3d 12, 22-23 (Haw. 2003).
692. Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 364 (Haw. 1994).
693. Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (Haw. 1974).
694. Sanchez v. Galey, 733 P.2d 1234, 1249 (Idaho 1986); Moeller v. Harshbarger, 794
P.2d 1148, 1149 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990).
695. Fetzer v. Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1244-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
696. Smith v. City of Evanston, 631 N.E.2d 1269, 1278 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
697. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057,1066 (Ill. 1997).
698. Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 608 (Ill. 1991).
699. Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (Ind. 1990).
700. Lovings v. Thomas, 805 N.E.2d 442, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
701. Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991).
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enjoy life are clearly relevant to the plaintiff's damage claims." 7°2 The
term "parasitic" has also been employed.7 °3
Kansas
In Kansas "evidence of loss of enjoyment of life is definitely
admissible and proper for the jury's consideration as it relates to
disability and pain and suffering, and may certainly be argued by
counsel to the jury," but not as a separate element of damages. The
term "hedonic" has also been used.7 5
Kentucky
In Kentucky, "[t]his court recognizes that there is measurable value
to one's life other than his or her earning capacity. However, this value
is already recoverable in the recognized category of mental suffering.
There is no need to allow for the recoupment of hedonic damages as a
separate category of loss. ' '7°6  The terms "parasitic, 70 7 as well as
"hedonic 7 0 have been employed.
Louisiana
In Louisiana, "[t]he types of damages awarded in a personal injury
action consist of general and special damages. General damages, are
speculative in nature and, thus, incapable of being fixed with any
mathematical certainty. They include pain and suffering, physical
impairment and disability, and loss of enjoyment of life. ' ' 7°  Recovery
may be had when there is proof that "the injured party's lifestyle was
detrimentally altered or that the injured party was forced to give up
702. Pexa v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 686 N.W.2d 150, 158 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted);
see also Estate of Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 347 (Iowa 2005)
("Mental pain and suffering includes mental anguish, anxiety, embarrassment, loss of
enjoyment of life, a feeling of uselessness, or other emotional distress."); Poyzer v. McGraw,
360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985) (concluding that loss of enjoyment of life is a factor to be
considered as a part of future pain and suffering, but not a separate element of damages).
703. Warner v. Moore, No. 5-960/05-0403, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 140, at *5 (Iowa Ct.
App. Feb. 15, 2006), affd, 713 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006).
704. Gregory v. Carey, 791 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Kan. 1990).
705. Id. at 1335.
706. Adams v. Miller, 908 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Ky. 1995).
707. Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Ky. 1996).
708. Adams, 908 S.W.2d at 116.
709. Thibeaux v. Trotter, 883 So. 2d 1128, 1130 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
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activities because of his injury. ' 710  The terms "hedonic, 71 or
"parasitic, 712 have also been used.
Maine
In Maine, the supreme court observed: "We have long allowed
recovery for 'mental anguish and loss of enjoyment of life' in most tort
actions. ' ' 7  In affirming a jury's damage award, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine noted long ago that "[t]he total loss of the left hand by a
boy 10 years of age takes a great deal of usefulness and enjoyment out
of his prospective life. The loss of earning power is by no means the
extent of the injury. 7 4  The term "parasitic" has at times been
employed."5
Maryland
In Maryland, "the 'loss of enjoyment of life' includes the
'impairment of the capacity to enjoy life, or to enjoy a particular
avocation' and, in some cases, it constitutes a proper, separate element
of damages."7 6 It has been held that loss of enjoyment of life, or a loss
characterized by some closely synonymous phrase, may not be claimed
as a separate element of damages, but may be treated as a factor in
determining the extent of the injuries and damages in general or for pain
and suffering.71 7 On the other hand, the state followed the view that loss
of enjoyment of life is a proper, separate element of damages. 718 The
term "parasitic" has also been used.719
Massachusetts
In Massachusetts it has been held that:
710. Simms v. Progressive Ins. Co., 883 So. 2d 473, 488 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
711. Poche v. Allstate Ins. Co., 900 So. 2d 55, 63 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
712. Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Shreveport, 792 So. 2d 33, 50 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
713. Curtis v. Porter, 784 A.2d 18, 26 (Me. 2001).
714. Haynes v. Waterville & 0. St. Ry., 64 A. 614, 615 (Me. 1906).
715. Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 804 (Me. 1986).
716. Smallwood v. Bradford, 720 A.2d 586, 592 (Md. 1998).
717. See generally id.
718. See generally Culley v. Pa. R.R., 244 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Del. 1965) (applying
Maryland law); Smallwood, 720 A.2d at 592 (stating that in some cases, loss of enjoyment of
life may constitute "a separate, proper element of damages"); McCalister v. Carl, 197 A.2d
140 (Md. Ct. App. 1964).
719. Hoffman v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 295 (Md. 2005).
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Where plaintiffs have suffered directly inflicted personal
injuries as a result of a defendant's negligence, courts
have not been reluctant to allow recovery for emotional
distress, occurring contemporaneously with those
personal injuries, as an additional element of damages.
In these cases, recovery for emotional distress was
allowed as a claim "parasitic" to the "host" claim of
damages for negligently inflicted physical injuries.7 21
The phrase "loss of enjoyment of life" has also been employed.2
Michigan
In Michigan, "compensation for a purely mental component of
damages where [a] defendant negligently inflicts an immediate physical
injury has always been awarded as 'parasitic damages.' ' 722 The phrase
"loss of natural enjoyments of life" has also been used.723
Minnesota
Minnesota follows the view that the effect of "injuries on the
enjoyment of the amenities of life" is a proper measurement of
damages. 724  The term "parasitic" is also used to describe those
damages.2 5
Mississippi
In Mississippi, "loss of enjoyment of life should be fully
compensated and should be considered on its own merits as a separate
element of damages, not as a part of one's pain and suffering. 726 The
term "parasitic" has also been recognized as descriptive of those
damages.727
720. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Mass. 1982) (citations omitted).
721. Glicklich v. Spievack, 452 N.E.2d 287, 291 n.3 (Mass. Ct. App. 1983).
722. Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Mich. 1970) (emphasis omitted).
723. Weymers v. Khera, 563 N.W.2d 647, 656 (Mich. 1997).
724. Anunti v. Payette, 268 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn. 1978).
725. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 n.7 (Minn. 1983).
726. Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374, 380 (Miss. 2001).
727. Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 150 So. 2d 154, 157 (Miss. 1963).
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Missouri
In Missouri, "lost enjoyment of life is a compensable element of
general damages in a personal injury case. 71
Montana
In Montana, "hedonic" damages, including damages for loss of
enjoyment of life are allowed in personal injury cases. 729 There, it has
been noted that "[d]amages for emotional distress with a host cause of
action, known as 'parasitic' damages, have been recovered even in cases
where the independent action giving rise to emotional distress damages
is trivial.
7 1
Nebraska
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has held that "[floss of enjoyment
of life may, in a particular case flow from a disability and be simply a
part thereof, and where the evidence supports it, may be argued to the
jury., 731 The court has also referred to a claim for "parasitic damages,
which are damages occasioned by anxiety specifically due to a
reasonable fear of future harm attributable to a physical injury caused
by the negligence of another.,
732
Nevada
The Nevada Supreme Court stated:
We agree with California and those jurisdictions
permitting plaintiffs to seek compensation for hedonic
loss [including loss of enjoyment of life] as an element of
the general award for pain and suffering. Like
California, Nevada does not restrict a plaintiff's attorney
from arguing hedonic damages. Moreover, by including
hedonic losses as a component of pain and suffering, we
perceive no problem of confusion or duplication of
733awards by the jury.
728. Schumann v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 912 S.W.2d 548, 554 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995).
729. Hunt v. K-Mart Corp., 981 P.2d 275, 277 (Mont. 1999).
730. Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 418 (Mont. 1995).
731. Swiler v. Baker's Super Mrkt., Inc., 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Neb. 1979).
732. Hamilton v. Nestor, 659 N.W.2d 321, 324-25 (Neb. 2003).
733. Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 64 (Nev. 2004).
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New Hampshire
In New Hampshire, the state supreme court, as to loss of enjoyment
of life or hedonic damages, held that the question whether
such losses exist is beyond dispute. "The capacity to
enjoy life . . . is unquestionably an attribute of an
ordinary healthy individual. The loss of that capacity as
a result of another's negligent act is at least as serious an
impairment as the permanent destruction of a physical
function, which has always been treated as a
compensable item under traditional tort principles."7"
New Jersey
The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that "[i]n the usual case
such elements of damage [loss of enjoyment of life] are readily included
in the ambit of the broad damages charge taking into account pain,
suffering, disability, and impairment., 735 The term "hedonic damages"
is also used in the state for this concept.736
New Mexico
In New Mexico it has been held that "tort remedy is theoretically
designed to compensate for lost wages, lost earning capacity, medical
expenses, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
expenses or losses proximately caused by the wrongdoer. 73 7 Loss of
enjoyment of life has also been referred to as "hedonic damages.",738
New York
In New York, loss of enjoyment of life is a recognized measure of
damages in a negligence action.7 9 However, "[f]oss of enjoyment of life
is not a separate element of damages deserving a distinct award, but is
only a factor to be considered by the jury in assessing damages for
734. Bennett v. Lembo, 761 A.2d 494, 498 (N.H. 2000) (quoting McDougald v. Garber,
536 N.E.2d 372, 377 (N.Y. 1989) (Titone, J., dissenting)).
735. Lombardo v. Hoag, 634 A.2d 550, 562 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
736. Smith v. Whitaker, 734 A.2d 243,246 (N.J. 1999).
737. Gutierrez v. City of Albuquerque, 964 P.2d 807, 811 (N.M. 1998).
738. Sena v. N.M. State Police, 892 P.2d 604, 610 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
739. Hotaling v. CSX Transp., 773 N.Y.S.2d 755, 762 (App. Div. 2004) (Cardona, J.,
dissenting).
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conscious pain and suffering, thereby requiring a demonstration that
plaintiffs have suffered some physical injury or pain.""74
North Carolina
Loss of enjoyment of life appears to be a recognized element of
damages in a negligence action in North Carolina.4 While "severe
emotional distress" is an essential element of a claim for infliction of
emotional distress, that is not the same as the emotional suffering that
"may be a part of a claim seeking damages for general pain and
suffering., 742  "Defendant's proposition that the psychological
component of damages for "pain and suffering" must meet the same
standard as the element of "severe emotional distress" that is part of
claims for infliction of emotional distress," is not supported.7 3
North Dakota
In North Dakota, it is proper for a plaintiff to argue "loss of
enjoyment of life as a component of pain, discomfort, mental anguish,
and impairment of health, mind, or person. ' 74
Ohio
In a negligence action in Ohio, compensatory damages include
actual losses, including past and future medical bills, pain and suffering,
disabilities or disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment of life.745 The term
"hedonic damages" has also been used 746 as has "parasitic" damages.7 47
Oklahoma
In affirming a jury award, the Oklahoma Supreme Court suggested
that a jury may hear evidence concerning all long-term effects a
personal injury will have on an individual and also that a jury need not
enumerate what amounts are compensating particularized "pain and
740. Golden v. Manhasset Condo., 770 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (App. Div. 2003) (citations
omitted).
741. Jones v. Asheville Radiological Group, P.A., 518 S.E.2d 528, 530 (N.C. Ct. App.
1999).
742. Iadanza v. Harper, 611 S.E.2d 217,219 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
743. Id.
744. First Trust Co. of N.D. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 5, 13-
14 (N.D. 1988).
745. Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 481-82 (Ohio 1992).
746. Lewis v. Alfa Laval Separation, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 426, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
747. Vandiver v. Morgan Adhesive Co., 710 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
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suffering.""7 ' It has recognized the concept of loss of enjoyment of life
as an element of damages in a bystander case.749
Oregon
Oregon appears to liberally allow recovery for parasitic mental
distress when it naturally flows from the injury caused by the underlying
tort.7
Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, "loss of the pleasures and enjoyments of life" and
"loss of feeling of well-being," are more properly "seen as subdivisions
of pain and suffering and do not set forth separate categories of
damages recognized by law which may be tabulated in addition to
damages awarded for pain and suffering. '
Rhode Island
In Rhode Island:
[W]hen a person suffers damages because of another's
intentional tortious acts, that person is entitled to recover
any and all losses caused by the tortfeasor's misconduct,
including, in certain circumstances, punitive damages,
compensatory damages, damages attributable to
emotional distress pain, and suffering, scarring or other
permanent injury, loss of enjoyment of life or reduced
life expectancy, humiliation, loss of consortium, and any
other consequential damages and monetary relief
potentially available to victims of tortious misconduct.752
South Carolina
In South Carolina:
[A]n award for the diminishment of pleasure resulting
from the loss of use of one of the senses, or for a
paraplegic's loss of the ability to participate in certain
748. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Hawes, 424 P.2d 6, 15 (Okla. 1967).
749. Kraszewski v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Okla., Inc., 916 P.2d 241, 247 n.17 (Okla. 1996).
750. Fehely v. Senders, 135 P.2d 283, 285 (Or. 1943).
751. Carpinet v. Mitchell, 853 A.2d 366, 369 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
752. Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830, 849 (R.I. 1997).
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physical activities, falls under the rubric of hedonic
damages. In our view, 'loss of enjoyment of life'
damages compensate the individual not only for the
subjective knowledge that one can no longer enjoy all of
life's pursuits, but also for the objective loss of the ability
to engage in these activities.753
South Dakota
The right to recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life is
statutorily recognized in South Dakota."' The Supreme Court of South
Dakota has also held that an instruction stating that the jury could
award the plaintiff damages for "[t]he pain and suffering, mental
anguish, and loss of capacity of the enjoyment of life experienced in the
past and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future as a result of
755the injury" was proper.
Tennessee
In Tennessee, it has been held that "[d]amages for loss of enjoyment
of life compensate the injured person for the limitations placed on his or
her ability to enjoy the pleasures and amenities of life. 756
Texas
In Texas, loss of enjoyment of life is sometimes referred to as
"physical impairment."
To receive damages for physical impairment, the injured
party must prove that the effect of his physical
impairment extends beyond any impediment to his
earning capacity and beyond any pain and suffering, to
the extent that it produces a separate and distinct loss
that is substantial and for which he should be
compensated. Therefore, even proof that one is entitled
to compensatory damages for pain and suffering, or for
lost wages, does not automatically entitle one to
compensation for physical impairment.
753. Boan v. Blackwell, 541 S.E.2d 242,245 (S.C. 2001).
754. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1-13.1 (2004).
755. Gilkyson v. Wheelchair Express, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 1, 6 (S.D. 1998).
756. Overstreet v. Shoney's, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 715-16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
757. Dawson v. Briggs, 107 S.W.3d 739,752 (Tex. App. 2003) (citation omitted).
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The term "hedonic damages" has also been used in the state to describe
loss of enjoyment of life. 758
Utah
In Utah, it has been held that:
The pain and suffering for which damages are
recoverable in a personal injury action include not only
physical pain but also mental pain or anguish, that is, the
mental reaction to that pain and to the possible
consequences of the physical injury. Included in mental
pain and suffering is the diminished enjoyment of life, as
well as the humiliation and embarrassment resulting
from permanent scars and disability.759
Vermont
In Vermont, damages for loss of enjoyment of life are allowed in a
negligence action that results in bodily injury.76° The term "parasitic"
damages has also been used. 6
Virginia
In Virginia, it has been held that "mental anguish may be inferred in
those instances where such would be the natural and probable
consequence of bodily injury and that it is error in such a situation to
refuse to instruct the jury that it may consider mental anguish as an
element of damages., 762  However, loss of enjoyment of life is not a
"separately compensable element of damages., 763
Washington
In Washington, "[a] plaintiff may recover for loss of enjoyment of
life as a distinct item of damages in a personal injury action that is not a
survival action.' ' 76  A damages instruction referring to injuries that
758. Patlyek v. Brittain, 149 S.W.3d 781, 785 (Tex. App. 2004).
759. Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980).
760. Debus v. Grand Union Stores of Vt., 621 A.2d 1288, 1295 (Vt. 1993) (Allen, C.J.,
dissenting).
761. Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 432 (Vt. 1978).
762. Bruce v. Madden, 160 S.E.2d 137, 140 (Va. 1968).
763. Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677 (Va. 1990).
764. Otani v. Broudy, 59 P.3d 126, 128 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
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"disable the plaintiff, if at all, from enjoying the natural and ordinary
uses of a healthy mind and body" was held proper.765 The term
"parasitic damage[s]" has also been used to describe the concept. 766
West Virginia
In West Virginia, it has been held that loss of enjoyment of life is a
proper element of damages in a personal injury action. 767 The court has
held: "We believe that our definition of a permanent injury which
includes 'those future effects of an injury which have reduced the
capability of an individual to function as a whole man' . . . is the
appropriate area for considering the element of the loss of enjoyment of
life. ,
,761
Wisconsin
Wisconsin follows the view that loss of enjoyment of life is a proper,
separate element of damages.769 "Loss of enjoyment of life includes
those damages that result from one's 'diminished capacity for enjoying
life' or due to the 'deprivations of the pleasures of life.'
' 770
Wyoming
Wyoming follows the view that "[l]oss of enjoyment of life is a
compensable damage that the fact finder may either make a separate
award for, or take into consideration when arriving at the total general
damages. '77 The term "parasitic" damages has also been employed.
765. Reed v. Jamieson Inv. Co., 10 P.2d 977, 978 (Wash. 1932).
766. Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Wash. 1976).
767. Henry v. Benyo, 506 S.E.2d 615, 622 (W. Va. 1998).
768. Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 437 (W. Va. 1982) (citation omitted).
769. Sawyer v. Midelfort, 595 N.W.2d 423, 437 (Wis. 1999).
770. Id. at 437 (quoting Bassett v. Milwaukee N. Ry. Co., 170 N.W. 944 (Wis. 1919)).
771. Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Murray, 27 P.3d 266, 269 (Wyo. 2001).
772. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 200 (Wyo. 1986).
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